When a hidden service is created via tor-control, /var/lib/tor/bitcoin-service/hostname is not created (credits to @vasild).

But this new text reads:

Given the above configuration ...

and just a few lines above it says how to configure the hidden service via torrc:

HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/bitcoin-service/
HiddenServicePort 8333 127.0.0.1:8333
HiddenServicePort 18333 127.0.0.1:18333

So it is ok to mention /var/lib/tor/bitcoin-service/hostname.

I would suggest to drop the last line HiddenServicePort 18333 127.0.0.1:18333 because it is for testnet and also to add HiddenServiceVersion 3 so that the tor daemon creates a v3 service:

HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/bitcoin-service/
HiddenServiceVersion 3
HiddenServicePort 8333 127.0.0.1:8333

Does bitcoind configure its onion service via torrc?

#19961 (comment)
Even given the above configuration, you make a point to consider we are talking about the operation of the parameter.

If the hidden service is created via tor-control and you need to discover it please check you debug.log for lines similar to the following, it should automatically be added as AddLocal

2020-08-11T13:42:26Z tor: Got service ID {random_service}, advertising service {random_service}.onion:8333
2020-08-11T13:42:26Z AddLocal({random_service}.onion:8333,4)

Does this mean onlynet=ipv4 onion=0 does not disable onion connections? This seems confusing.

-noonion or onion=0 is always needed to explicitly disable outbound onion access, as described in the -proxy and onion section?

(I missed this last commit, glad you asked for the clarification. I ACKd 42e6180)

Does this mean onlynet=ipv4 onion=0 does not disable onion connections? This seems confusing.

Yes and No , a default fallback outbound pure .onion not IP name resolving proxy just for onion address will be created by default even without -proxy definition if ̶o̶n̶i̶o̶n̶!̶=̶0̶ ̶ ̶ to be precise if -onion== "" and regardless of -onlynet= if -listenonion=1 ( default) if the inbound Tor onion service could be created successfully by the ever polling torcontroller in bitcoind (What creates your advertised Tor address created by bitcoind independent of what onion services defined in torrc ) The idea was, (i guess) if that is successfully to create also an outbound proxy to reach Tor onion nodes.

So suppose u have a running bitcoind daemon and edit at some point just torrc to allow the control port or start the Tor service, bitcoind does if -listeonion=1 permanent poll for such changes and instantly creates on the fly an inbound onion address and an outbound proxy. So if u want to be sure that the outbound default proxy is disabled since u want i.e. just ipv4 set -noonion since -onlynet=ipv4 wont do that and please note the inbound Tor is created regardless of that if -listenonion=1 what is the default.

If that is a desired way to act depends, fixes or changes to that are not merged yet and at least that's the way it is and its now documented so that users are aware of that.

@jonatack did edit the comment text to be more precise, so please review ur thumbs up ;-)

Dropping this commit.

@jonatack i am almost certain there will be an rc5 and some backport's ping @luke-jr, so no time to rush here and have another release that is not precise in what the options and Tor-controller does.

Do u need a detailed descriiption and log to show the real behavior?

@Rspigler tyi, only explicit -nonion or -onion=0 can prevent outbound onion connections, solely -onllynet=pv4/ipv6 is not sufficient to disable that.

that what is said in the PR now dropped.

Please use -noonion or -onion=0 if you want to be sure to have no
outbound onion connections over the default proxy or your defined proxy..

654dc04#diff-a33b1b15efbc14c65460ef7a883b530ca52144a4f06642e4a188351d959f9894R42

So please be so kind to hint what was misunderstanding in this wording that u came to the conclusion that -onion=0 would not prevent all outbound onion connections so that we can adapt that in followup PR

@Saibato I might propose the dropped commits, including yours, in a new PR and make some of the changes suggested by @vasild.

@Saibato thanks for the explanation/edits. Although now dropped, would ACK in a new PR

@Saibato thanks for the explanation/edits. Although now dropped, would ACK in a new PR

Done in #20757, please add suggestions or ACKs there.

Huh! :-( This is indeed a strange behavior, but I think something like the following belongs to bitcoind -help rather than doc/tor.md:

If -onlynet= is used with other networks and -onlynet=onion is not among them, but -onion= or -proxy is provided then outbound onion connections will still be made! Use -noonion or -onion=0 to disable outbound onion connections in this case.

Given that this is a guide on how to enable and configure Tor, not how to disable it, I would suggest to drop the last part and leave it to just:

-onlynet=onion  Make outgoing connections only to .onion addresses. Incoming
	        connections are not affected by this option.

Dropped the commit completely.

@vasild

-onlynet=onion Make outgoing connections only to .onion addresses. Incoming
connections are not affected by this option.

I guess its hard to grasp and i was 🤦‍♀️ too when i stumbled about, but what we believed the code does from src comments or doc and almost any post i am aware about bitcoin and Tor and social media is
not what really happens when assuming option do what they say and u follow the docs.

only -noonion or -onion=0 can prevent that, onlynet= is buggy since #7553 (2016)
Similar but also fact is that although seeders are not called directly in IP if the DNS returns are random that is not the case when bootstrap over Tor here the seeders have full control and can be sure ( or ther MITM'S or proxys) that the first entry in the DNS return a exit gets will be called since socks5 works that way all seeders ( or what they want to be called ) will be called in a distinct sequence over exist and then ADDR gossip that is highly disturbing give the timing correlation bogus Tor relays and exits can do.
Tacking in account that all that happens and wrong configured at bootstrap at least once, pure Tor nodes are quite f***ed if they not aware.

Brought back the commits and added also to the -onlynet help in #20757, please add suggestions or ACKs there.