[ Upstream commit 7962ef1 ]

In 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in
evsel->priv") it only was freeing if strcmp(evsel->tp_format->system,
"syscalls") returned zero, while the corresponding initialization of
evsel->priv was being performed if it was _not_ zero, i.e. if the tp
system wasn't 'syscalls'.

Just stop looking for that and free it if evsel->priv was set, which
should be equivalent.

Also use the pre-existing evsel_trace__delete() function.

This resolves these leaks, detected with:

  $ make EXTRA_CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" BUILD_BPF_SKEL=1 CORESIGHT=1 O=/tmp/build/perf-tools-next -C tools/perf install-bin

  =================================================================
  ==481565==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097)
      #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966)
      #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307
      #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333
      #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458
      #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480
      #6 0x540e8b in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3212
      torvalds#7 0x540e8b in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891
      torvalds#8 0x540e8b in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156
      torvalds#9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323
      torvalds#10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377
      torvalds#11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421
      torvalds#12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537
      torvalds#13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097)
      #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966)
      #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307
      #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333
      #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458
      #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480
      #6 0x540dd1 in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3205
      torvalds#7 0x540dd1 in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891
      torvalds#8 0x540dd1 in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156
      torvalds#9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323
      torvalds#10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377
      torvalds#11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421
      torvalds#12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537
      torvalds#13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)

  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 80 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
  [root@quaco ~]#

With this we plug all leaks with "perf trace sleep 1".

Fixes: 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in evsel->priv")
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230719202951.534582-5-acme@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ef23cb5 ]

While debugging a segfault on 'perf lock contention' without an
available perf.data file I noticed that it was basically calling:

	perf_session__delete(ERR_PTR(-1))

Resulting in:

  (gdb) run lock contention
  Starting program: /root/bin/perf lock contention
  [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
  Using host libthread_db library "/lib64/libthread_db.so.1".
  failed to open perf.data: No such file or directory  (try 'perf record' first)
  Initializing perf session failed

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858
  2858		if (!session->auxtrace)
  (gdb) p session
  $1 = (struct perf_session *) 0xffffffffffffffff
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858
  #1  0x000000000057bb4d in perf_session__delete (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/session.c:300
  #2  0x000000000047c421 in __cmd_contention (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2161
  #3  0x000000000047dc95 in cmd_lock (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2604
  #4  0x0000000000501466 in run_builtin (p=0xe597a8 <commands+552>, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:322
  #5  0x00000000005016d5 in handle_internal_command (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:375
  #6  0x0000000000501824 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe02c, argv=0x7fffffffe020) at perf.c:419
  torvalds#7  0x0000000000501b11 in main (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:535
  (gdb)

So just set it to NULL after using PTR_ERR(session) to decode the error
as perf_session__delete(NULL) is supported.

The same problem was found in 'perf top' after an audit of all
perf_session__new() failure handling.

Fixes: 6ef81c5 ("perf session: Return error code for perf_session__new() function on failure")
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jeremie Galarneau <jeremie.galarneau@efficios.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Mamatha Inamdar <mamatha4@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Mukesh Ojha <mojha@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Shawn Landden <shawn@git.icu>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tzvetomir Stoyanov <tstoyanov@vmware.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZN4Q2rxxsL08A8rd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit abaf1e0 ]

While debugging a segfault on 'perf lock contention' without an
available perf.data file I noticed that it was basically calling:

	perf_session__delete(ERR_PTR(-1))

Resulting in:

  (gdb) run lock contention
  Starting program: /root/bin/perf lock contention
  [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
  Using host libthread_db library "/lib64/libthread_db.so.1".
  failed to open perf.data: No such file or directory  (try 'perf record' first)
  Initializing perf session failed

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858
  2858		if (!session->auxtrace)
  (gdb) p session
  $1 = (struct perf_session *) 0xffffffffffffffff
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858
  #1  0x000000000057bb4d in perf_session__delete (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/session.c:300
  #2  0x000000000047c421 in __cmd_contention (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2161
  #3  0x000000000047dc95 in cmd_lock (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2604
  #4  0x0000000000501466 in run_builtin (p=0xe597a8 <commands+552>, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:322
  #5  0x00000000005016d5 in handle_internal_command (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:375
  #6  0x0000000000501824 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe02c, argv=0x7fffffffe020) at perf.c:419
  torvalds#7  0x0000000000501b11 in main (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:535
  (gdb)

So just set it to NULL after using PTR_ERR(session) to decode the error
as perf_session__delete(NULL) is supported.

Fixes: eef4fee ("perf lock: Dynamically allocate lockhash_table")
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Mamatha Inamdar <mamatha4@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <zwisler@chromium.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZN4R1AYfsD2J8lRs@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 82ba0ff ]

We should not call trace_handshake_cmd_done_err() if socket lookup has failed.

Also we should call trace_handshake_cmd_done_err() before releasing the file,
otherwise dereferencing sock->sk can return garbage.

This also reverts 7afc6d0 ("net/handshake: Fix uninitialized local variable")

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfff800000000003
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000005
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[dfff800000000003] address between user and kernel address ranges
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 5986 Comm: syz-executor292 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-gfe4469582053 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023
pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : handshake_nl_done_doit+0x198/0x9c8 net/handshake/netlink.c:193
lr : handshake_nl_done_doit+0x180/0x9c8
sp : ffff800096e37180
x29: ffff800096e37200 x28: 1ffff00012dc6e34 x27: dfff800000000000
x26: ffff800096e373d0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000ffffffa8
x23: ffff800096e373f0 x22: 1ffff00012dc6e38 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: ffff800096e371c0 x19: 0000000000000018 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff800080516cc4 x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 1fffe0001b14aa3b x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000003
x8 : 0000000000000003 x7 : ffff800080afe47c x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff800080a88078
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 00000000ffffffa8 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
handshake_nl_done_doit+0x198/0x9c8 net/handshake/netlink.c:193
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:970 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1050 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x96c/0xc50 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1067
netlink_rcv_skb+0x214/0x3c4 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2549
genl_rcv+0x38/0x50 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1078
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x660/0x8d4 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365
netlink_sendmsg+0x834/0xb18 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1914
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:725 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:748 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x56c/0x840 net/socket.c:2494
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2548 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x26c/0x33c net/socket.c:2577
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2586 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline]
__arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x80/0x94 net/socket.c:2584
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51
el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155
el0_svc+0x58/0x16c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:678
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:696
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591
Code: 12800108 b90043e8 910062b3 d343fe68 (387b6908)

Fixes: 3b3009e ("net/handshake: Create a NETLINK service for handling handshake requests")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit a96a44a ]

'./test_progs -t test_local_storage' reported a splat:

[   27.137569] =============================
[   27.138122] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
[   27.138650] 6.5.0-03980-gd11ae1b16b0a torvalds#247 Tainted: G           O
[   27.139542] -----------------------------
[   27.140106] test_progs/1729 is trying to lock:
[   27.140713] ffff8883ef047b88 (stock_lock){-.-.}-{3:3}, at: local_lock_acquire+0x9/0x130
[   27.141834] other info that might help us debug this:
[   27.142437] context-{5:5}
[   27.142856] 2 locks held by test_progs/1729:
[   27.143352]  #0: ffffffff84bcd9c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x4/0x40
[   27.144492]  #1: ffff888107deb2c0 (&storage->lock){..-.}-{2:2}, at: bpf_local_storage_update+0x39e/0x8e0
[   27.145855] stack backtrace:
[   27.146274] CPU: 0 PID: 1729 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G           O       6.5.0-03980-gd11ae1b16b0a torvalds#247
[   27.147550] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   27.149127] Call Trace:
[   27.149490]  <TASK>
[   27.149867]  dump_stack_lvl+0x130/0x1d0
[   27.152609]  dump_stack+0x14/0x20
[   27.153131]  __lock_acquire+0x1657/0x2220
[   27.153677]  lock_acquire+0x1b8/0x510
[   27.157908]  local_lock_acquire+0x29/0x130
[   27.159048]  obj_cgroup_charge+0xf4/0x3c0
[   27.160794]  slab_pre_alloc_hook+0x28e/0x2b0
[   27.161931]  __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x51/0x210
[   27.163557]  __kmalloc+0xaa/0x210
[   27.164593]  bpf_map_kzalloc+0xbc/0x170
[   27.165147]  bpf_selem_alloc+0x130/0x510
[   27.166295]  bpf_local_storage_update+0x5aa/0x8e0
[   27.167042]  bpf_fd_sk_storage_update_elem+0xdb/0x1a0
[   27.169199]  bpf_map_update_value+0x415/0x4f0
[   27.169871]  map_update_elem+0x413/0x550
[   27.170330]  __sys_bpf+0x5e9/0x640
[   27.174065]  __x64_sys_bpf+0x80/0x90
[   27.174568]  do_syscall_64+0x48/0xa0
[   27.175201]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
[   27.175932] RIP: 0033:0x7effb40e41ad
[   27.176357] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d8
[   27.179028] RSP: 002b:00007ffe64c21fc8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
[   27.180088] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe64c22768 RCX: 00007effb40e41ad
[   27.181082] RDX: 0000000000000020 RSI: 00007ffe64c22008 RDI: 0000000000000002
[   27.182030] RBP: 00007ffe64c21ff0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffe64c22788
[   27.183038] R10: 0000000000000064 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000
[   27.184006] R13: 00007ffe64c22788 R14: 00007effb42a1000 R15: 0000000000000000
[   27.184958]  </TASK>

It complains about acquiring a local_lock while holding a raw_spin_lock.
It means it should not allocate memory while holding a raw_spin_lock
since it is not safe for RT.

raw_spin_lock is needed because bpf_local_storage supports tracing
context. In particular for task local storage, it is easy to
get a "current" task PTR_TO_BTF_ID in tracing bpf prog.
However, task (and cgroup) local storage has already been moved to
bpf mem allocator which can be used after raw_spin_lock.

The splat is for the sk storage. For sk (and inode) storage,
it has not been moved to bpf mem allocator. Using raw_spin_lock or not,
kzalloc(GFP_ATOMIC) could theoretically be unsafe in tracing context.
However, the local storage helper requires a verifier accepted
sk pointer (PTR_TO_BTF_ID), it is hypothetical if that (mean running
a bpf prog in a kzalloc unsafe context and also able to hold a verifier
accepted sk pointer) could happen.

This patch avoids kzalloc after raw_spin_lock to silent the splat.
There is an existing kzalloc before the raw_spin_lock. At that point,
a kzalloc is very likely required because a lookup has just been done
before. Thus, this patch always does the kzalloc before acquiring
the raw_spin_lock and remove the later kzalloc usage after the
raw_spin_lock. After this change, it will have a charge and then
uncharge during the syscall bpf_map_update_elem() code path.
This patch opts for simplicity and not continue the old
optimization to save one charge and uncharge.

This issue is dated back to the very first commit of bpf_sk_storage
which had been refactored multiple times to create task, inode, and
cgroup storage. This patch uses a Fixes tag with a more recent
commit that should be easier to do backport.

Fixes: b00fa38 ("bpf: Enable non-atomic allocations in local storage")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230901231129.578493-2-martin.lau@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit f4f8a78 ]

The opt_num field is controlled by user mode and is not currently
validated inside the kernel. An attacker can take advantage of this to
trigger an OOB read and potentially leak information.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88804bc64272 by task poc/6431

CPU: 1 PID: 6431 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4 #1
Call Trace:
 nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88
 nf_osf_find+0x186/0x2f0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:281
 nft_osf_eval+0x37f/0x590 net/netfilter/nft_osf.c:47
 expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:214
 nft_do_chain+0x2b0/0x1490 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:264
 nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x17c/0x1f0 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23
 [..]

Also add validation to genre, subtype and version fields.

Fixes: 11eeef4 ("netfilter: passive OS fingerprint xtables match")
Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang@infosec.exchange>
Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 9b5ba5c ]

Deliver audit log from __nf_tables_dump_rules(), table dereference at
the end of the table list loop might point to the list head, leading to
this crash.

[ 4137.407349] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000001f3c50
[ 4137.407357] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 4137.407359] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 4137.407360] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 4137.407363] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 4137.407365] CPU: 4 PID: 500177 Comm: nft Not tainted 6.5.0+ torvalds#277
[ 4137.407369] RIP: 0010:string+0x49/0xd0
[ 4137.407374] Code: ff 77 36 45 89 d1 31 f6 49 01 f9 66 45 85 d2 75 19 eb 1e 49 39 f8 76 02 88 07 48 83 c7 01 83 c6 01 48 83 c2 01 4c 39 cf 74 07 <0f> b6 02 84 c0 75 e2 4c 89 c2 e9 58 e5 ff ff 48 c7 c0 0e b2 ff 81
[ 4137.407377] RSP: 0018:ffff8881179737f0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 4137.407379] RAX: 00000000001f2c50 RBX: ffff888117973848 RCX: ffff0a00ffffff04
[ 4137.407380] RDX: 00000000001f3c50 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 4137.407381] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffffff
[ 4137.407383] R10: ffffffffffffffff R11: ffff88813584d200 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 4137.407384] R13: ffffffffa15cf709 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffa15cf709
[ 4137.407385] FS:  00007fcfc18bb580(0000) GS:ffff88840e700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 4137.407387] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 4137.407388] CR2: 00000000001f3c50 CR3: 00000001055b2001 CR4: 00000000001706e0
[ 4137.407390] Call Trace:
[ 4137.407392]  <TASK>
[ 4137.407393]  ? __die+0x1b/0x60
[ 4137.407397]  ? page_fault_oops+0x6b/0xa0
[ 4137.407399]  ? exc_page_fault+0x60/0x120
[ 4137.407403]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 4137.407408]  ? string+0x49/0xd0
[ 4137.407410]  vsnprintf+0x257/0x4f0
[ 4137.407414]  kvasprintf+0x3e/0xb0
[ 4137.407417]  kasprintf+0x3e/0x50
[ 4137.407419]  nf_tables_dump_rules+0x1c0/0x360 [nf_tables]
[ 4137.407439]  ? __alloc_skb+0xc3/0x170
[ 4137.407442]  netlink_dump+0x170/0x330
[ 4137.407447]  __netlink_dump_start+0x227/0x300
[ 4137.407449]  nf_tables_getrule+0x205/0x390 [nf_tables]

Deliver audit log only once at the end of the rule dump+reset for
consistency with the set dump+reset.

Ensure audit reset access to table under rcu read side lock. The table
list iteration holds rcu read lock side, but recent audit code
dereferences table object out of the rcu read lock side.

Fixes: ea078ae ("netfilter: nf_tables: Audit log rule reset")
Fixes: 7e9be11 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Audit log setelem reset")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 768d612 upstream.

Yikebaer reported an issue:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_es_insert_extent+0xc68/0xcb0
fs/ext4/extents_status.c:894
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888112ecc1a4 by task syz-executor/8438

CPU: 1 PID: 8438 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5 #1
Call Trace:
 [...]
 kasan_report+0xba/0xf0 mm/kasan/report.c:588
 ext4_es_insert_extent+0xc68/0xcb0 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:894
 ext4_map_blocks+0x92a/0x16f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:680
 ext4_alloc_file_blocks.isra.0+0x2df/0xb70 fs/ext4/extents.c:4462
 ext4_zero_range fs/ext4/extents.c:4622 [inline]
 ext4_fallocate+0x251c/0x3ce0 fs/ext4/extents.c:4721
 [...]

Allocated by task 8438:
 [...]
 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:693 [inline]
 __es_alloc_extent fs/ext4/extents_status.c:469 [inline]
 ext4_es_insert_extent+0x672/0xcb0 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:873
 ext4_map_blocks+0x92a/0x16f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:680
 ext4_alloc_file_blocks.isra.0+0x2df/0xb70 fs/ext4/extents.c:4462
 ext4_zero_range fs/ext4/extents.c:4622 [inline]
 ext4_fallocate+0x251c/0x3ce0 fs/ext4/extents.c:4721
 [...]

Freed by task 8438:
 [...]
 kmem_cache_free+0xec/0x490 mm/slub.c:3823
 ext4_es_try_to_merge_right fs/ext4/extents_status.c:593 [inline]
 __es_insert_extent+0x9f4/0x1440 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:802
 ext4_es_insert_extent+0x2ca/0xcb0 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:882
 ext4_map_blocks+0x92a/0x16f0 fs/ext4/inode.c:680
 ext4_alloc_file_blocks.isra.0+0x2df/0xb70 fs/ext4/extents.c:4462
 ext4_zero_range fs/ext4/extents.c:4622 [inline]
 ext4_fallocate+0x251c/0x3ce0 fs/ext4/extents.c:4721
 [...]
==================================================================

The flow of issue triggering is as follows:
1. remove es
      raw es               es  removed  es1
|-------------------| -> |----|.......|------|

2. insert es
  es   insert   es1      merge with es  es1     merge with es and free es1
|----|.......|------| -> |------------|------| -> |-------------------|

es merges with newes, then merges with es1, frees es1, then determines
if es1->es_len is 0 and triggers a UAF.

The code flow is as follows:
ext4_es_insert_extent
  es1 = __es_alloc_extent(true);
  es2 = __es_alloc_extent(true);
  __es_remove_extent(inode, lblk, end, NULL, es1)
    __es_insert_extent(inode, &newes, es1) ---> insert es1 to es tree
  __es_insert_extent(inode, &newes, es2)
    ext4_es_try_to_merge_right
      ext4_es_free_extent(inode, es1) --->  es1 is freed
  if (es1 && !es1->es_len)
    // Trigger UAF by determining if es1 is used.

We determine whether es1 or es2 is used immediately after calling
__es_remove_extent() or __es_insert_extent() to avoid triggering a
UAF if es1 or es2 is freed.

Reported-by: Yikebaer Aizezi <yikebaer61@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CALcu4raD4h9coiyEBL4Bm0zjDwxC2CyPiTwsP3zFuhot6y9Beg@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: 2a69c45 ("ext4: using nofail preallocation in ext4_es_insert_extent()")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815070808.3377171-1-libaokun1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit a3ab557 upstream.

Let's flush the inode being aborted atomic operation to avoid stale dirty
inode during eviction in this call stack:

  f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync+0x22/0x40 [f2fs]
  f2fs_abort_atomic_write+0xc4/0xf0 [f2fs]
  f2fs_evict_inode+0x3f/0x690 [f2fs]
  ? sugov_start+0x140/0x140
  evict+0xc3/0x1c0
  evict_inodes+0x17b/0x210
  generic_shutdown_super+0x32/0x120
  kill_block_super+0x21/0x50
  deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x90
  cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160
  task_work_run+0x59/0x90
  do_exit+0x33b/0xa50
  do_group_exit+0x2d/0x80
  __x64_sys_exit_group+0x14/0x20
  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

This triggers f2fs_bug_on() in f2fs_evict_inode:
 f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE));

This fixes the syzbot report:

loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072
F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value
F2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint
F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 48b305e4
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:869!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 5014 Comm: syz-executor220 Not tainted 6.4.0-syzkaller-11479-g6cd06ab12d1a #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x172d/0x1e00 fs/f2fs/inode.c:869
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6a 06 00 00 8b 75 40 ba 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 6d ce 06 00 e9 aa fc ff ff e8 63 22 e2 fd <0f> 0b e8 5c 22 e2 fd 48 c7 c0 a8 3a 18 8d 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a6fa00 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff8880273b8000 RSI: ffffffff83a2bd0d RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: ffff888077db91b0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888029a3c000
R13: ffff888077db9660 R14: ffff888029a3c0b8 R15: ffff888077db9c50
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1909bb9000 CR3: 00000000276a9000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 evict+0x2ed/0x6b0 fs/inode.c:665
 dispose_list+0x117/0x1e0 fs/inode.c:698
 evict_inodes+0x345/0x440 fs/inode.c:748
 generic_shutdown_super+0xaf/0x480 fs/super.c:478
 kill_block_super+0x64/0xb0 fs/super.c:1417
 kill_f2fs_super+0x2af/0x3c0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4704
 deactivate_locked_super+0x98/0x160 fs/super.c:330
 deactivate_super+0xb1/0xd0 fs/super.c:361
 cleanup_mnt+0x2ae/0x3d0 fs/namespace.c:1254
 task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
 do_exit+0xa9a/0x29a0 kernel/exit.c:874
 do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1024
 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1035 [inline]
 __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1033 [inline]
 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3e/0x50 kernel/exit.c:1033
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f309be71a09
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f309be719df.
RSP: 002b:00007fff171df518 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f309bef7330 RCX: 00007f309be71a09
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffffffffffc0 R09: 00007f309bef1e40
R10: 0000000000010600 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f309bef7330
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x172d/0x1e00 fs/f2fs/inode.c:869
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6a 06 00 00 8b 75 40 ba 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 6d ce 06 00 e9 aa fc ff ff e8 63 22 e2 fd <0f> 0b e8 5c 22 e2 fd 48 c7 c0 a8 3a 18 8d 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a6fa00 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff8880273b8000 RSI: ffffffff83a2bd0d RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: ffff888077db91b0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888029a3c000
R13: ffff888077db9660 R14: ffff888029a3c0b8 R15: ffff888077db9c50
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1909bb9000 CR3: 00000000276a9000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e1246909d526a9d470fa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 5c13e23 upstream.

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.5.0-rc5-syzkaller-00353-gae545c3283dc #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor273/5027 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888077fe1fb0 (&fi->i_sem){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_down_write fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2133 [inline]
ffff888077fe1fb0 (&fi->i_sem){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_add_inline_entry+0x300/0x6f0 fs/f2fs/inline.c:644

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888077fe07c8 (&fi->i_xattr_sem){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_down_read fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2108 [inline]
ffff888077fe07c8 (&fi->i_xattr_sem){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_add_dentry+0x92/0x230 fs/f2fs/dir.c:783

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (&fi->i_xattr_sem){.+.+}-{3:3}:
       down_read+0x9c/0x470 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1520
       f2fs_down_read fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2108 [inline]
       f2fs_getxattr+0xb1e/0x12c0 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:532
       __f2fs_get_acl+0x5a/0x900 fs/f2fs/acl.c:179
       f2fs_acl_create fs/f2fs/acl.c:377 [inline]
       f2fs_init_acl+0x15c/0xb30 fs/f2fs/acl.c:420
       f2fs_init_inode_metadata+0x159/0x1290 fs/f2fs/dir.c:558
       f2fs_add_regular_entry+0x79e/0xb90 fs/f2fs/dir.c:740
       f2fs_add_dentry+0x1de/0x230 fs/f2fs/dir.c:788
       f2fs_do_add_link+0x190/0x280 fs/f2fs/dir.c:827
       f2fs_add_link fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3554 [inline]
       f2fs_mkdir+0x377/0x620 fs/f2fs/namei.c:781
       vfs_mkdir+0x532/0x7e0 fs/namei.c:4117
       do_mkdirat+0x2a9/0x330 fs/namei.c:4140
       __do_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:4160 [inline]
       __se_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:4158 [inline]
       __x64_sys_mkdir+0xf2/0x140 fs/namei.c:4158
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

-> #0 (&fi->i_sem){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
       validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
       __lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
       lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline]
       lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726
       down_write+0x93/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1573
       f2fs_down_write fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2133 [inline]
       f2fs_add_inline_entry+0x300/0x6f0 fs/f2fs/inline.c:644
       f2fs_add_dentry+0xa6/0x230 fs/f2fs/dir.c:784
       f2fs_do_add_link+0x190/0x280 fs/f2fs/dir.c:827
       f2fs_add_link fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3554 [inline]
       f2fs_mkdir+0x377/0x620 fs/f2fs/namei.c:781
       vfs_mkdir+0x532/0x7e0 fs/namei.c:4117
       ovl_do_mkdir fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h:196 [inline]
       ovl_mkdir_real+0xb5/0x370 fs/overlayfs/dir.c:146
       ovl_workdir_create+0x3de/0x820 fs/overlayfs/super.c:309
       ovl_make_workdir fs/overlayfs/super.c:711 [inline]
       ovl_get_workdir fs/overlayfs/super.c:864 [inline]
       ovl_fill_super+0xdab/0x6180 fs/overlayfs/super.c:1400
       vfs_get_super+0xf9/0x290 fs/super.c:1152
       vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x350 fs/super.c:1519
       do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3335 [inline]
       path_mount+0x1492/0x1ed0 fs/namespace.c:3662
       do_mount fs/namespace.c:3675 [inline]
       __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3884 [inline]
       __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3861 [inline]
       __x64_sys_mount+0x293/0x310 fs/namespace.c:3861
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  rlock(&fi->i_xattr_sem);
                               lock(&fi->i_sem);
                               lock(&fi->i_xattr_sem);
  lock(&fi->i_sem);

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e5600587fa9cbf8e3826@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 5eda1ad "f2fs: fix deadlock in i_xattr_sem and inode page lock"
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 6f0df8e upstream.

In the eviction recency check, we attempt to retrieve the memcg to which
the folio belonged when it was evicted, by the memcg id stored in the
shadow entry.  However, there is a chance that the retrieved memcg is not
the original memcg that has been killed, but a new one which happens to
have the same id.

This is a somewhat unfortunate, but acceptable and rare inaccuracy in the
heuristics.  However, if we retrieve this new memcg between its allocation
and when it is properly attached to the memcg hierarchy, we could run into
the following NULL pointer exception during the memcg hierarchy traversal
done in mem_cgroup_get_nr_swap_pages():

[ 155757.793456] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c0
[ 155757.807568] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 155757.818024] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 155757.828482] PGD 401f77067 P4D 401f77067 PUD 401f76067 PMD 0
[ 155757.839985] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 155757.887870] RIP: 0010:mem_cgroup_get_nr_swap_pages+0x3d/0xb0
[ 155757.899377] Code: 29 19 4a 02 48 39 f9 74 63 48 8b 97 c0 00 00 00 48 8b b7 58 02 00 00 48 2b b7 c0 01 00 00 48 39 f0 48 0f 4d c6 48 39 d1 74 42 <48> 8b b2 c0 00 00 00 48 8b ba 58 02 00 00 48 2b ba c0 01 00 00 48
[ 155757.937125] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002ecdfbc8 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 155757.947755] RAX: 00000000003a3b1c RBX: 000007ffffffffff RCX: ffff888280183000
[ 155757.962202] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0007ffffffffffff RDI: ffff888bbc2d1000
[ 155757.976648] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 000000000000000b R09: ffff888ad9cedba0
[ 155757.991094] R10: ffffea0039c07900 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: ffff888b23a7b000
[ 155758.005540] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888bbc2d1000 R15: 000007ffffc71354
[ 155758.019991] FS:  00007f6234c68640(0000) GS:ffff88903f9c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 155758.036356] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 155758.048023] CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000000a83eb8004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
[ 155758.062473] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 155758.076924] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 155758.091376] PKRU: 55555554
[ 155758.096957] Call Trace:
[ 155758.102016]  <TASK>
[ 155758.106502]  ? __die+0x78/0xc0
[ 155758.112793]  ? page_fault_oops+0x286/0x380
[ 155758.121175]  ? exc_page_fault+0x5d/0x110
[ 155758.129209]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 155758.137763]  ? mem_cgroup_get_nr_swap_pages+0x3d/0xb0
[ 155758.148060]  workingset_test_recent+0xda/0x1b0
[ 155758.157133]  workingset_refault+0xca/0x1e0
[ 155758.165508]  filemap_add_folio+0x4d/0x70
[ 155758.173538]  page_cache_ra_unbounded+0xed/0x190
[ 155758.182919]  page_cache_sync_ra+0xd6/0x1e0
[ 155758.191738]  filemap_read+0x68d/0xdf0
[ 155758.199495]  ? mlx5e_napi_poll+0x123/0x940
[ 155758.207981]  ? __napi_schedule+0x55/0x90
[ 155758.216095]  __x64_sys_pread64+0x1d6/0x2c0
[ 155758.224601]  do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
[ 155758.232058]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
[ 155758.242473] RIP: 0033:0x7f62c29153b5
[ 155758.249938] Code: e8 48 89 75 f0 89 7d f8 48 89 4d e0 e8 b4 e6 f7 ff 41 89 c0 4c 8b 55 e0 48 8b 55 e8 48 8b 75 f0 8b 7d f8 b8 11 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 33 44 89 c7 48 89 45 f8 e8 e7 e6 f7 ff 48 8b
[ 155758.288005] RSP: 002b:00007f6234c5ffd0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000011
[ 155758.303474] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f628c4e70c0 RCX: 00007f62c29153b5
[ 155758.318075] RDX: 000000000003c041 RSI: 00007f61d2986000 RDI: 0000000000000076
[ 155758.332678] RBP: 00007f6234c5fff0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000064d5230c
[ 155758.347452] R10: 000000000027d450 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000000000003c041
[ 155758.362044] R13: 00007f61d2986000 R14: 00007f629e11b060 R15: 000000000027d450
[ 155758.376661]  </TASK>

This patch fixes the issue by moving the memcg's id publication from the
alloc stage to online stage, ensuring that any memcg acquired via id must
be connected to the memcg tree.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230823225430.166925-1-nphamcs@gmail.com
Fixes: f78dfc7 ("workingset: fix confusion around eviction vs refault container")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Co-developed-by: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit e7f1326 upstream.

One of the CI runs triggered the following panic

  assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) && page->private, in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229!
  Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 0 PID: 923660 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #1
  pstate: 6140000 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
  lr : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
  sp : ffff800093213720
  x29: ffff800093213720 x28: ffff8000932138b4 x27: 000000000c280000
  x26: 00000001b5d00000 x25: 000000000c281000 x24: 000000000c281fff
  x23: 0000000000001000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffff42b95bf880
  x20: ffff42b9528e0000 x19: 0000000000001000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
  x17: 667274622f736620 x16: 6e69202c65746176 x15: 0000000000000028
  x14: 0000000000000003 x13: 00000000002672d7 x12: 0000000000000000
  x11: ffffcd3f0ccd9204 x10: ffffcd3f0554ae50 x9 : ffffcd3f0379528c
  x8 : ffff800093213428 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffcd3f091771e8
  x5 : ffff42b97f333948 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
  x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff42b9556cde80 x0 : 000000000000004f
  Call trace:
   btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0
   btrfs_subpage_set_dirty+0x38/0xa0
   btrfs_page_set_dirty+0x58/0x88
   relocate_one_page+0x204/0x5f0
   relocate_file_extent_cluster+0x11c/0x180
   relocate_data_extent+0xd0/0xf8
   relocate_block_group+0x3d0/0x4e8
   btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x2d8/0x490
   btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x54/0x1a8
   btrfs_balance+0x7f4/0x1150
   btrfs_ioctl+0x10f0/0x20b8
   __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x120/0x11d8
   invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x80/0xd8
   do_el0_svc+0x6c/0x158
   el0_svc+0x50/0x1b0
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130
   el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198
  Code: 91098021 b0007fa0 91346000 97e9c6d2 (d4210000)

This is the same problem outlined in 17b17fc ("btrfs:
set_page_extent_mapped after read_folio in btrfs_cont_expand") , and the
fix is the same.  I originally looked for the same pattern elsewhere in
our code, but mistakenly skipped over this code because I saw the page
cache readahead before we set_page_extent_mapped, not realizing that
this was only in the !page case, that we can still end up with a
!uptodate page and then do the btrfs_read_folio further down.

The fix here is the same as the above mentioned patch, move the
set_page_extent_mapped call to after the btrfs_read_folio() block to
make sure that we have the subpage blocksize stuff setup properly before
using the page.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit f1187ef upstream.

Fix a goof where KVM tries to grab source vCPUs from the destination VM
when doing intrahost migration.  Grabbing the wrong vCPU not only hoses
the guest, it also crashes the host due to the VMSA pointer being left
NULL.

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe38687000000
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 39 PID: 17143 Comm: sev_migrate_tes Tainted: GO       6.5.0-smp--fff2e47e6c3b-next torvalds#151
  Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.28.0 07/10/2023
  RIP: 0010:__free_pages+0x15/0xd0
  RSP: 0018:ffff923fcf6e3c78 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffe38687000000 RCX: 0000000000000100
  RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffe38687000000
  RBP: ffff923fcf6e3c88 R08: ffff923fcafb0000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff83619b90 R12: ffff923fa9540000
  R13: 0000000000080007 R14: ffff923f6d35d000 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff929d0d7c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: ffffe38687000000 CR3: 0000005224c34005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
  PKRU: 55555554
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   sev_free_vcpu+0xcb/0x110 [kvm_amd]
   svm_vcpu_free+0x75/0xf0 [kvm_amd]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x36/0x140 [kvm]
   kvm_destroy_vcpus+0x67/0x100 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x161/0x1d0 [kvm]
   kvm_put_kvm+0x276/0x560 [kvm]
   kvm_vm_release+0x25/0x30 [kvm]
   __fput+0x106/0x280
   ____fput+0x12/0x20
   task_work_run+0x86/0xb0
   do_exit+0x2e3/0x9c0
   do_group_exit+0xb1/0xc0
   __x64_sys_exit_group+0x1b/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x41/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
   </TASK>
  CR2: ffffe38687000000

Fixes: 6defa24 ("KVM: SEV: Init target VMCBs in sev_migrate_from")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230825022357.2852133-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 2810c1e ]

Inject fault while probing kunit-example-test.ko, if kstrdup()
fails in mod_sysfs_setup() in load_module(), the mod->state will
switch from MODULE_STATE_COMING to MODULE_STATE_GOING instead of
from MODULE_STATE_LIVE to MODULE_STATE_GOING, so only
kunit_module_exit() will be called without kunit_module_init(), and
the mod->kunit_suites is no set correctly and the free in
kunit_free_suite_set() will cause below wild-memory-access bug.

The mod->state state machine when load_module() succeeds:

MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED ---> MODULE_STATE_COMING ---> MODULE_STATE_LIVE
	 ^						|
	 |						| delete_module
	 +---------------- MODULE_STATE_GOING <---------+

The mod->state state machine when load_module() fails at
mod_sysfs_setup():

MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED ---> MODULE_STATE_COMING ---> MODULE_STATE_GOING
	^						|
	|						|
	+-----------------------------------------------+

Call kunit_module_init() at MODULE_STATE_COMING state to fix the issue
because MODULE_STATE_LIVE is transformed from it.

 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffff341e942a88
 KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x0003f9a0f4a15440-0x0003f9a0f4a15447]
 Mem abort info:
   ESR = 0x0000000096000004
   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
   SET = 0, FnV = 0
   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
   FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
 Data abort info:
   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000441ea000
 [ffffff341e942a88] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 Modules linked in: kunit_example_test(-) cfg80211 rfkill 8021q garp mrp stp llc ipv6 [last unloaded: kunit_example_test]
 CPU: 3 PID: 2035 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G        W        N 6.5.0-next-20230828+ torvalds#136
 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
 pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 pc : kfree+0x2c/0x70
 lr : kunit_free_suite_set+0xcc/0x13c
 sp : ffff8000829b75b0
 x29: ffff8000829b75b0 x28: ffff8000829b7b90 x27: 0000000000000000
 x26: dfff800000000000 x25: ffffcd07c82a7280 x24: ffffcd07a50ab300
 x23: ffffcd07a50ab2e8 x22: 1ffff00010536ec0 x21: dfff800000000000
 x20: ffffcd07a50ab2f0 x19: ffffcd07a50ab2f0 x18: 0000000000000000
 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffffcd07c24b6764
 x14: ffffcd07c24b63c0 x13: ffffcd07c4cebb94 x12: ffff700010536ec7
 x11: 1ffff00010536ec6 x10: ffff700010536ec6 x9 : dfff800000000000
 x8 : 00008fffefac913a x7 : 0000000041b58ab3 x6 : 0000000000000000
 x5 : 1ffff00010536ec5 x4 : ffff8000829b7628 x3 : dfff800000000000
 x2 : ffffff341e942a80 x1 : ffffcd07a50aa000 x0 : fffffc0000000000
 Call trace:
  kfree+0x2c/0x70
  kunit_free_suite_set+0xcc/0x13c
  kunit_module_notify+0xd8/0x360
  blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xc4/0x128
  load_module+0x382c/0x44a4
  init_module_from_file+0xd4/0x128
  idempotent_init_module+0x2c8/0x524
  __arm64_sys_finit_module+0xac/0x100
  invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x258
  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x160/0x22c
  do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c
  el0_svc+0x38/0x78
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158
  el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
 Code: aa0003e1 b25657e0 d34cfc42 8b021802 (f9400440)
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception
 SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
 Kernel Offset: 0x4d0742200000 from 0xffff800080000000
 PHYS_OFFSET: 0xffffee43c0000000
 CPU features: 0x88000203,3c020000,1000421b
 Memory Limit: none
 Rebooting in 1 seconds..

Fixes: 3d6e446 ("kunit: unify module and builtin suite definitions")
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Rae Moar <rmoar@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…n smcr_port_add

[ Upstream commit f5146e3 ]

While doing smcr_port_add, there maybe linkgroup add into or delete
from smc_lgr_list.list at the same time, which may result kernel crash.
So, use smc_lgr_list.lock to protect smc_lgr_list.list iterate in
smcr_port_add.

The crash calltrace show below:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 559726 Comm: kworker/0:92 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 449e491 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events smc_ib_port_event_work [smc]
RIP: 0010:smcr_port_add+0xa6/0xf0 [smc]
RSP: 0000:ffffa5a2c8f67de0 EFLAGS: 00010297
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff9935e0650000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffff9935e0654290 RDI: ffff9935c8560000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9934c0401918
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffb4a5c278 R12: ffff99364029aae4
R13: ffff99364029aa00 R14: 00000000ffffffed R15: ffff99364029ab08
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff994380600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000f06a10003 CR4: 0000000002770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 smc_ib_port_event_work+0x18f/0x380 [smc]
 process_one_work+0x19b/0x340
 worker_thread+0x30/0x370
 ? process_one_work+0x340/0x340
 kthread+0x114/0x130
 ? __kthread_cancel_work+0x50/0x50
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fixes: 1f90a05 ("net/smc: add smcr_port_add() and smcr_link_up() processing")
Signed-off-by: Guangguan Wang <guangguan.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 403f0e7 ]

macb_set_tx_clk() is called under a spinlock but itself calls clk_set_rate()
which can sleep. This results in:

| BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580
| pps pps1: new PPS source ptp1
| in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 40, name: kworker/u4:3
| preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
| RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
| 4 locks held by kworker/u4:3/40:
|  #0: ffff000003409148
| macb ff0c000.ethernet: gem-ptp-timer ptp clock registered.
|  ((wq_completion)events_power_efficient){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x14c/0x51c
|  #1: ffff8000833cbdd8 ((work_completion)(&pl->resolve)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x14c/0x51c
|  #2: ffff000004f01578 (&pl->state_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phylink_resolve+0x44/0x4e8
|  #3: ffff000004f06f50 (&bp->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: macb_mac_link_up+0x40/0x2ac
| irq event stamp: 113998
| hardirqs last  enabled at (113997): [<ffff800080e8503c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x64
| hardirqs last disabled at (113998): [<ffff800080e84478>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xac/0xc8
| softirqs last  enabled at (113608): [<ffff800080010630>] __do_softirq+0x430/0x4e4
| softirqs last disabled at (113597): [<ffff80008001614c>] ____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c
| CPU: 0 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 6.5.0-11717-g9355ce8b2f50-dirty torvalds#368
| Hardware name: ... ZynqMP ... (DT)
| Workqueue: events_power_efficient phylink_resolve
| Call trace:
|  dump_backtrace+0x98/0xf0
|  show_stack+0x18/0x24
|  dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xac
|  dump_stack+0x18/0x24
|  __might_resched+0x144/0x24c
|  __might_sleep+0x48/0x98
|  __mutex_lock+0x58/0x7b0
|  mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30
|  clk_prepare_lock+0x4c/0xa8
|  clk_set_rate+0x24/0x8c
|  macb_mac_link_up+0x25c/0x2ac
|  phylink_resolve+0x178/0x4e8
|  process_one_work+0x1ec/0x51c
|  worker_thread+0x1ec/0x3e4
|  kthread+0x120/0x124
|  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

The obvious fix is to move the call to macb_set_tx_clk() out of the
protected area. This seems safe as rx and tx are both disabled anyway at
this point.
It is however not entirely clear what the spinlock shall protect. It
could be the read-modify-write access to the NCFGR register, but this
is accessed in macb_set_rx_mode() and macb_set_rxcsum_feature() as well
without holding the spinlock. It could also be the register accesses
done in mog_init_rings() or macb_init_buffers(), but again these
functions are called without holding the spinlock in macb_hresp_error_task().
The locking seems fishy in this driver and it might deserve another look
before this patch is applied.

Fixes: 633e98a ("net: macb: use resolved link config in mac_link_up()")
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230908112913.1701766-1-s.hauer@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 910e230 ]

Macro symbol_put() is defined as __symbol_put(__stringify(x))

    ksym_name = "jiffies"
    symbol_put(ksym_name)

will be resolved as

    __symbol_put("ksym_name")

which is clearly wrong. So symbol_put must be replaced with __symbol_put.

When we uninstall hw_breakpoint.ko (rmmod), a kernel bug occurs with the
following error:

[11381.854152] kernel BUG at kernel/module/main.c:779!
[11381.854159] invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[11381.854163] CPU: 8 PID: 59623 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G      D    OE      6.2.9-200.fc37.x86_64 #1
[11381.854167] Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./B360M-HDV, BIOS P3.20 10/23/2018
[11381.854169] RIP: 0010:__symbol_put+0xa2/0xb0
[11381.854175] Code: 00 e8 92 d2 f7 ff 65 8b 05 c3 2f e6 78 85 c0 74 1b 48 8b 44 24 30 65 48 2b 04 25 28 00 00 00 75 12 48 83 c4 38 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 0f 1f 44 00 00 eb de e8 c0 df d8 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
[11381.854178] RSP: 0018:ffffad8ec6ae7dd0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[11381.854181] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc1fd1240 RCX: 000000000000000c
[11381.854184] RDX: 000000000000006b RSI: ffffffffc02bf7c7 RDI: ffffffffc1fd001c
[11381.854186] RBP: 000055a38b76e7c8 R08: ffffffff871ccfe0 R09: 0000000000000000
[11381.854188] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[11381.854190] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[11381.854192] FS:  00007fbf7c62c740(0000) GS:ffff8c5badc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[11381.854195] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[11381.854197] CR2: 000055a38b7793f8 CR3: 0000000363e1e001 CR4: 00000000003726e0
[11381.854200] DR0: ffffffffb3407980 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[11381.854202] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[11381.854204] Call Trace:
[11381.854207]  <TASK>
[11381.854212]  s_module_exit+0xc/0xff0 [symbol_getput]
[11381.854219]  __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x198/0x2f0
[11381.854225]  do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80
[11381.854231]  ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x180/0x1f0
[11381.854237]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[11381.854241]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[11381.854245]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[11381.854248]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[11381.854252]  ? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x170
[11381.854256]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

Signed-off-by: Rong Tao <rongtao@cestc.cn>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b97f96e ]

When compiling the kernel with clang and having HARDENED_USERCOPY
enabled, the liburing openat2.t test case fails during request setup:

usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to SLUB object 'io_kiocb' (offset 24, size 24)!
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
CPU: 3 PID: 413 Comm: openat2.t Tainted: G                 N 6.4.3-g6995e2de6891-dirty torvalds#19
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.1-0-g3208b098f51a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
Code: ce 49 89 ce 48 c7 c3 68 48 98 82 48 0f 44 de 48 c7 c7 56 c6 94 82 4c 89 de 48 89 c1 41 52 41 56 53 e8 e0 51 c5 00 48 83 c4 18 <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 41 57 41 56
RSP: 0018:ffffc900016b3da0 EFLAGS: 00010296
RAX: 0000000000000062 RBX: ffffffff82984868 RCX: 4e9b661ac6275b00
RDX: ffff8881b90ec580 RSI: ffffffff82949a64 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: 0000000000000018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc900016b3c88 R11: ffffc900016b3c30 R12: 00007ffe549659e0
R13: ffff888119014000 R14: 0000000000000018 R15: 0000000000000018
FS:  00007f862e3ca680(0000) GS:ffff8881b90c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005571483542a8 CR3: 0000000118c11000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die_body+0x63/0xb0
 ? die+0x9d/0xc0
 ? do_trap+0xa7/0x180
 ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
 ? do_error_trap+0xc6/0x110
 ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
 ? handle_invalid_op+0x2c/0x40
 ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x2f/0x40
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
 ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
 __check_heap_object+0xe2/0x110
 __check_object_size+0x142/0x3d0
 io_openat2_prep+0x68/0x140
 io_submit_sqes+0x28a/0x680
 __se_sys_io_uring_enter+0x120/0x580
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x55714834de26
Code: ca 01 0f b6 82 d0 00 00 00 8b ba cc 00 00 00 45 31 c0 31 d2 41 b9 08 00 00 00 83 e0 01 c1 e0 04 41 09 c2 b8 aa 01 00 00 0f 05 <c3> 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 89 30 eb 89 0f 1f 40 00 8b 00 a8 06
RSP: 002b:00007ffe549659c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001aa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe54965a50 RCX: 000055714834de26
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000008
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055714834f057
R13: 00007ffe54965a50 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000557148351dd8
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

when it tries to copy struct open_how from userspace into the per-command
space in the io_kiocb. There's nothing wrong with the copy, but we're
missing the appropriate annotations for allowing user copies to/from the
io_kiocb slab.

Allow copies in the per-command area, which is from the 'file' pointer to
when 'opcode' starts. We do have existing user copies there, but they are
not all annotated like the one that openat2_prep() uses,
copy_struct_from_user(). But in practice opcodes should be allowed to
copy data into their per-command area in the io_kiocb.

Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 2319b9c ]

The device may be scheduled during the resume process,
so this cannot appear in atomic operations. Since
pm_runtime_set_active will resume suppliers, put set
active outside the spin lock, which is only used to
protect the struct cdns data structure, otherwise the
kernel will report the following warning:

  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/base/power/runtime.c:1163
  in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 651, name: sh
  preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
  RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
  CPU: 0 PID: 651 Comm: sh Tainted: G        WC         6.1.20 #1
  Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QM MEK (DT)
  Call trace:
    dump_backtrace.part.0+0xe0/0xf0
    show_stack+0x18/0x30
    dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x80
    dump_stack+0x1c/0x38
    __might_resched+0x1fc/0x240
    __might_sleep+0x68/0xc0
    __pm_runtime_resume+0x9c/0xe0
    rpm_get_suppliers+0x68/0x1b0
    __pm_runtime_set_status+0x298/0x560
    cdns_resume+0xb0/0x1c0
    cdns3_controller_resume.isra.0+0x1e0/0x250
    cdns3_plat_resume+0x28/0x40

Signed-off-by: Xiaolei Wang <xiaolei.wang@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230616021952.1025854-1-xiaolei.wang@windriver.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit af42269 ]

For cases where icc_bw_set() can be called in callbaths that could
deadlock against shrinker/reclaim, such as runpm resume, we need to
decouple the icc locking.  Introduce a new icc_bw_lock for cases where
we need to serialize bw aggregation and update to decouple that from
paths that require memory allocation such as node/link creation/
destruction.

Fixes this lockdep splat:

   ======================================================
   WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
   6.2.0-rc8-debug+ torvalds#554 Not tainted
   ------------------------------------------------------
   ring0/132 is trying to acquire lock:
   ffffff80871916d0 (&gmu->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: a6xx_pm_resume+0xf0/0x234

   but task is already holding lock:
   ffffffdb5aee57e8 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: msm_job_run+0x68/0x150

   which lock already depends on the new lock.

   the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

   -> #4 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}:
          __dma_fence_might_wait+0x74/0xc0
          dma_resv_lockdep+0x1f4/0x2f4
          do_one_initcall+0x104/0x2bc
          kernel_init_freeable+0x344/0x34c
          kernel_init+0x30/0x134
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   -> #3 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}:
          fs_reclaim_acquire+0x80/0xa8
          slab_pre_alloc_hook.constprop.0+0x40/0x25c
          __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x60/0x1cc
          __kmalloc+0xd8/0x100
          topology_parse_cpu_capacity+0x8c/0x178
          get_cpu_for_node+0x88/0xc4
          parse_cluster+0x1b0/0x28c
          parse_cluster+0x8c/0x28c
          init_cpu_topology+0x168/0x188
          smp_prepare_cpus+0x24/0xf8
          kernel_init_freeable+0x18c/0x34c
          kernel_init+0x30/0x134
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:
          __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x3c/0x48
          fs_reclaim_acquire+0x54/0xa8
          slab_pre_alloc_hook.constprop.0+0x40/0x25c
          __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x60/0x1cc
          __kmalloc+0xd8/0x100
          kzalloc.constprop.0+0x14/0x20
          icc_node_create_nolock+0x4c/0xc4
          icc_node_create+0x38/0x58
          qcom_icc_rpmh_probe+0x1b8/0x248
          platform_probe+0x70/0xc4
          really_probe+0x158/0x290
          __driver_probe_device+0xc8/0xe0
          driver_probe_device+0x44/0x100
          __driver_attach+0xf8/0x108
          bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc4
          driver_attach+0x2c/0x38
          bus_add_driver+0xd0/0x1d8
          driver_register+0xbc/0xf8
          __platform_driver_register+0x30/0x3c
          qnoc_driver_init+0x24/0x30
          do_one_initcall+0x104/0x2bc
          kernel_init_freeable+0x344/0x34c
          kernel_init+0x30/0x134
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   -> #1 (icc_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
          __mutex_lock+0xcc/0x3c8
          mutex_lock_nested+0x30/0x44
          icc_set_bw+0x88/0x2b4
          _set_opp_bw+0x8c/0xd8
          _set_opp+0x19c/0x300
          dev_pm_opp_set_opp+0x84/0x94
          a6xx_gmu_resume+0x18c/0x804
          a6xx_pm_resume+0xf8/0x234
          adreno_runtime_resume+0x2c/0x38
          pm_generic_runtime_resume+0x30/0x44
          __rpm_callback+0x15c/0x174
          rpm_callback+0x78/0x7c
          rpm_resume+0x318/0x524
          __pm_runtime_resume+0x78/0xbc
          adreno_load_gpu+0xc4/0x17c
          msm_open+0x50/0x120
          drm_file_alloc+0x17c/0x228
          drm_open_helper+0x74/0x118
          drm_open+0xa0/0x144
          drm_stub_open+0xd4/0xe4
          chrdev_open+0x1b8/0x1e4
          do_dentry_open+0x2f8/0x38c
          vfs_open+0x34/0x40
          path_openat+0x64c/0x7b4
          do_filp_open+0x54/0xc4
          do_sys_openat2+0x9c/0x100
          do_sys_open+0x50/0x7c
          __arm64_sys_openat+0x28/0x34
          invoke_syscall+0x8c/0x128
          el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xa0/0x11c
          do_el0_svc+0xac/0xbc
          el0_svc+0x48/0xa0
          el0t_64_sync_handler+0xac/0x13c
          el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194

   -> #0 (&gmu->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
          __lock_acquire+0xe00/0x1060
          lock_acquire+0x1e0/0x2f8
          __mutex_lock+0xcc/0x3c8
          mutex_lock_nested+0x30/0x44
          a6xx_pm_resume+0xf0/0x234
          adreno_runtime_resume+0x2c/0x38
          pm_generic_runtime_resume+0x30/0x44
          __rpm_callback+0x15c/0x174
          rpm_callback+0x78/0x7c
          rpm_resume+0x318/0x524
          __pm_runtime_resume+0x78/0xbc
          pm_runtime_get_sync.isra.0+0x14/0x20
          msm_gpu_submit+0x58/0x178
          msm_job_run+0x78/0x150
          drm_sched_main+0x290/0x370
          kthread+0xf0/0x100
          ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

   other info that might help us debug this:

   Chain exists of:
     &gmu->lock --> mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start --> dma_fence_map

    Possible unsafe locking scenario:

          CPU0                    CPU1
          ----                    ----
     lock(dma_fence_map);
                                  lock(mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start);
                                  lock(dma_fence_map);
     lock(&gmu->lock);

    *** DEADLOCK ***

   2 locks held by ring0/132:
    #0: ffffff8087191170 (&gpu->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: msm_job_run+0x64/0x150
    #1: ffffffdb5aee57e8 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: msm_job_run+0x68/0x150

   stack backtrace:
   CPU: 7 PID: 132 Comm: ring0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc8-debug+ torvalds#554
   Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev1 - 2) with LTE (DT)
   Call trace:
    dump_backtrace.part.0+0xb4/0xf8
    show_stack+0x20/0x38
    dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xd0
    dump_stack+0x18/0x34
    print_circular_bug+0x1b4/0x1f0
    check_noncircular+0x78/0xac
    __lock_acquire+0xe00/0x1060
    lock_acquire+0x1e0/0x2f8
    __mutex_lock+0xcc/0x3c8
    mutex_lock_nested+0x30/0x44
    a6xx_pm_resume+0xf0/0x234
    adreno_runtime_resume+0x2c/0x38
    pm_generic_runtime_resume+0x30/0x44
    __rpm_callback+0x15c/0x174
    rpm_callback+0x78/0x7c
    rpm_resume+0x318/0x524
    __pm_runtime_resume+0x78/0xbc
    pm_runtime_get_sync.isra.0+0x14/0x20
    msm_gpu_submit+0x58/0x178
    msm_job_run+0x78/0x150
    drm_sched_main+0x290/0x370
    kthread+0xf0/0x100
    ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807171148.210181-7-robdclark@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Georgi Djakov <djakov@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit bc056e7 ]

When we calculate the end position of ext4_free_extent, this position may
be exactly where ext4_lblk_t (i.e. uint) overflows. For example, if
ac_g_ex.fe_logical is 4294965248 and ac_orig_goal_len is 2048, then the
computed end is 0x100000000, which is 0. If ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical is not
the first case of adjusting the best extent, that is, new_bex_end > 0, the
following BUG_ON will be triggered:

=========================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/mballoc.c:5116!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 3 PID: 673 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G E 6.5.0-rc1+ torvalds#279
RIP: 0010:ext4_mb_new_inode_pa+0xc5/0x430
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ext4_mb_use_best_found+0x203/0x2f0
 ext4_mb_try_best_found+0x163/0x240
 ext4_mb_regular_allocator+0x158/0x1550
 ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x86a/0xe10
 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xb0c/0x13a0
 ext4_map_blocks+0x2cd/0x8f0
 ext4_iomap_begin+0x27b/0x400
 iomap_iter+0x222/0x3d0
 __iomap_dio_rw+0x243/0xcb0
 iomap_dio_rw+0x16/0x80
=========================================================

A simple reproducer demonstrating the problem:

	mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sda -b 4096 100M
	mount /dev/sda /tmp/test
	fallocate -l1M /tmp/test/tmp
	fallocate -l10M /tmp/test/file
	fallocate -i -o 1M -l16777203M /tmp/test/file
	fsstress -d /tmp/test -l 0 -n 100000 -p 8 &
	sleep 10 && killall -9 fsstress
	rm -f /tmp/test/tmp
	xfs_io -c "open -ad /tmp/test/file" -c "pwrite -S 0xff 0 8192"

We simply refactor the logic for adjusting the best extent by adding
a temporary ext4_free_extent ex and use extent_logical_end() to avoid
overflow, which also simplifies the code.

Cc: stable@kernel.org # 6.4
Fixes: 93cdf49 ("ext4: Fix best extent lstart adjustment logic in ext4_mb_new_inode_pa()")
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230724121059.11834-3-libaokun1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

… tree"

commit 3c70de9 upstream.

This reverts commit 06f4543.

John Ogness reports the case that the allocation is in atomic context under
acquired spin-lock.

[   12.555784] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:306
[   12.555808] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 70, name: kworker/1:2
[   12.555814] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
[   12.555820] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[   12.555824] irq event stamp: 208
[   12.555828] hardirqs last  enabled at (207): [<c00000000111e414>] ._raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x44/0x80
[   12.555850] hardirqs last disabled at (208): [<c00000000110ff94>] .__schedule+0x854/0xfe0
[   12.555859] softirqs last  enabled at (188): [<c000000000f73504>] .addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x2c4/0xb70
[   12.555872] softirqs last disabled at (182): [<c000000000f732b0>] .addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x70/0xb70
[   12.555884] CPU: 1 PID: 70 Comm: kworker/1:2 Tainted: G S                 6.6.0-rc1 #1
[   12.555893] Hardware name: PowerMac7,2 PPC970 0x390202 PowerMac
[   12.555898] Workqueue: firewire_ohci .bus_reset_work [firewire_ohci]
[   12.555939] Call Trace:
[   12.555944] [c000000009677830] [c0000000010d83c0] .dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xd0 (unreliable)
[   12.555963] [c0000000096778b0] [c000000000140270] .__might_resched+0x320/0x340
[   12.555978] [c000000009677940] [c000000000497600] .__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x390/0x460
[   12.555993] [c000000009677a10] [c0000000003fe620] .__kmalloc+0x70/0x310
[   12.556007] [c000000009677ac0] [c0003d00004e2268] .fw_core_handle_bus_reset+0x2c8/0xba0 [firewire_core]
[   12.556060] [c000000009677c20] [c0003d0000491190] .bus_reset_work+0x330/0x9b0 [firewire_ohci]
[   12.556079] [c000000009677d10] [c00000000011d0d0] .process_one_work+0x280/0x6f0
[   12.556094] [c000000009677e10] [c00000000011d8a0] .worker_thread+0x360/0x500
[   12.556107] [c000000009677ef0] [c00000000012e3b4] .kthread+0x154/0x160
[   12.556120] [c000000009677f90] [c00000000000bfa8] .start_kernel_thread+0x10/0x14

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87jzsuv1xk.fsf@jogness.linutronix.de/raw
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 33caa20 upstream.

The existing code move the VF NIC to new namespace when NETDEV_REGISTER is
received on netvsc NIC. During deletion of the namespace,
default_device_exit_batch() >> default_device_exit_net() is called. When
netvsc NIC is moved back and registered to the default namespace, it
automatically brings VF NIC back to the default namespace. This will cause
the default_device_exit_net() >> for_each_netdev_safe loop unable to detect
the list end, and hit NULL ptr:

[  231.449420] mana 7870:00:00.0 enP30832s1: Moved VF to namespace with: eth0
[  231.449656] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
[  231.450246] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  231.450579] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  231.450916] PGD 17b8a8067 P4D 0
[  231.451163] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[  231.451450] CPU: 82 UID: 0 PID: 1394 Comm: kworker/u768:1 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4+ #3 VOLUNTARY
[  231.452042] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 11/21/2024
[  231.452692] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
[  231.452947] RIP: 0010:default_device_exit_batch+0x16c/0x3f0
[  231.453326] Code: c0 0c f5 b3 e8 d5 db fe ff 48 85 c0 74 15 48 c7 c2 f8 fd ca b2 be 10 00 00 00 48 8d 7d c0 e8 7b 77 25 00 49 8b 86 28 01 00 00 <48> 8b 50 10 4c 8b 2a 4c 8d 62 f0 49 83 ed 10 4c 39 e0 0f 84 d6 00
[  231.454294] RSP: 0018:ff75fc7c9bf9fd00 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  231.454610] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 61c8864680b583eb
[  231.455094] RDX: ff1fa9f71462d800 RSI: ff75fc7c9bf9fd38 RDI: 0000000030766564
[  231.455686] RBP: ff75fc7c9bf9fd78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  231.456126] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: ff1fa9f70088e340
[  231.456621] R13: ff1fa9f70088e340 R14: ffffffffb3f50c20 R15: ff1fa9f7103e6340
[  231.457161] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff1faa6783a08000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  231.457707] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  231.458031] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000179ab2006 CR4: 0000000000b73ef0
[  231.458434] Call Trace:
[  231.458600]  <TASK>
[  231.458777]  ops_undo_list+0x100/0x220
[  231.459015]  cleanup_net+0x1b8/0x300
[  231.459285]  process_one_work+0x184/0x340

To fix it, move the ns change to a workqueue, and take rtnl_lock to avoid
changing the netdev list when default_device_exit_net() is using it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4c26280 ("hv_netvsc: Fix VF namespace also in synthetic NIC NETDEV_REGISTER event")
Signed-off-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1754511711-11188-1-git-send-email-haiyangz@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…dlock

When a user creates a dualpi2 qdisc it automatically sets a timer. This
timer will run constantly and update the qdisc's probability field.
The issue is that the timer acquires the qdisc root lock and runs in
hardirq. The qdisc root lock is also acquired in dev.c whenever a packet
arrives for this qdisc. Since the dualpi2 timer callback runs in hardirq,
it may interrupt the packet processing running in softirq. If that happens
and it runs on the same CPU, it will acquire the same lock and cause a
deadlock. The following splat shows up when running a kernel compiled with
lock debugging:

[  +0.000224] WARNING: inconsistent lock state
[  +0.000224] 6.16.0+ torvalds#10 Not tainted
[  +0.000169] --------------------------------
[  +0.000029] inconsistent {IN-HARDIRQ-W} -> {HARDIRQ-ON-W} usage.
[  +0.000000] ping/156 [HC0[0]:SC0[2]:HE1:SE0] takes:
[  +0.000000] ffff897841242110 (&sch->root_lock_key){?.-.}-{3:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x86d/0x1140
[  +0.000000] {IN-HARDIRQ-W} state was registered at:
[  +0.000000]   lock_acquire.part.0+0xb6/0x220
[  +0.000000]   _raw_spin_lock+0x31/0x80
[  +0.000000]   dualpi2_timer+0x6f/0x270
[  +0.000000]   __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1c5/0x360
[  +0.000000]   hrtimer_interrupt+0x115/0x260
[  +0.000000]   __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x1a0
[  +0.000000]   sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x80
[  +0.000000]   asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
[  +0.000000]   pv_native_safe_halt+0xf/0x20
[  +0.000000]   default_idle+0x9/0x10
[  +0.000000]   default_idle_call+0x7e/0x1e0
[  +0.000000]   do_idle+0x1e8/0x250
[  +0.000000]   cpu_startup_entry+0x29/0x30
[  +0.000000]   rest_init+0x151/0x160
[  +0.000000]   start_kernel+0x6f3/0x700
[  +0.000000]   x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30
[  +0.000000]   x86_64_start_kernel+0xc8/0xd0
[  +0.000000]   common_startup_64+0x13e/0x148
[  +0.000000] irq event stamp: 6884
[  +0.000000] hardirqs last  enabled at (6883): [<ffffffffa75700b3>] neigh_resolve_output+0x223/0x270
[  +0.000000] hardirqs last disabled at (6882): [<ffffffffa7570078>] neigh_resolve_output+0x1e8/0x270
[  +0.000000] softirqs last  enabled at (6880): [<ffffffffa757006b>] neigh_resolve_output+0x1db/0x270
[  +0.000000] softirqs last disabled at (6884): [<ffffffffa755b533>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x73/0x1140
[  +0.000000]
              other info that might help us debug this:
[  +0.000000]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  +0.000000]        CPU0
[  +0.000000]        ----
[  +0.000000]   lock(&sch->root_lock_key);
[  +0.000000]   <Interrupt>
[  +0.000000]     lock(&sch->root_lock_key);
[  +0.000000]
               *** DEADLOCK ***

[  +0.000000] 4 locks held by ping/156:
[  +0.000000]  #0: ffff897842332e08 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_sendmsg+0x41e/0xf40
[  +0.000000]  CachyOS#1: ffffffffa816f880 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: ip_output+0x2c/0x190
[  +0.000000]  CachyOS#2: ffffffffa816f880 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: ip_finish_output2+0xad/0x950
[  +0.000000]  CachyOS#3: ffffffffa816f840 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x73/0x1140

I am able to reproduce it consistently when running the following:

tc qdisc add dev lo handle 1: root dualpi2
ping -f 127.0.0.1

To fix it, make the timer run in softirq.

Fixes: 320d031 ("sched: Struct definition and parsing of dualpi2 qdisc")
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250815135317.664993-1-victor@mojatatu.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

BPF CI testing report a UAF issue:

  [   16.446633] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000003  0
  [   16.447134] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mod  e
  [   16.447516] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present pag  e
  [   16.447878] PGD 0 P4D   0
  [   16.448063] Oops: Oops: 0000 [CachyOS#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPT  I
  [   16.448409] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G           OE      6.13.0-rc3-g89e8a75fda73-dirty CachyOS#4  2
  [   16.449124] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODUL  E
  [   16.449502] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/201  4
  [   16.450201] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_wor  k
  [   16.450531] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159  0
  [   16.452158] RSP: 0018:ffffb5ab40053d98 EFLAGS: 0001024  6
  [   16.452526] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000030  0
  [   16.452994] RDX: 0000000000000280 RSI: 00003513840053f0 RDI: 000000000000000  0
  [   16.453492] RBP: ffffa097808e3800 R08: ffffa09782dba1e0 R09: 000000000000000  5
  [   16.453987] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0978274640  0
  [   16.454497] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa09782d4092  0
  [   16.454996] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa097bbc00000(0000) knlGS:000000000000000  0
  [   16.455557] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003  3
  [   16.455961] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000102788004 CR4: 0000000000770ef  0
  [   16.456459] PKRU: 5555555  4
  [   16.456654] Call Trace  :
  [   16.456832]  <TASK  >
  [   16.456989]  ? __die+0x23/0x7  0
  [   16.457215]  ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c  0
  [   16.457508]  ? __lock_acquire+0x3e6/0x249  0
  [   16.457801]  ? exc_page_fault+0x68/0x20  0
  [   16.458080]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x3  0
  [   16.458389]  ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159  0
  [   16.458689]  ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159  0
  [   16.458987]  ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x10  0
  [   16.459284]  process_one_work+0x1ea/0x6d  0
  [   16.459570]  worker_thread+0x1c3/0x38  0
  [   16.459839]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x1  0
  [   16.460144]  kthread+0xe0/0x11  0
  [   16.460372]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1  0
  [   16.460640]  ret_from_fork+0x31/0x5  0
  [   16.460896]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1  0
  [   16.461166]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x3  0
  [   16.461453]  </TASK  >
  [   16.461616] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE)  ]
  [   16.462134] CR2: 000000000000003  0
  [   16.462380] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  [   16.462710] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x1590

The direct cause of this issue is that after smc_listen_out_connected(),
newclcsock->sk may be NULL since it will releases the smcsk. Therefore,
if the application closes the socket immediately after accept,
newclcsock->sk can be NULL. A possible execution order could be as
follows:

smc_listen_work                                 | userspace
-----------------------------------------------------------------
lock_sock(sk)                                   |
smc_listen_out_connected()                      |
| \- smc_listen_out                             |
|    | \- release_sock                          |
     | |- sk->sk_data_ready()                   |
                                                | fd = accept();
                                                | close(fd);
                                                |  \- socket->sk = NULL;
/* newclcsock->sk is NULL now */
SMC_STAT_SERV_SUCC_INC(sock_net(newclcsock->sk))

Since smc_listen_out_connected() will not fail, simply swapping the order
of the code can easily fix this issue.

Fixes: 3b2dec2 ("net/smc: restructure client and server code in af_smc")
Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Guangguan Wang <guangguan.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250818054618.41615-1-alibuda@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Receiving HSR frame with insufficient space to hold HSR tag in the skb
can result in a crash (kernel BUG):

[   45.390915] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff86f32cac len:26 put:14 head:ffff888042418000 data:ffff888042417ff4 tail:0xe end:0x180 dev:bridge_slave_1
[   45.392559] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   45.392912] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:211!
[   45.393276] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [CachyOS#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
[   45.393809] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2496 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 6.15.0 torvalds#12 PREEMPT(undef)
[   45.394433] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   45.395273] RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15b/0x1d0

<snip registers, remove unreliable trace>

[   45.402911] Call Trace:
[   45.403105]  <IRQ>
[   45.404470]  skb_push+0xcd/0xf0
[   45.404726]  br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x7c/0x6c0
[   45.406513]  br_forward_finish+0x128/0x260
[   45.408483]  __br_forward+0x42d/0x590
[   45.409464]  maybe_deliver+0x2eb/0x420
[   45.409763]  br_flood+0x174/0x4a0
[   45.410030]  br_handle_frame_finish+0xc7c/0x1bc0
[   45.411618]  br_handle_frame+0xac3/0x1230
[   45.413674]  __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x808/0x3df0
[   45.422966]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb4/0x1f0
[   45.424478]  __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x170
[   45.424806]  process_backlog+0x242/0x6d0
[   45.425116]  __napi_poll+0xbb/0x630
[   45.425394]  net_rx_action+0x4d1/0xcc0
[   45.427613]  handle_softirqs+0x1a4/0x580
[   45.427926]  do_softirq+0x74/0x90
[   45.428196]  </IRQ>

This issue was found by syzkaller.

The panic happens in br_dev_queue_push_xmit() once it receives a
corrupted skb with ETH header already pushed in linear data. When it
attempts the skb_push() call, there's not enough headroom and
skb_push() panics.

The corrupted skb is put on the queue by HSR layer, which makes a
sequence of unintended transformations when it receives a specific
corrupted HSR frame (with incomplete TAG).

Fix it by dropping and consuming frames that are not long enough to
contain both ethernet and hsr headers.

Alternative fix would be to check for enough headroom before skb_push()
in br_dev_queue_push_xmit().

In the reproducer, this is injected via AF_PACKET, but I don't easily
see why it couldn't be sent over the wire from adjacent network.

Further Details:

In the reproducer, the following network interface chain is set up:

┌────────────────┐   ┌────────────────┐
│ veth0_to_hsr   ├───┤  hsr_slave0    ┼───┐
└────────────────┘   └────────────────┘   │
                                          │ ┌──────┐
                                          ├─┤ hsr0 ├───┐
                                          │ └──────┘   │
┌────────────────┐   ┌────────────────┐   │            │┌────────┐
│ veth1_to_hsr   ┼───┤  hsr_slave1    ├───┘            └┤        │
└────────────────┘   └────────────────┘                ┌┼ bridge │
                                                       ││        │
                                                       │└────────┘
                                                       │
                                        ┌───────┐      │
                                        │  ...  ├──────┘
                                        └───────┘

To trigger the events leading up to crash, reproducer sends a corrupted
HSR frame with incomplete TAG, via AF_PACKET socket on 'veth0_to_hsr'.

The first HSR-layer function to process this frame is
hsr_handle_frame(). It and then checks if the
protocol is ETH_P_PRP or ETH_P_HSR. If it is, it calls
skb_set_network_header(skb, ETH_HLEN + HSR_HLEN), without checking that
the skb is long enough. For the crashing frame it is not, and hence the
skb->network_header and skb->mac_len fields are set incorrectly,
pointing after the end of the linear buffer.

I will call this a BUG#1 and it is what is addressed by this patch. In
the crashing scenario before the fix, the skb continues to go down the
hsr path as follows.

hsr_handle_frame() then calls this sequence
hsr_forward_skb()
  fill_frame_info()
    hsr->proto_ops->fill_frame_info()
      hsr_fill_frame_info()

hsr_fill_frame_info() contains a check that intends to check whether the
skb actually contains the HSR header. But the check relies on the
skb->mac_len field which was erroneously setup due to BUG#1, so the
check passes and the execution continues  back in the hsr_forward_skb():

hsr_forward_skb()
  hsr_forward_do()
    hsr->proto_ops->get_untagged_frame()
      hsr_get_untagged_frame()
        create_stripped_skb_hsr()

In create_stripped_skb_hsr(), a copy of the skb is created and is
further corrupted by operation that attempts to strip the HSR tag in a
call to __pskb_copy().

The skb enters create_stripped_skb_hsr() with ethernet header pushed in
linear buffer. The skb_pull(skb_in, HSR_HLEN) thus pulls 6 bytes of
ethernet header into the headroom, creating skb_in with a headroom of
size 8. The subsequent __pskb_copy() then creates an skb with headroom
of just 2 and skb->len of just 12, this is how it looks after the copy:

gdb) p skb->len
$10 = 12
(gdb) p skb->data
$11 = (unsigned char *) 0xffff888041e45382 "\252\252\252\252\252!\210\373",
(gdb) p skb->head
$12 = (unsigned char *) 0xffff888041e45380 ""

It seems create_stripped_skb_hsr() assumes that ETH header is pulled
in the headroom when it's entered, because it just pulls HSR header on
top. But that is not the case in our code-path and we end up with the
corrupted skb instead. I will call this BUG#2

*I got confused here because it seems that under no conditions can
create_stripped_skb_hsr() work well, the assumption it makes is not true
during the processing of hsr frames - since the skb_push() in
hsr_handle_frame to skb_pull in hsr_deliver_master(). I wonder whether I
missed something here.*

Next, the execution arrives in hsr_deliver_master(). It calls
skb_pull(ETH_HLEN), which just returns NULL - the SKB does not have
enough space for the pull (as it only has 12 bytes in total at this
point).

*The skb_pull() here further suggests that ethernet header is meant
to be pushed through the whole hsr processing and
create_stripped_skb_hsr() should pull it before doing the HSR header
pull.*

hsr_deliver_master() then puts the corrupted skb on the queue, it is
then picked up from there by bridge frame handling layer and finally
lands in br_dev_queue_push_xmit where it panics.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 48b491a ("net: hsr: fix mac_len checks")
Reported-by: syzbot+a81f2759d022496b40ab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <acsjakub@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250819082842.94378-1-acsjakub@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Commit 3c7ac40 ("scsi: ufs: core: Delegate the interrupt service
routine to a threaded IRQ handler") introduced an IRQ lock inversion
issue. Fix this lock inversion by changing the spin_lock_irq() calls into
spin_lock_irqsave() calls in code that can be called either from
interrupt context or from thread context. This patch fixes the following
lockdep complaint:

WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k CachyOS#1 Tainted: G        W  OE
--------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u28:0/12 just changed the state of lock:
ffffff881e29dd60 (&hba->clk_gating.lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110
but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-unsafe lock in the past:
 (shost->host_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}

and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(shost->host_lock);
                               local_irq_disable();
                               lock(&hba->clk_gating.lock);
                               lock(shost->host_lock);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(&hba->clk_gating.lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

4 locks held by kworker/u28:0/12:
 #0: ffffff8800ac6158 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1bc/0x65c
 CachyOS#1: ffffffc085c93d70 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1e4/0x65c
 CachyOS#2: ffffff881e29c0e0 (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __scsi_add_device+0x74/0x120
 CachyOS#3: ffffff881960ea00 (&hwq->cq_lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0x28/0x104

the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock:
 -> (shost->host_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} {
    HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
                      lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
                      _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64
                      ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08
                      ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c
                      irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8
                      irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec
                      kthread+0x110/0x134
                      ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
    SOFTIRQ-ON-W at:
                      lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
                      _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64
                      ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08
                      ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c
                      irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8
                      irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec
                      kthread+0x110/0x134
                      ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
    INITIAL USE at:
                     lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
                     _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64
                     ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08
                     ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c
                     irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8
                     irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec
                     kthread+0x110/0x134
                     ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
  }
  ... key      at: [<ffffffc085ba1a98>] scsi_host_alloc.__key+0x0/0x10
  ... acquired at:
   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
   __ufshcd_release+0x78/0x118
   ufshcd_send_uic_cmd+0xe4/0x118
   ufshcd_dme_set_attr+0x88/0x1c8
   ufs_google_phy_initialization+0x68/0x418 [ufs]
   ufs_google_link_startup_notify+0x78/0x27c [ufs]
   ufshcd_link_startup+0x84/0x720
   ufshcd_init+0xf3c/0x1330
   ufshcd_pltfrm_init+0x728/0x7d8
   ufs_google_probe+0x30/0x84 [ufs]
   platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0
   really_probe+0x114/0x454
   __driver_probe_device+0xa4/0x160
   driver_probe_device+0x44/0x23c
   __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xd4
   async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c
   process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
   worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
   kthread+0x110/0x134
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

-> (&hba->clk_gating.lock){-...}-{2:2} {
   IN-HARDIRQ-W at:
                    lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
                    _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
                    ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110
                    ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4
                    ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104
                    ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs]
                    __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c
                    handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c
                    handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8
                    generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80
                    gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104
                    call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50
                    do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8
                    el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58
                    el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
                    el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c
                    _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c
                    debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c
                    __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c
                    schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c
                    io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70
                    do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194
                    wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c
                    blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c
                    scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8
                    scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74
                    __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120
                    ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0
                    async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c
                    process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
                    worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
                    kthread+0x110/0x134
                    ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
   INITIAL USE at:
                   lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
                   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
                   ufshcd_hold+0x34/0x14c
                   ufshcd_send_uic_cmd+0x28/0x118
                   ufshcd_dme_set_attr+0x88/0x1c8
                   ufs_google_phy_initialization+0x68/0x418 [ufs]
                   ufs_google_link_startup_notify+0x78/0x27c [ufs]
                   ufshcd_link_startup+0x84/0x720
                   ufshcd_init+0xf3c/0x1330
                   ufshcd_pltfrm_init+0x728/0x7d8
                   ufs_google_probe+0x30/0x84 [ufs]
                   platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0
                   really_probe+0x114/0x454
                   __driver_probe_device+0xa4/0x160
                   driver_probe_device+0x44/0x23c
                   __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xd4
                   async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c
                   process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
                   worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
                   kthread+0x110/0x134
                   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
 }
 ... key      at: [<ffffffc085ba6fe8>] ufshcd_init.__key+0x0/0x10
 ... acquired at:
   mark_lock+0x1c4/0x224
   __lock_acquire+0x438/0x2e1c
   lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
   ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110
   ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4
   ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104
   ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs]
   __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c
   handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c
   handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8
   generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80
   gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104
   call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50
   do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8
   el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58
   el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
   el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c
   _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c
   debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c
   __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c
   schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c
   io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70
   do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194
   wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c
   blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c
   scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8
   scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74
   __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120
   ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0
   async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c
   process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
   worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
   kthread+0x110/0x134
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

stack backtrace:
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u28:0 Tainted: G        W  OE      6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k CachyOS#1 ccd4020fe444bdf629efc3b86df6be920b8df7d0
Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Spacecraft board based on MALIBU (DT)
Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c
 show_stack+0x18/0x28
 dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0
 dump_stack+0x18/0x24
 print_irq_inversion_bug+0x2fc/0x304
 mark_lock_irq+0x388/0x4fc
 mark_lock+0x1c4/0x224
 __lock_acquire+0x438/0x2e1c
 lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
 ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110
 ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4
 ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104
 ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs dd6f385554e109da094ab91d5f7be18625a2222a]
 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c
 handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c
 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8
 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80
 gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104
 call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50
 do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8
 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58
 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
 el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c
 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c
 debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c
 __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c
 schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c
 io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70
 do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194
 wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c
 blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c
 scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8
 scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74
 __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120
 ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0
 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c
 process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
 worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
 kthread+0x110/0x134
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Cc: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Cc: André Draszik <andre.draszik@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wang <peter.wang@mediatek.com>
Fixes: 3c7ac40 ("scsi: ufs: core: Delegate the interrupt service routine to a threaded IRQ handler")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250815155842.472867-2-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>

The mm/debug_vm_pagetable test allocates manually page table entries for
the tests it runs, using also its manually allocated mm_struct.  That in
itself is ok, but when it exits, at destroy_args() it fails to clear those
entries with the *_clear functions.

The problem is that leaves stale entries.  If another process allocates an
mm_struct with a pgd at the same address, it may end up running into the
stale entry.  This is happening in practice on a debug kernel with
CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE=y, for example this is the output with some extra
debugging I added (it prints a warning trace if pgtables_bytes goes
negative, in addition to the warning at check_mm() function):

[    2.539353] debug_vm_pgtable: [get_random_vaddr         ]: random_vaddr is 0x7ea247140000
[    2.539366] kmem_cache info
[    2.539374] kmem_cachep 0x000000002ce82385 - freelist 0x0000000000000000 - offset 0x508
[    2.539447] debug_vm_pgtable: [init_args                ]: args->mm is 0x000000002267cc9e
(...)
[    2.552800] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 116 at include/linux/mm.h:2841 free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0
[    2.552816] Modules linked in:
[    2.552843] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 116 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug CachyOS#1 VOLUNTARY
[    2.552859] Hardware name: IBM,9009-41A POWER9 (architected) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW910.00 (VL910_062) hv:phyp pSeries
[    2.552872] NIP:  c0000000007eef3c LR: c0000000007eef30 CTR: c0000000003d8c90
[    2.552885] REGS: c0000000622e73b0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug)
[    2.552899] MSR:  800000000282b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 24002822  XER: 0000000a
[    2.552954] CFAR: c0000000008f03f0 IRQMASK: 0
[    2.552954] GPR00: c0000000007eef30 c0000000622e7650 c000000002b1ac00 0000000000000001
[    2.552954] GPR04: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 c0000000007eef30 ffffffffffffffff
[    2.552954] GPR08: 00000000ffff00f5 0000000000000001 0000000000000048 0000000000004000
[    2.552954] GPR12: 00000003fa440000 c000000017ffa300 c0000000051d9f80 ffffffffffffffdb
[    2.552954] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 000000000000000a 60000000000000e0
[    2.552954] GPR20: 4080000000000000 c0000000113af038 00007fffcf130000 0000700000000000
[    2.552954] GPR24: c000000062a6a000 0000000000000001 8000000062a68000 0000000000000001
[    2.552954] GPR28: 000000000000000a c000000062ebc600 0000000000002000 c000000062ebc760
[    2.553170] NIP [c0000000007eef3c] free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0
[    2.553185] LR [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0
[    2.553199] Call Trace:
[    2.553207] [c0000000622e7650] [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0 (unreliable)
[    2.553229] [c0000000622e7750] [c0000000007f40b4] free_pgd_range+0x284/0x3b0
[    2.553248] [c0000000622e7800] [c0000000007f4630] free_pgtables+0x450/0x570
[    2.553274] [c0000000622e78e0] [c0000000008161c0] exit_mmap+0x250/0x650
[    2.553292] [c0000000622e7a30] [c0000000001b95b8] __mmput+0x98/0x290
[    2.558344] [c0000000622e7a80] [c0000000001d1018] exit_mm+0x118/0x1b0
[    2.558361] [c0000000622e7ac0] [c0000000001d141c] do_exit+0x2ec/0x870
[    2.558376] [c0000000622e7b60] [c0000000001d1ca8] do_group_exit+0x88/0x150
[    2.558391] [c0000000622e7bb0] [c0000000001d1db8] sys_exit_group+0x48/0x50
[    2.558407] [c0000000622e7be0] [c00000000003d810] system_call_exception+0x1e0/0x4c0
[    2.558423] [c0000000622e7e50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
(...)
[    2.558892] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[    2.559022] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:000000002267cc9e type:MM_ANONPAGES val:1
[    2.559037] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -6144

Here the modprobe process ended up with an allocated mm_struct from the
mm_struct slab that was used before by the debug_vm_pgtable test.  That is
not a problem, since the mm_struct is initialized again etc., however, if
it ends up using the same pgd table, it bumps into the old stale entry
when clearing/freeing the page table entries, so it tries to free an entry
already gone (that one which was allocated by the debug_vm_pgtable test),
which also explains the negative pgtables_bytes since it's accounting for
not allocated entries in the current process.

As far as I looked pgd_{alloc,free} etc.  does not clear entries, and
clearing of the entries is explicitly done in the free_pgtables->
free_pgd_range->free_p4d_range->free_pud_range->free_pmd_range->
free_pte_range path.  However, the debug_vm_pgtable test does not call
free_pgtables, since it allocates mm_struct and entries manually for its
test and eg.  not goes through page faults.  So it also should clear
manually the entries before exit at destroy_args().

This problem was noticed on a reboot X number of times test being done on
a powerpc host, with a debug kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE enabled. 
Depends on the system, but on a 100 times reboot loop the problem could
manifest once or twice, if a process ends up getting the right mm->pgd
entry with the stale entries used by mm/debug_vm_pagetable.  After using
this patch, I couldn't reproduce/experience the problems anymore.  I was
able to reproduce the problem as well on latest upstream kernel (6.16).

I also modified destroy_args() to use mmput() instead of mmdrop(), there
is no reason to hold mm_users reference and not release the mm_struct
entirely, and in the output above with my debugging prints I already had
patched it to use mmput, it did not fix the problem, but helped in the
debugging as well.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250731214051.4115182-1-herton@redhat.com
Fixes: 3c9b84f ("mm/debug_vm_pgtable: introduce struct pgtable_debug_args")
Signed-off-by: Herton R. Krzesinski <herton@redhat.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Cc: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

commit 7f8fdd4 upstream.

When the PSLVERR_RESP_EN parameter is set to 1, the device generates
an error response if an attempt is made to read an empty RBR (Receive
Buffer Register) while the FIFO is enabled.

In serial8250_do_startup(), calling serial_port_out(port, UART_LCR,
UART_LCR_WLEN8) triggers dw8250_check_lcr(), which invokes
dw8250_force_idle() and serial8250_clear_and_reinit_fifos(). The latter
function enables the FIFO via serial_out(p, UART_FCR, p->fcr).
Execution proceeds to the serial_port_in(port, UART_RX).
This satisfies the PSLVERR trigger condition.

When another CPU (e.g., using printk()) is accessing the UART (UART
is busy), the current CPU fails the check (value & ~UART_LCR_SPAR) ==
(lcr & ~UART_LCR_SPAR) in dw8250_check_lcr(), causing it to enter
dw8250_force_idle().

Put serial_port_out(port, UART_LCR, UART_LCR_WLEN8) under the port->lock
to fix this issue.

Panic backtrace:
[    0.442336] Oops - unknown exception [#1]
[    0.442343] epc : dw8250_serial_in32+0x1e/0x4a
[    0.442351]  ra : serial8250_do_startup+0x2c8/0x88e
...
[    0.442416] console_on_rootfs+0x26/0x70

Fixes: c49436b ("serial: 8250_dw: Improve unwritable LCR workaround")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/84cydt5peu.fsf@jogness.linutronix.de/T/
Signed-off-by: Yunhui Cui <cuiyunhui@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250723023322.464-2-cuiyunhui@bytedance.com
[ adapted to inline code structure without separate serial8250_initialize helper function ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 5ffc47f upstream.

Since the CAAM on these SoCs is managed by another ARM core, called the
SECO (Security Controller) on iMX8QM and Secure Enclave on iMX8ULP, which
also reserves access to register page 0 suspend operations cannot touch
this page.

This is similar to when running OPTEE, where OPTEE will reserve page 0.

Track this situation using a new state variable no_page0, reflecting if
page 0 is reserved elsewhere, either by other management cores in SoC or
by OPTEE.

Replace the optee_en check in suspend/resume with the new check.

optee_en cannot go away as it's needed elsewhere to gate OPTEE specific
situations.

Fixes the following splat at suspend:

    Internal error: synchronous external abort: 0000000096000010 [#1] SMP
    Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP ACU6C (DT)
    pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
    pc : readl+0x0/0x18
    lr : rd_reg32+0x18/0x3c
    sp : ffffffc08192ba20
    x29: ffffffc08192ba20 x28: ffffff8025190000 x27: 0000000000000000
    x26: ffffffc0808ae808 x25: ffffffc080922338 x24: ffffff8020e89090
    x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffffc080922000 x21: ffffff8020e89010
    x20: ffffffc080387ef8 x19: ffffff8020e89010 x18: 000000005d8000d5
    x17: 0000000030f35963 x16: 000000008f785f3f x15: 000000003b8ef57c
    x14: 00000000c418aef8 x13: 00000000f5fea526 x12: 0000000000000001
    x11: 0000000000000002 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : 0000000000000000
    x8 : ffffff8025190870 x7 : ffffff8021726880 x6 : 0000000000000002
    x5 : ffffff80217268f0 x4 : ffffff8021726880 x3 : ffffffc081200000
    x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffffff8020e89010 x0 : ffffffc081200004
    Call trace:
     readl+0x0/0x18
     caam_ctrl_suspend+0x30/0xdc
     dpm_run_callback.constprop.0+0x24/0x5c
     device_suspend+0x170/0x2e8
     dpm_suspend+0xa0/0x104
     dpm_suspend_start+0x48/0x50
     suspend_devices_and_enter+0x7c/0x45c
     pm_suspend+0x148/0x160
     state_store+0xb4/0xf8
     kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x24
     sysfs_kf_write+0x38/0x48
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xb4/0x178
     vfs_write+0x118/0x178
     ksys_write+0x6c/0xd0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x14/0x1c
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x64/0xb0
     do_el0_svc+0x90/0xb0
     el0_svc+0x18/0x44
     el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0x124
     el0t_64_sync+0x150/0x154
    Code: 88dffc21 88dffc21 5ac00800 d65f03c0 (b9400000)

Fixes: d283570 ("crypto: caam - i.MX8ULP donot have CAAM page0 access")
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v6.10+
Signed-off-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se>
Reviewed-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d79123d upstream.

Doing a list_del() on the epf_group field of struct pci_epf_driver in
pci_epf_remove_cfs() is not correct as this field is a list head, not
a list entry. This list_del() call triggers a KASAN warning when an
endpoint function driver which has a configfs attribute group is torn
down:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pci_epf_remove_cfs+0x17c/0x198
Write of size 8 at addr ffff00010f4a0d80 by task rmmod/319

CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 319 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.16.0-rc2 #1 NONE
Hardware name: Radxa ROCK 5B (DT)
Call trace:
show_stack+0x2c/0x84 (C)
dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x98
print_report+0x17c/0x538
kasan_report+0xb8/0x190
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x20/0x2c
pci_epf_remove_cfs+0x17c/0x198
pci_epf_unregister_driver+0x18/0x30
nvmet_pci_epf_cleanup_module+0x24/0x30 [nvmet_pci_epf]
__arm64_sys_delete_module+0x264/0x424
invoke_syscall+0x70/0x260
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xac/0x230
do_el0_svc+0x40/0x58
el0_svc+0x48/0xdc
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
...

Remove this incorrect list_del() call from pci_epf_remove_cfs().

Fixes: ef1433f ("PCI: endpoint: Create configfs entry for each pci_epf_device_id table entry")
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <mani@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250624114544.342159-2-dlemoal@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 7af76e9 upstream.

Receiving HSR frame with insufficient space to hold HSR tag in the skb
can result in a crash (kernel BUG):

[   45.390915] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff86f32cac len:26 put:14 head:ffff888042418000 data:ffff888042417ff4 tail:0xe end:0x180 dev:bridge_slave_1
[   45.392559] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   45.392912] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:211!
[   45.393276] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
[   45.393809] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2496 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 6.15.0 torvalds#12 PREEMPT(undef)
[   45.394433] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   45.395273] RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15b/0x1d0

<snip registers, remove unreliable trace>

[   45.402911] Call Trace:
[   45.403105]  <IRQ>
[   45.404470]  skb_push+0xcd/0xf0
[   45.404726]  br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x7c/0x6c0
[   45.406513]  br_forward_finish+0x128/0x260
[   45.408483]  __br_forward+0x42d/0x590
[   45.409464]  maybe_deliver+0x2eb/0x420
[   45.409763]  br_flood+0x174/0x4a0
[   45.410030]  br_handle_frame_finish+0xc7c/0x1bc0
[   45.411618]  br_handle_frame+0xac3/0x1230
[   45.413674]  __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x808/0x3df0
[   45.422966]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb4/0x1f0
[   45.424478]  __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x170
[   45.424806]  process_backlog+0x242/0x6d0
[   45.425116]  __napi_poll+0xbb/0x630
[   45.425394]  net_rx_action+0x4d1/0xcc0
[   45.427613]  handle_softirqs+0x1a4/0x580
[   45.427926]  do_softirq+0x74/0x90
[   45.428196]  </IRQ>

This issue was found by syzkaller.

The panic happens in br_dev_queue_push_xmit() once it receives a
corrupted skb with ETH header already pushed in linear data. When it
attempts the skb_push() call, there's not enough headroom and
skb_push() panics.

The corrupted skb is put on the queue by HSR layer, which makes a
sequence of unintended transformations when it receives a specific
corrupted HSR frame (with incomplete TAG).

Fix it by dropping and consuming frames that are not long enough to
contain both ethernet and hsr headers.

Alternative fix would be to check for enough headroom before skb_push()
in br_dev_queue_push_xmit().

In the reproducer, this is injected via AF_PACKET, but I don't easily
see why it couldn't be sent over the wire from adjacent network.

Further Details:

In the reproducer, the following network interface chain is set up:

┌────────────────┐   ┌────────────────┐
│ veth0_to_hsr   ├───┤  hsr_slave0    ┼───┐
└────────────────┘   └────────────────┘   │
                                          │ ┌──────┐
                                          ├─┤ hsr0 ├───┐
                                          │ └──────┘   │
┌────────────────┐   ┌────────────────┐   │            │┌────────┐
│ veth1_to_hsr   ┼───┤  hsr_slave1    ├───┘            └┤        │
└────────────────┘   └────────────────┘                ┌┼ bridge │
                                                       ││        │
                                                       │└────────┘
                                                       │
                                        ┌───────┐      │
                                        │  ...  ├──────┘
                                        └───────┘

To trigger the events leading up to crash, reproducer sends a corrupted
HSR frame with incomplete TAG, via AF_PACKET socket on 'veth0_to_hsr'.

The first HSR-layer function to process this frame is
hsr_handle_frame(). It and then checks if the
protocol is ETH_P_PRP or ETH_P_HSR. If it is, it calls
skb_set_network_header(skb, ETH_HLEN + HSR_HLEN), without checking that
the skb is long enough. For the crashing frame it is not, and hence the
skb->network_header and skb->mac_len fields are set incorrectly,
pointing after the end of the linear buffer.

I will call this a BUG#1 and it is what is addressed by this patch. In
the crashing scenario before the fix, the skb continues to go down the
hsr path as follows.

hsr_handle_frame() then calls this sequence
hsr_forward_skb()
  fill_frame_info()
    hsr->proto_ops->fill_frame_info()
      hsr_fill_frame_info()

hsr_fill_frame_info() contains a check that intends to check whether the
skb actually contains the HSR header. But the check relies on the
skb->mac_len field which was erroneously setup due to BUG#1, so the
check passes and the execution continues  back in the hsr_forward_skb():

hsr_forward_skb()
  hsr_forward_do()
    hsr->proto_ops->get_untagged_frame()
      hsr_get_untagged_frame()
        create_stripped_skb_hsr()

In create_stripped_skb_hsr(), a copy of the skb is created and is
further corrupted by operation that attempts to strip the HSR tag in a
call to __pskb_copy().

The skb enters create_stripped_skb_hsr() with ethernet header pushed in
linear buffer. The skb_pull(skb_in, HSR_HLEN) thus pulls 6 bytes of
ethernet header into the headroom, creating skb_in with a headroom of
size 8. The subsequent __pskb_copy() then creates an skb with headroom
of just 2 and skb->len of just 12, this is how it looks after the copy:

gdb) p skb->len
$10 = 12
(gdb) p skb->data
$11 = (unsigned char *) 0xffff888041e45382 "\252\252\252\252\252!\210\373",
(gdb) p skb->head
$12 = (unsigned char *) 0xffff888041e45380 ""

It seems create_stripped_skb_hsr() assumes that ETH header is pulled
in the headroom when it's entered, because it just pulls HSR header on
top. But that is not the case in our code-path and we end up with the
corrupted skb instead. I will call this BUG#2

*I got confused here because it seems that under no conditions can
create_stripped_skb_hsr() work well, the assumption it makes is not true
during the processing of hsr frames - since the skb_push() in
hsr_handle_frame to skb_pull in hsr_deliver_master(). I wonder whether I
missed something here.*

Next, the execution arrives in hsr_deliver_master(). It calls
skb_pull(ETH_HLEN), which just returns NULL - the SKB does not have
enough space for the pull (as it only has 12 bytes in total at this
point).

*The skb_pull() here further suggests that ethernet header is meant
to be pushed through the whole hsr processing and
create_stripped_skb_hsr() should pull it before doing the HSR header
pull.*

hsr_deliver_master() then puts the corrupted skb on the queue, it is
then picked up from there by bridge frame handling layer and finally
lands in br_dev_queue_push_xmit where it panics.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 48b491a ("net: hsr: fix mac_len checks")
Reported-by: syzbot+a81f2759d022496b40ab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <acsjakub@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250819082842.94378-1-acsjakub@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 7e6c313 upstream.

damon_migrate_pages() tries migration even if the target node is invalid.
If users mistakenly make such invalid requests via
DAMOS_MIGRATE_{HOT,COLD} action, the below kernel BUG can happen.

    [ 7831.883495] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001f48
    [ 7831.884160] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
    [ 7831.884681] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
    [ 7831.885203] PGD 0 P4D 0
    [ 7831.885468] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
    [ 7831.885852] CPU: 31 UID: 0 PID: 94202 Comm: kdamond.0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc5-mm-new-damon+ torvalds#93 PREEMPT(voluntary)
    [ 7831.886913] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-4.el9 04/01/2014
    [ 7831.887777] RIP: 0010:__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof (include/linux/mmzone.h:1724 include/linux/mmzone.h:1750 mm/page_alloc.c:4936 mm/page_alloc.c:5137)
    [...]
    [ 7831.895953] Call Trace:
    [ 7831.896195]  <TASK>
    [ 7831.896397] __folio_alloc_noprof (mm/page_alloc.c:5183 mm/page_alloc.c:5192)
    [ 7831.896787] migrate_pages_batch (mm/migrate.c:1189 mm/migrate.c:1851)
    [ 7831.897228] ? __pfx_alloc_migration_target (mm/migrate.c:2137)
    [ 7831.897735] migrate_pages (mm/migrate.c:2078)
    [ 7831.898141] ? __pfx_alloc_migration_target (mm/migrate.c:2137)
    [ 7831.898664] damon_migrate_folio_list (mm/damon/ops-common.c:321 mm/damon/ops-common.c:354)
    [ 7831.899140] damon_migrate_pages (mm/damon/ops-common.c:405)
    [...]

Add a target node validity check in damon_migrate_pages().  The validity
check is stolen from that of do_pages_move(), which is being used for the
move_pages() system call.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250720185822.1451-1-sj@kernel.org
Fixes: b51820e ("mm/damon/paddr: introduce DAMOS_MIGRATE_COLD action for demotion")	[6.11.x]
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Joshua Hahn <joshua.hahnjy@gmail.com>
Cc: Honggyu Kim <honggyu.kim@sk.com>
Cc: Hyeongtak Ji <hyeongtak.ji@sk.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit ad580df ]

There is a potential deadlock that can happen in
try_release_subpage_extent_buffer() because the irq-safe xarray spin
lock fs_info->buffer_tree is being acquired before the irq-unsafe
eb->refs_lock.

This leads to the potential race:
// T1 (random eb->refs user)                  // T2 (release folio)

spin_lock(&eb->refs_lock);
// interrupt
end_bbio_meta_write()
  btrfs_meta_folio_clear_writeback()
                                              btree_release_folio()
                                                folio_test_writeback() //false
                                                try_release_extent_buffer()
                                                  try_release_subpage_extent_buffer()
                                                    xa_lock_irq(&fs_info->buffer_tree)
                                                    spin_lock(&eb->refs_lock); // blocked; held by T1
  buffer_tree_clear_mark()
    xas_lock_irqsave() // blocked; held by T2

I believe that the spin lock can safely be replaced by an rcu_read_lock.
The xa_for_each loop does not need the spin lock as it's already
internally protected by the rcu_read_lock. The extent buffer is also
protected by the rcu_read_lock so it won't be freed before we take the
eb->refs_lock and check the ref count.

The rcu_read_lock is taken and released every iteration, just like the
spin lock, which means we're not protected against concurrent
insertions into the xarray. This is fine because we rely on
folio->private to detect if there are any ebs remaining in the folio.

There is already some precedent for this with find_extent_buffer_nolock,
which loads an extent buffer from the xarray with only rcu_read_lock.

lockdep warning:

            =====================================================
            WARNING: HARDIRQ-safe -> HARDIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
            6.16.0-0_fbk701_debug_rc0_123_g4c06e63b9203 #1 Tainted: G E    N
            -----------------------------------------------------
            kswapd0/66 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire:
            ffff000011ffd600 (&eb->refs_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: try_release_extent_buffer+0x18c/0x560

and this task is already holding:
            ffff0000c1d91b88 (&buffer_xa_class){-.-.}-{3:3}, at: try_release_extent_buffer+0x13c/0x560
            which would create a new lock dependency:
             (&buffer_xa_class){-.-.}-{3:3} -> (&eb->refs_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}

but this new dependency connects a HARDIRQ-irq-safe lock:
             (&buffer_xa_class){-.-.}-{3:3}

... which became HARDIRQ-irq-safe at:
              lock_acquire+0x178/0x358
              _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x88
              buffer_tree_clear_mark+0xc4/0x160
              end_bbio_meta_write+0x238/0x398
              btrfs_bio_end_io+0x1f8/0x330
              btrfs_orig_write_end_io+0x1c4/0x2c0
              bio_endio+0x63c/0x678
              blk_update_request+0x1c4/0xa00
              blk_mq_end_request+0x54/0x88
              virtblk_request_done+0x124/0x1d0
              blk_mq_complete_request+0x84/0xa0
              virtblk_done+0x130/0x238
              vring_interrupt+0x130/0x288
              __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x1e8/0x708
              handle_irq_event+0x98/0x1b0
              handle_fasteoi_irq+0x264/0x7c0
              generic_handle_domain_irq+0xa4/0x108
              gic_handle_irq+0x7c/0x1a0
              do_interrupt_handler+0xe4/0x148
              el1_interrupt+0x30/0x50
              el1h_64_irq_handler+0x14/0x20
              el1h_64_irq+0x6c/0x70
              _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x38/0x70
              __run_timer_base+0xdc/0x5e0
              run_timer_softirq+0xa0/0x138
              handle_softirqs.llvm.13542289750107964195+0x32c/0xbd0
              ____do_softirq.llvm.17674514681856217165+0x18/0x28
              call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x30
              __irq_exit_rcu+0x164/0x430
              irq_exit_rcu+0x18/0x88
              el1_interrupt+0x34/0x50
              el1h_64_irq_handler+0x14/0x20
              el1h_64_irq+0x6c/0x70
              arch_local_irq_enable+0x4/0x8
              do_idle+0x1a0/0x3b8
              cpu_startup_entry+0x60/0x80
              rest_init+0x204/0x228
              start_kernel+0x394/0x3f0
              __primary_switched+0x8c/0x8958

to a HARDIRQ-irq-unsafe lock:
             (&eb->refs_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}

... which became HARDIRQ-irq-unsafe at:
            ...
              lock_acquire+0x178/0x358
              _raw_spin_lock+0x4c/0x68
              free_extent_buffer_stale+0x2c/0x170
              btrfs_read_sys_array+0x1b0/0x338
              open_ctree+0xeb0/0x1df8
              btrfs_get_tree+0xb60/0x1110
              vfs_get_tree+0x8c/0x250
              fc_mount+0x20/0x98
              btrfs_get_tree+0x4a4/0x1110
              vfs_get_tree+0x8c/0x250
              do_new_mount+0x1e0/0x6c0
              path_mount+0x4ec/0xa58
              __arm64_sys_mount+0x370/0x490
              invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x208
              el0_svc_common+0x14c/0x1b8
              do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x60
              el0_svc+0x4c/0x160
              el0t_64_sync_handler+0x70/0x100
              el0t_64_sync+0x168/0x170

other info that might help us debug this:
             Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
                   CPU0                    CPU1
                   ----                    ----
              lock(&eb->refs_lock);
                                           local_irq_disable();
                                           lock(&buffer_xa_class);
                                           lock(&eb->refs_lock);
              <Interrupt>
                lock(&buffer_xa_class);

  *** DEADLOCK ***
            2 locks held by kswapd0/66:
             #0: ffff800085506e40 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0xe8/0xe50
             #1: ffff0000c1d91b88 (&buffer_xa_class){-.-.}-{3:3}, at: try_release_extent_buffer+0x13c/0x560

Link: https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/locking/lockdep-design.rst#:~:text=Multi%2Dlock%20dependency%20rules%3A
Fixes: 19d7f65 ("btrfs: convert the buffer_radix to an xarray")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.16+
Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Leo Martins <loemra.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit b151136 ]

btrfs_subpage_set_writeback() calls folio_start_writeback() the first time
a folio is written back, and it also clears the PAGECACHE_TAG_TOWRITE tag
even if there are still dirty blocks in the folio. This can break ordering
guarantees, such as those required by btrfs_wait_ordered_extents().

That ordering breakage leads to a real failure. For example, running
generic/464 on a zoned setup will hit the following ASSERT. This happens
because the broken ordering fails to flush existing dirty pages before the
file size is truncated.

  assertion failed: !list_empty(&ordered->list) :: 0, in fs/btrfs/zoned.c:1899
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/zoned.c:1899!
  Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1906169 Comm: kworker/u130:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.16.0-rc6-BTRFS-ZNS+ torvalds#554 PREEMPT(voluntary)
  Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/H12SSL-NT, BIOS 2.0 02/22/2021
  Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned.cold+0x50/0x52 [btrfs]
  RSP: 0018:ffffc9002efdbd60 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 000000000000004c RBX: ffff88811923c4e0 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff827e38b1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
  RBP: ffff88810005d000 R08: 00000000ffffdfff R09: ffffffff831051c8
  R10: ffffffff83055220 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881c2458c00
  R13: ffff88811923c540 R14: ffff88811923c5e8 R15: ffff8881c1bd9680
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88a04acd0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f907c7a918c CR3: 0000000004024000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x4a/0x60 [btrfs]
   btrfs_work_helper+0xf9/0x490 [btrfs]
   process_one_work+0x204/0x590
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   worker_thread+0x1d6/0x3d0
   ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
   kthread+0x118/0x230
   ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork+0x205/0x260
   ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
   </TASK>

Consider process A calling writepages() with WB_SYNC_NONE. In zoned mode or
for compressed writes, it locks several folios for delalloc and starts
writing them out. Let's call the last locked folio folio X. Suppose the
write range only partially covers folio X, leaving some pages dirty.
Process A calls btrfs_subpage_set_writeback() when building a bio. This
function call clears the TOWRITE tag of folio X, whose size = 8K and
the block size = 4K. It is following state.

   0     4K    8K
   |/////|/////|  (flag: DIRTY, tag: DIRTY)
   <-----> Process A will write this range.

Now suppose process B concurrently calls writepages() with WB_SYNC_ALL. It
calls tag_pages_for_writeback() to tag dirty folios with
PAGECACHE_TAG_TOWRITE. Since folio X is still dirty, it gets tagged. Then,
B collects tagged folios using filemap_get_folios_tag() and must wait for
folio X to be written before returning from writepages().

   0     4K    8K
   |/////|/////|  (flag: DIRTY, tag: DIRTY|TOWRITE)

However, between tagging and collecting, process A may call
btrfs_subpage_set_writeback() and clear folio X's TOWRITE tag.
   0     4K    8K
   |     |/////|  (flag: DIRTY|WRITEBACK, tag: DIRTY)

As a result, process B won't see folio X in its batch, and returns without
waiting for it. This breaks the WB_SYNC_ALL ordering requirement.

Fix this by using btrfs_subpage_set_writeback_keepwrite(), which retains
the TOWRITE tag. We now manually clear the tag only after the folio becomes
clean, via the xas operation.

Fixes: 3470da3 ("btrfs: subpage: introduce helpers for writeback status")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.12+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit dde3085 upstream.

The mm/debug_vm_pagetable test allocates manually page table entries for
the tests it runs, using also its manually allocated mm_struct.  That in
itself is ok, but when it exits, at destroy_args() it fails to clear those
entries with the *_clear functions.

The problem is that leaves stale entries.  If another process allocates an
mm_struct with a pgd at the same address, it may end up running into the
stale entry.  This is happening in practice on a debug kernel with
CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE=y, for example this is the output with some extra
debugging I added (it prints a warning trace if pgtables_bytes goes
negative, in addition to the warning at check_mm() function):

[    2.539353] debug_vm_pgtable: [get_random_vaddr         ]: random_vaddr is 0x7ea247140000
[    2.539366] kmem_cache info
[    2.539374] kmem_cachep 0x000000002ce82385 - freelist 0x0000000000000000 - offset 0x508
[    2.539447] debug_vm_pgtable: [init_args                ]: args->mm is 0x000000002267cc9e
(...)
[    2.552800] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 116 at include/linux/mm.h:2841 free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0
[    2.552816] Modules linked in:
[    2.552843] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 116 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug #1 VOLUNTARY
[    2.552859] Hardware name: IBM,9009-41A POWER9 (architected) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW910.00 (VL910_062) hv:phyp pSeries
[    2.552872] NIP:  c0000000007eef3c LR: c0000000007eef30 CTR: c0000000003d8c90
[    2.552885] REGS: c0000000622e73b0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug)
[    2.552899] MSR:  800000000282b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 24002822  XER: 0000000a
[    2.552954] CFAR: c0000000008f03f0 IRQMASK: 0
[    2.552954] GPR00: c0000000007eef30 c0000000622e7650 c000000002b1ac00 0000000000000001
[    2.552954] GPR04: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 c0000000007eef30 ffffffffffffffff
[    2.552954] GPR08: 00000000ffff00f5 0000000000000001 0000000000000048 0000000000004000
[    2.552954] GPR12: 00000003fa440000 c000000017ffa300 c0000000051d9f80 ffffffffffffffdb
[    2.552954] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 000000000000000a 60000000000000e0
[    2.552954] GPR20: 4080000000000000 c0000000113af038 00007fffcf130000 0000700000000000
[    2.552954] GPR24: c000000062a6a000 0000000000000001 8000000062a68000 0000000000000001
[    2.552954] GPR28: 000000000000000a c000000062ebc600 0000000000002000 c000000062ebc760
[    2.553170] NIP [c0000000007eef3c] free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0
[    2.553185] LR [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0
[    2.553199] Call Trace:
[    2.553207] [c0000000622e7650] [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0 (unreliable)
[    2.553229] [c0000000622e7750] [c0000000007f40b4] free_pgd_range+0x284/0x3b0
[    2.553248] [c0000000622e7800] [c0000000007f4630] free_pgtables+0x450/0x570
[    2.553274] [c0000000622e78e0] [c0000000008161c0] exit_mmap+0x250/0x650
[    2.553292] [c0000000622e7a30] [c0000000001b95b8] __mmput+0x98/0x290
[    2.558344] [c0000000622e7a80] [c0000000001d1018] exit_mm+0x118/0x1b0
[    2.558361] [c0000000622e7ac0] [c0000000001d141c] do_exit+0x2ec/0x870
[    2.558376] [c0000000622e7b60] [c0000000001d1ca8] do_group_exit+0x88/0x150
[    2.558391] [c0000000622e7bb0] [c0000000001d1db8] sys_exit_group+0x48/0x50
[    2.558407] [c0000000622e7be0] [c00000000003d810] system_call_exception+0x1e0/0x4c0
[    2.558423] [c0000000622e7e50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
(...)
[    2.558892] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[    2.559022] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:000000002267cc9e type:MM_ANONPAGES val:1
[    2.559037] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -6144

Here the modprobe process ended up with an allocated mm_struct from the
mm_struct slab that was used before by the debug_vm_pgtable test.  That is
not a problem, since the mm_struct is initialized again etc., however, if
it ends up using the same pgd table, it bumps into the old stale entry
when clearing/freeing the page table entries, so it tries to free an entry
already gone (that one which was allocated by the debug_vm_pgtable test),
which also explains the negative pgtables_bytes since it's accounting for
not allocated entries in the current process.

As far as I looked pgd_{alloc,free} etc.  does not clear entries, and
clearing of the entries is explicitly done in the free_pgtables->
free_pgd_range->free_p4d_range->free_pud_range->free_pmd_range->
free_pte_range path.  However, the debug_vm_pgtable test does not call
free_pgtables, since it allocates mm_struct and entries manually for its
test and eg.  not goes through page faults.  So it also should clear
manually the entries before exit at destroy_args().

This problem was noticed on a reboot X number of times test being done on
a powerpc host, with a debug kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE enabled.
Depends on the system, but on a 100 times reboot loop the problem could
manifest once or twice, if a process ends up getting the right mm->pgd
entry with the stale entries used by mm/debug_vm_pagetable.  After using
this patch, I couldn't reproduce/experience the problems anymore.  I was
able to reproduce the problem as well on latest upstream kernel (6.16).

I also modified destroy_args() to use mmput() instead of mmdrop(), there
is no reason to hold mm_users reference and not release the mm_struct
entirely, and in the output above with my debugging prints I already had
patched it to use mmput, it did not fix the problem, but helped in the
debugging as well.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250731214051.4115182-1-herton@redhat.com
Fixes: 3c9b84f ("mm/debug_vm_pgtable: introduce struct pgtable_debug_args")
Signed-off-by: Herton R. Krzesinski <herton@redhat.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Cc: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit eabcac8 ]

Commit 3c7ac40 ("scsi: ufs: core: Delegate the interrupt service
routine to a threaded IRQ handler") introduced an IRQ lock inversion
issue. Fix this lock inversion by changing the spin_lock_irq() calls into
spin_lock_irqsave() calls in code that can be called either from
interrupt context or from thread context. This patch fixes the following
lockdep complaint:

WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 Tainted: G        W  OE
--------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u28:0/12 just changed the state of lock:
ffffff881e29dd60 (&hba->clk_gating.lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110
but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-unsafe lock in the past:
 (shost->host_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}

and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(shost->host_lock);
                               local_irq_disable();
                               lock(&hba->clk_gating.lock);
                               lock(shost->host_lock);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(&hba->clk_gating.lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

4 locks held by kworker/u28:0/12:
 #0: ffffff8800ac6158 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1bc/0x65c
 #1: ffffffc085c93d70 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1e4/0x65c
 #2: ffffff881e29c0e0 (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __scsi_add_device+0x74/0x120
 #3: ffffff881960ea00 (&hwq->cq_lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0x28/0x104

the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock:
 -> (shost->host_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} {
    HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
                      lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
                      _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64
                      ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08
                      ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c
                      irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8
                      irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec
                      kthread+0x110/0x134
                      ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
    SOFTIRQ-ON-W at:
                      lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
                      _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64
                      ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08
                      ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c
                      irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8
                      irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec
                      kthread+0x110/0x134
                      ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
    INITIAL USE at:
                     lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
                     _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64
                     ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08
                     ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c
                     irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8
                     irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec
                     kthread+0x110/0x134
                     ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
  }
  ... key      at: [<ffffffc085ba1a98>] scsi_host_alloc.__key+0x0/0x10
  ... acquired at:
   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
   __ufshcd_release+0x78/0x118
   ufshcd_send_uic_cmd+0xe4/0x118
   ufshcd_dme_set_attr+0x88/0x1c8
   ufs_google_phy_initialization+0x68/0x418 [ufs]
   ufs_google_link_startup_notify+0x78/0x27c [ufs]
   ufshcd_link_startup+0x84/0x720
   ufshcd_init+0xf3c/0x1330
   ufshcd_pltfrm_init+0x728/0x7d8
   ufs_google_probe+0x30/0x84 [ufs]
   platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0
   really_probe+0x114/0x454
   __driver_probe_device+0xa4/0x160
   driver_probe_device+0x44/0x23c
   __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xd4
   async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c
   process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
   worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
   kthread+0x110/0x134
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

-> (&hba->clk_gating.lock){-...}-{2:2} {
   IN-HARDIRQ-W at:
                    lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
                    _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
                    ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110
                    ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4
                    ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104
                    ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs]
                    __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c
                    handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c
                    handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8
                    generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80
                    gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104
                    call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50
                    do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8
                    el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58
                    el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
                    el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c
                    _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c
                    debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c
                    __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c
                    schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c
                    io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70
                    do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194
                    wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c
                    blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c
                    scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8
                    scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74
                    __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120
                    ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0
                    async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c
                    process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
                    worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
                    kthread+0x110/0x134
                    ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
   INITIAL USE at:
                   lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
                   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
                   ufshcd_hold+0x34/0x14c
                   ufshcd_send_uic_cmd+0x28/0x118
                   ufshcd_dme_set_attr+0x88/0x1c8
                   ufs_google_phy_initialization+0x68/0x418 [ufs]
                   ufs_google_link_startup_notify+0x78/0x27c [ufs]
                   ufshcd_link_startup+0x84/0x720
                   ufshcd_init+0xf3c/0x1330
                   ufshcd_pltfrm_init+0x728/0x7d8
                   ufs_google_probe+0x30/0x84 [ufs]
                   platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0
                   really_probe+0x114/0x454
                   __driver_probe_device+0xa4/0x160
                   driver_probe_device+0x44/0x23c
                   __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xd4
                   async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c
                   process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
                   worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
                   kthread+0x110/0x134
                   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
 }
 ... key      at: [<ffffffc085ba6fe8>] ufshcd_init.__key+0x0/0x10
 ... acquired at:
   mark_lock+0x1c4/0x224
   __lock_acquire+0x438/0x2e1c
   lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
   ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110
   ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4
   ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104
   ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs]
   __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c
   handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c
   handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8
   generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80
   gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104
   call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50
   do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8
   el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58
   el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
   el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c
   _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c
   debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c
   __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c
   schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c
   io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70
   do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194
   wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c
   blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c
   scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8
   scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74
   __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120
   ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0
   async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c
   process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
   worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
   kthread+0x110/0x134
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

stack backtrace:
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u28:0 Tainted: G        W  OE      6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 ccd4020fe444bdf629efc3b86df6be920b8df7d0
Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Spacecraft board based on MALIBU (DT)
Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c
 show_stack+0x18/0x28
 dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0
 dump_stack+0x18/0x24
 print_irq_inversion_bug+0x2fc/0x304
 mark_lock_irq+0x388/0x4fc
 mark_lock+0x1c4/0x224
 __lock_acquire+0x438/0x2e1c
 lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
 ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110
 ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4
 ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104
 ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs dd6f385554e109da094ab91d5f7be18625a2222a]
 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c
 handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c
 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8
 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80
 gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104
 call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50
 do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8
 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58
 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
 el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c
 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c
 debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c
 __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c
 schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c
 io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70
 do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194
 wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c
 blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c
 scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8
 scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74
 __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120
 ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0
 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c
 process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
 worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
 kthread+0x110/0x134
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Cc: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Cc: André Draszik <andre.draszik@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wang <peter.wang@mediatek.com>
Fixes: 3c7ac40 ("scsi: ufs: core: Delegate the interrupt service routine to a threaded IRQ handler")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250815155842.472867-2-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit d9cef55 ]

BPF CI testing report a UAF issue:

  [   16.446633] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000003  0
  [   16.447134] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mod  e
  [   16.447516] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present pag  e
  [   16.447878] PGD 0 P4D   0
  [   16.448063] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPT  I
  [   16.448409] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G           OE      6.13.0-rc3-g89e8a75fda73-dirty #4  2
  [   16.449124] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODUL  E
  [   16.449502] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/201  4
  [   16.450201] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_wor  k
  [   16.450531] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159  0
  [   16.452158] RSP: 0018:ffffb5ab40053d98 EFLAGS: 0001024  6
  [   16.452526] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000030  0
  [   16.452994] RDX: 0000000000000280 RSI: 00003513840053f0 RDI: 000000000000000  0
  [   16.453492] RBP: ffffa097808e3800 R08: ffffa09782dba1e0 R09: 000000000000000  5
  [   16.453987] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0978274640  0
  [   16.454497] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa09782d4092  0
  [   16.454996] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa097bbc00000(0000) knlGS:000000000000000  0
  [   16.455557] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003  3
  [   16.455961] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000102788004 CR4: 0000000000770ef  0
  [   16.456459] PKRU: 5555555  4
  [   16.456654] Call Trace  :
  [   16.456832]  <TASK  >
  [   16.456989]  ? __die+0x23/0x7  0
  [   16.457215]  ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c  0
  [   16.457508]  ? __lock_acquire+0x3e6/0x249  0
  [   16.457801]  ? exc_page_fault+0x68/0x20  0
  [   16.458080]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x3  0
  [   16.458389]  ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159  0
  [   16.458689]  ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159  0
  [   16.458987]  ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x10  0
  [   16.459284]  process_one_work+0x1ea/0x6d  0
  [   16.459570]  worker_thread+0x1c3/0x38  0
  [   16.459839]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x1  0
  [   16.460144]  kthread+0xe0/0x11  0
  [   16.460372]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1  0
  [   16.460640]  ret_from_fork+0x31/0x5  0
  [   16.460896]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1  0
  [   16.461166]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x3  0
  [   16.461453]  </TASK  >
  [   16.461616] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE)  ]
  [   16.462134] CR2: 000000000000003  0
  [   16.462380] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  [   16.462710] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x1590

The direct cause of this issue is that after smc_listen_out_connected(),
newclcsock->sk may be NULL since it will releases the smcsk. Therefore,
if the application closes the socket immediately after accept,
newclcsock->sk can be NULL. A possible execution order could be as
follows:

smc_listen_work                                 | userspace
-----------------------------------------------------------------
lock_sock(sk)                                   |
smc_listen_out_connected()                      |
| \- smc_listen_out                             |
|    | \- release_sock                          |
     | |- sk->sk_data_ready()                   |
                                                | fd = accept();
                                                | close(fd);
                                                |  \- socket->sk = NULL;
/* newclcsock->sk is NULL now */
SMC_STAT_SERV_SUCC_INC(sock_net(newclcsock->sk))

Since smc_listen_out_connected() will not fail, simply swapping the order
of the code can easily fix this issue.

Fixes: 3b2dec2 ("net/smc: restructure client and server code in af_smc")
Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Guangguan Wang <guangguan.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250818054618.41615-1-alibuda@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 7f8fdd4 upstream.

When the PSLVERR_RESP_EN parameter is set to 1, the device generates
an error response if an attempt is made to read an empty RBR (Receive
Buffer Register) while the FIFO is enabled.

In serial8250_do_startup(), calling serial_port_out(port, UART_LCR,
UART_LCR_WLEN8) triggers dw8250_check_lcr(), which invokes
dw8250_force_idle() and serial8250_clear_and_reinit_fifos(). The latter
function enables the FIFO via serial_out(p, UART_FCR, p->fcr).
Execution proceeds to the serial_port_in(port, UART_RX).
This satisfies the PSLVERR trigger condition.

When another CPU (e.g., using printk()) is accessing the UART (UART
is busy), the current CPU fails the check (value & ~UART_LCR_SPAR) ==
(lcr & ~UART_LCR_SPAR) in dw8250_check_lcr(), causing it to enter
dw8250_force_idle().

Put serial_port_out(port, UART_LCR, UART_LCR_WLEN8) under the port->lock
to fix this issue.

Panic backtrace:
[    0.442336] Oops - unknown exception [#1]
[    0.442343] epc : dw8250_serial_in32+0x1e/0x4a
[    0.442351]  ra : serial8250_do_startup+0x2c8/0x88e
...
[    0.442416] console_on_rootfs+0x26/0x70

Fixes: c49436b ("serial: 8250_dw: Improve unwritable LCR workaround")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/84cydt5peu.fsf@jogness.linutronix.de/T/
Signed-off-by: Yunhui Cui <cuiyunhui@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250723023322.464-2-cuiyunhui@bytedance.com
[ adapted to inline code structure without separate serial8250_initialize helper function ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 5ffc47f upstream.

Since the CAAM on these SoCs is managed by another ARM core, called the
SECO (Security Controller) on iMX8QM and Secure Enclave on iMX8ULP, which
also reserves access to register page 0 suspend operations cannot touch
this page.

This is similar to when running OPTEE, where OPTEE will reserve page 0.

Track this situation using a new state variable no_page0, reflecting if
page 0 is reserved elsewhere, either by other management cores in SoC or
by OPTEE.

Replace the optee_en check in suspend/resume with the new check.

optee_en cannot go away as it's needed elsewhere to gate OPTEE specific
situations.

Fixes the following splat at suspend:

    Internal error: synchronous external abort: 0000000096000010 [#1] SMP
    Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP ACU6C (DT)
    pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
    pc : readl+0x0/0x18
    lr : rd_reg32+0x18/0x3c
    sp : ffffffc08192ba20
    x29: ffffffc08192ba20 x28: ffffff8025190000 x27: 0000000000000000
    x26: ffffffc0808ae808 x25: ffffffc080922338 x24: ffffff8020e89090
    x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffffc080922000 x21: ffffff8020e89010
    x20: ffffffc080387ef8 x19: ffffff8020e89010 x18: 000000005d8000d5
    x17: 0000000030f35963 x16: 000000008f785f3f x15: 000000003b8ef57c
    x14: 00000000c418aef8 x13: 00000000f5fea526 x12: 0000000000000001
    x11: 0000000000000002 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : 0000000000000000
    x8 : ffffff8025190870 x7 : ffffff8021726880 x6 : 0000000000000002
    x5 : ffffff80217268f0 x4 : ffffff8021726880 x3 : ffffffc081200000
    x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffffff8020e89010 x0 : ffffffc081200004
    Call trace:
     readl+0x0/0x18
     caam_ctrl_suspend+0x30/0xdc
     dpm_run_callback.constprop.0+0x24/0x5c
     device_suspend+0x170/0x2e8
     dpm_suspend+0xa0/0x104
     dpm_suspend_start+0x48/0x50
     suspend_devices_and_enter+0x7c/0x45c
     pm_suspend+0x148/0x160
     state_store+0xb4/0xf8
     kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x24
     sysfs_kf_write+0x38/0x48
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xb4/0x178
     vfs_write+0x118/0x178
     ksys_write+0x6c/0xd0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x14/0x1c
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x64/0xb0
     do_el0_svc+0x90/0xb0
     el0_svc+0x18/0x44
     el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0x124
     el0t_64_sync+0x150/0x154
    Code: 88dffc21 88dffc21 5ac00800 d65f03c0 (b9400000)

Fixes: d283570 ("crypto: caam - i.MX8ULP donot have CAAM page0 access")
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v6.10+
Signed-off-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se>
Reviewed-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d79123d upstream.

Doing a list_del() on the epf_group field of struct pci_epf_driver in
pci_epf_remove_cfs() is not correct as this field is a list head, not
a list entry. This list_del() call triggers a KASAN warning when an
endpoint function driver which has a configfs attribute group is torn
down:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pci_epf_remove_cfs+0x17c/0x198
Write of size 8 at addr ffff00010f4a0d80 by task rmmod/319

CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 319 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.16.0-rc2 #1 NONE
Hardware name: Radxa ROCK 5B (DT)
Call trace:
show_stack+0x2c/0x84 (C)
dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x98
print_report+0x17c/0x538
kasan_report+0xb8/0x190
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x20/0x2c
pci_epf_remove_cfs+0x17c/0x198
pci_epf_unregister_driver+0x18/0x30
nvmet_pci_epf_cleanup_module+0x24/0x30 [nvmet_pci_epf]
__arm64_sys_delete_module+0x264/0x424
invoke_syscall+0x70/0x260
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xac/0x230
do_el0_svc+0x40/0x58
el0_svc+0x48/0xdc
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
...

Remove this incorrect list_del() call from pci_epf_remove_cfs().

Fixes: ef1433f ("PCI: endpoint: Create configfs entry for each pci_epf_device_id table entry")
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <mani@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250624114544.342159-2-dlemoal@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 7af76e9 upstream.

Receiving HSR frame with insufficient space to hold HSR tag in the skb
can result in a crash (kernel BUG):

[   45.390915] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff86f32cac len:26 put:14 head:ffff888042418000 data:ffff888042417ff4 tail:0xe end:0x180 dev:bridge_slave_1
[   45.392559] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   45.392912] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:211!
[   45.393276] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
[   45.393809] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2496 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 6.15.0 torvalds#12 PREEMPT(undef)
[   45.394433] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   45.395273] RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15b/0x1d0

<snip registers, remove unreliable trace>

[   45.402911] Call Trace:
[   45.403105]  <IRQ>
[   45.404470]  skb_push+0xcd/0xf0
[   45.404726]  br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x7c/0x6c0
[   45.406513]  br_forward_finish+0x128/0x260
[   45.408483]  __br_forward+0x42d/0x590
[   45.409464]  maybe_deliver+0x2eb/0x420
[   45.409763]  br_flood+0x174/0x4a0
[   45.410030]  br_handle_frame_finish+0xc7c/0x1bc0
[   45.411618]  br_handle_frame+0xac3/0x1230
[   45.413674]  __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x808/0x3df0
[   45.422966]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb4/0x1f0
[   45.424478]  __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x170
[   45.424806]  process_backlog+0x242/0x6d0
[   45.425116]  __napi_poll+0xbb/0x630
[   45.425394]  net_rx_action+0x4d1/0xcc0
[   45.427613]  handle_softirqs+0x1a4/0x580
[   45.427926]  do_softirq+0x74/0x90
[   45.428196]  </IRQ>

This issue was found by syzkaller.

The panic happens in br_dev_queue_push_xmit() once it receives a
corrupted skb with ETH header already pushed in linear data. When it
attempts the skb_push() call, there's not enough headroom and
skb_push() panics.

The corrupted skb is put on the queue by HSR layer, which makes a
sequence of unintended transformations when it receives a specific
corrupted HSR frame (with incomplete TAG).

Fix it by dropping and consuming frames that are not long enough to
contain both ethernet and hsr headers.

Alternative fix would be to check for enough headroom before skb_push()
in br_dev_queue_push_xmit().

In the reproducer, this is injected via AF_PACKET, but I don't easily
see why it couldn't be sent over the wire from adjacent network.

Further Details:

In the reproducer, the following network interface chain is set up:

┌────────────────┐   ┌────────────────┐
│ veth0_to_hsr   ├───┤  hsr_slave0    ┼───┐
└────────────────┘   └────────────────┘   │
                                          │ ┌──────┐
                                          ├─┤ hsr0 ├───┐
                                          │ └──────┘   │
┌────────────────┐   ┌────────────────┐   │            │┌────────┐
│ veth1_to_hsr   ┼───┤  hsr_slave1    ├───┘            └┤        │
└────────────────┘   └────────────────┘                ┌┼ bridge │
                                                       ││        │
                                                       │└────────┘
                                                       │
                                        ┌───────┐      │
                                        │  ...  ├──────┘
                                        └───────┘

To trigger the events leading up to crash, reproducer sends a corrupted
HSR frame with incomplete TAG, via AF_PACKET socket on 'veth0_to_hsr'.

The first HSR-layer function to process this frame is
hsr_handle_frame(). It and then checks if the
protocol is ETH_P_PRP or ETH_P_HSR. If it is, it calls
skb_set_network_header(skb, ETH_HLEN + HSR_HLEN), without checking that
the skb is long enough. For the crashing frame it is not, and hence the
skb->network_header and skb->mac_len fields are set incorrectly,
pointing after the end of the linear buffer.

I will call this a BUG#1 and it is what is addressed by this patch. In
the crashing scenario before the fix, the skb continues to go down the
hsr path as follows.

hsr_handle_frame() then calls this sequence
hsr_forward_skb()
  fill_frame_info()
    hsr->proto_ops->fill_frame_info()
      hsr_fill_frame_info()

hsr_fill_frame_info() contains a check that intends to check whether the
skb actually contains the HSR header. But the check relies on the
skb->mac_len field which was erroneously setup due to BUG#1, so the
check passes and the execution continues  back in the hsr_forward_skb():

hsr_forward_skb()
  hsr_forward_do()
    hsr->proto_ops->get_untagged_frame()
      hsr_get_untagged_frame()
        create_stripped_skb_hsr()

In create_stripped_skb_hsr(), a copy of the skb is created and is
further corrupted by operation that attempts to strip the HSR tag in a
call to __pskb_copy().

The skb enters create_stripped_skb_hsr() with ethernet header pushed in
linear buffer. The skb_pull(skb_in, HSR_HLEN) thus pulls 6 bytes of
ethernet header into the headroom, creating skb_in with a headroom of
size 8. The subsequent __pskb_copy() then creates an skb with headroom
of just 2 and skb->len of just 12, this is how it looks after the copy:

gdb) p skb->len
$10 = 12
(gdb) p skb->data
$11 = (unsigned char *) 0xffff888041e45382 "\252\252\252\252\252!\210\373",
(gdb) p skb->head
$12 = (unsigned char *) 0xffff888041e45380 ""

It seems create_stripped_skb_hsr() assumes that ETH header is pulled
in the headroom when it's entered, because it just pulls HSR header on
top. But that is not the case in our code-path and we end up with the
corrupted skb instead. I will call this BUG#2

*I got confused here because it seems that under no conditions can
create_stripped_skb_hsr() work well, the assumption it makes is not true
during the processing of hsr frames - since the skb_push() in
hsr_handle_frame to skb_pull in hsr_deliver_master(). I wonder whether I
missed something here.*

Next, the execution arrives in hsr_deliver_master(). It calls
skb_pull(ETH_HLEN), which just returns NULL - the SKB does not have
enough space for the pull (as it only has 12 bytes in total at this
point).

*The skb_pull() here further suggests that ethernet header is meant
to be pushed through the whole hsr processing and
create_stripped_skb_hsr() should pull it before doing the HSR header
pull.*

hsr_deliver_master() then puts the corrupted skb on the queue, it is
then picked up from there by bridge frame handling layer and finally
lands in br_dev_queue_push_xmit where it panics.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 48b491a ("net: hsr: fix mac_len checks")
Reported-by: syzbot+a81f2759d022496b40ab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <acsjakub@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250819082842.94378-1-acsjakub@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 7e6c313 upstream.

damon_migrate_pages() tries migration even if the target node is invalid.
If users mistakenly make such invalid requests via
DAMOS_MIGRATE_{HOT,COLD} action, the below kernel BUG can happen.

    [ 7831.883495] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001f48
    [ 7831.884160] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
    [ 7831.884681] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
    [ 7831.885203] PGD 0 P4D 0
    [ 7831.885468] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
    [ 7831.885852] CPU: 31 UID: 0 PID: 94202 Comm: kdamond.0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc5-mm-new-damon+ torvalds#93 PREEMPT(voluntary)
    [ 7831.886913] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-4.el9 04/01/2014
    [ 7831.887777] RIP: 0010:__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof (include/linux/mmzone.h:1724 include/linux/mmzone.h:1750 mm/page_alloc.c:4936 mm/page_alloc.c:5137)
    [...]
    [ 7831.895953] Call Trace:
    [ 7831.896195]  <TASK>
    [ 7831.896397] __folio_alloc_noprof (mm/page_alloc.c:5183 mm/page_alloc.c:5192)
    [ 7831.896787] migrate_pages_batch (mm/migrate.c:1189 mm/migrate.c:1851)
    [ 7831.897228] ? __pfx_alloc_migration_target (mm/migrate.c:2137)
    [ 7831.897735] migrate_pages (mm/migrate.c:2078)
    [ 7831.898141] ? __pfx_alloc_migration_target (mm/migrate.c:2137)
    [ 7831.898664] damon_migrate_folio_list (mm/damon/ops-common.c:321 mm/damon/ops-common.c:354)
    [ 7831.899140] damon_migrate_pages (mm/damon/ops-common.c:405)
    [...]

Add a target node validity check in damon_migrate_pages().  The validity
check is stolen from that of do_pages_move(), which is being used for the
move_pages() system call.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250720185822.1451-1-sj@kernel.org
Fixes: b51820e ("mm/damon/paddr: introduce DAMOS_MIGRATE_COLD action for demotion")	[6.11.x]
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Joshua Hahn <joshua.hahnjy@gmail.com>
Cc: Honggyu Kim <honggyu.kim@sk.com>
Cc: Hyeongtak Ji <hyeongtak.ji@sk.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit dde3085 upstream.

The mm/debug_vm_pagetable test allocates manually page table entries for
the tests it runs, using also its manually allocated mm_struct.  That in
itself is ok, but when it exits, at destroy_args() it fails to clear those
entries with the *_clear functions.

The problem is that leaves stale entries.  If another process allocates an
mm_struct with a pgd at the same address, it may end up running into the
stale entry.  This is happening in practice on a debug kernel with
CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE=y, for example this is the output with some extra
debugging I added (it prints a warning trace if pgtables_bytes goes
negative, in addition to the warning at check_mm() function):

[    2.539353] debug_vm_pgtable: [get_random_vaddr         ]: random_vaddr is 0x7ea247140000
[    2.539366] kmem_cache info
[    2.539374] kmem_cachep 0x000000002ce82385 - freelist 0x0000000000000000 - offset 0x508
[    2.539447] debug_vm_pgtable: [init_args                ]: args->mm is 0x000000002267cc9e
(...)
[    2.552800] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 116 at include/linux/mm.h:2841 free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0
[    2.552816] Modules linked in:
[    2.552843] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 116 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug #1 VOLUNTARY
[    2.552859] Hardware name: IBM,9009-41A POWER9 (architected) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW910.00 (VL910_062) hv:phyp pSeries
[    2.552872] NIP:  c0000000007eef3c LR: c0000000007eef30 CTR: c0000000003d8c90
[    2.552885] REGS: c0000000622e73b0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug)
[    2.552899] MSR:  800000000282b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 24002822  XER: 0000000a
[    2.552954] CFAR: c0000000008f03f0 IRQMASK: 0
[    2.552954] GPR00: c0000000007eef30 c0000000622e7650 c000000002b1ac00 0000000000000001
[    2.552954] GPR04: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 c0000000007eef30 ffffffffffffffff
[    2.552954] GPR08: 00000000ffff00f5 0000000000000001 0000000000000048 0000000000004000
[    2.552954] GPR12: 00000003fa440000 c000000017ffa300 c0000000051d9f80 ffffffffffffffdb
[    2.552954] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 000000000000000a 60000000000000e0
[    2.552954] GPR20: 4080000000000000 c0000000113af038 00007fffcf130000 0000700000000000
[    2.552954] GPR24: c000000062a6a000 0000000000000001 8000000062a68000 0000000000000001
[    2.552954] GPR28: 000000000000000a c000000062ebc600 0000000000002000 c000000062ebc760
[    2.553170] NIP [c0000000007eef3c] free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0
[    2.553185] LR [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0
[    2.553199] Call Trace:
[    2.553207] [c0000000622e7650] [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0 (unreliable)
[    2.553229] [c0000000622e7750] [c0000000007f40b4] free_pgd_range+0x284/0x3b0
[    2.553248] [c0000000622e7800] [c0000000007f4630] free_pgtables+0x450/0x570
[    2.553274] [c0000000622e78e0] [c0000000008161c0] exit_mmap+0x250/0x650
[    2.553292] [c0000000622e7a30] [c0000000001b95b8] __mmput+0x98/0x290
[    2.558344] [c0000000622e7a80] [c0000000001d1018] exit_mm+0x118/0x1b0
[    2.558361] [c0000000622e7ac0] [c0000000001d141c] do_exit+0x2ec/0x870
[    2.558376] [c0000000622e7b60] [c0000000001d1ca8] do_group_exit+0x88/0x150
[    2.558391] [c0000000622e7bb0] [c0000000001d1db8] sys_exit_group+0x48/0x50
[    2.558407] [c0000000622e7be0] [c00000000003d810] system_call_exception+0x1e0/0x4c0
[    2.558423] [c0000000622e7e50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
(...)
[    2.558892] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[    2.559022] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:000000002267cc9e type:MM_ANONPAGES val:1
[    2.559037] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -6144

Here the modprobe process ended up with an allocated mm_struct from the
mm_struct slab that was used before by the debug_vm_pgtable test.  That is
not a problem, since the mm_struct is initialized again etc., however, if
it ends up using the same pgd table, it bumps into the old stale entry
when clearing/freeing the page table entries, so it tries to free an entry
already gone (that one which was allocated by the debug_vm_pgtable test),
which also explains the negative pgtables_bytes since it's accounting for
not allocated entries in the current process.

As far as I looked pgd_{alloc,free} etc.  does not clear entries, and
clearing of the entries is explicitly done in the free_pgtables->
free_pgd_range->free_p4d_range->free_pud_range->free_pmd_range->
free_pte_range path.  However, the debug_vm_pgtable test does not call
free_pgtables, since it allocates mm_struct and entries manually for its
test and eg.  not goes through page faults.  So it also should clear
manually the entries before exit at destroy_args().

This problem was noticed on a reboot X number of times test being done on
a powerpc host, with a debug kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE enabled.
Depends on the system, but on a 100 times reboot loop the problem could
manifest once or twice, if a process ends up getting the right mm->pgd
entry with the stale entries used by mm/debug_vm_pagetable.  After using
this patch, I couldn't reproduce/experience the problems anymore.  I was
able to reproduce the problem as well on latest upstream kernel (6.16).

I also modified destroy_args() to use mmput() instead of mmdrop(), there
is no reason to hold mm_users reference and not release the mm_struct
entirely, and in the output above with my debugging prints I already had
patched it to use mmput, it did not fix the problem, but helped in the
debugging as well.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250731214051.4115182-1-herton@redhat.com
Fixes: 3c9b84f ("mm/debug_vm_pgtable: introduce struct pgtable_debug_args")
Signed-off-by: Herton R. Krzesinski <herton@redhat.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Cc: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit b151136 ]

btrfs_subpage_set_writeback() calls folio_start_writeback() the first time
a folio is written back, and it also clears the PAGECACHE_TAG_TOWRITE tag
even if there are still dirty blocks in the folio. This can break ordering
guarantees, such as those required by btrfs_wait_ordered_extents().

That ordering breakage leads to a real failure. For example, running
generic/464 on a zoned setup will hit the following ASSERT. This happens
because the broken ordering fails to flush existing dirty pages before the
file size is truncated.

  assertion failed: !list_empty(&ordered->list) :: 0, in fs/btrfs/zoned.c:1899
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/zoned.c:1899!
  Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1906169 Comm: kworker/u130:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.16.0-rc6-BTRFS-ZNS+ torvalds#554 PREEMPT(voluntary)
  Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/H12SSL-NT, BIOS 2.0 02/22/2021
  Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned.cold+0x50/0x52 [btrfs]
  RSP: 0018:ffffc9002efdbd60 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 000000000000004c RBX: ffff88811923c4e0 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff827e38b1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
  RBP: ffff88810005d000 R08: 00000000ffffdfff R09: ffffffff831051c8
  R10: ffffffff83055220 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881c2458c00
  R13: ffff88811923c540 R14: ffff88811923c5e8 R15: ffff8881c1bd9680
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88a04acd0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f907c7a918c CR3: 0000000004024000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x4a/0x60 [btrfs]
   btrfs_work_helper+0xf9/0x490 [btrfs]
   process_one_work+0x204/0x590
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   worker_thread+0x1d6/0x3d0
   ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
   kthread+0x118/0x230
   ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork+0x205/0x260
   ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
   </TASK>

Consider process A calling writepages() with WB_SYNC_NONE. In zoned mode or
for compressed writes, it locks several folios for delalloc and starts
writing them out. Let's call the last locked folio folio X. Suppose the
write range only partially covers folio X, leaving some pages dirty.
Process A calls btrfs_subpage_set_writeback() when building a bio. This
function call clears the TOWRITE tag of folio X, whose size = 8K and
the block size = 4K. It is following state.

   0     4K    8K
   |/////|/////|  (flag: DIRTY, tag: DIRTY)
   <-----> Process A will write this range.

Now suppose process B concurrently calls writepages() with WB_SYNC_ALL. It
calls tag_pages_for_writeback() to tag dirty folios with
PAGECACHE_TAG_TOWRITE. Since folio X is still dirty, it gets tagged. Then,
B collects tagged folios using filemap_get_folios_tag() and must wait for
folio X to be written before returning from writepages().

   0     4K    8K
   |/////|/////|  (flag: DIRTY, tag: DIRTY|TOWRITE)

However, between tagging and collecting, process A may call
btrfs_subpage_set_writeback() and clear folio X's TOWRITE tag.
   0     4K    8K
   |     |/////|  (flag: DIRTY|WRITEBACK, tag: DIRTY)

As a result, process B won't see folio X in its batch, and returns without
waiting for it. This breaks the WB_SYNC_ALL ordering requirement.

Fix this by using btrfs_subpage_set_writeback_keepwrite(), which retains
the TOWRITE tag. We now manually clear the tag only after the folio becomes
clean, via the xas operation.

Fixes: 3470da3 ("btrfs: subpage: introduce helpers for writeback status")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.12+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ Adjust context ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit d9cef55 ]

BPF CI testing report a UAF issue:

  [   16.446633] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000003  0
  [   16.447134] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mod  e
  [   16.447516] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present pag  e
  [   16.447878] PGD 0 P4D   0
  [   16.448063] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPT  I
  [   16.448409] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G           OE      6.13.0-rc3-g89e8a75fda73-dirty #4  2
  [   16.449124] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODUL  E
  [   16.449502] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/201  4
  [   16.450201] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_wor  k
  [   16.450531] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159  0
  [   16.452158] RSP: 0018:ffffb5ab40053d98 EFLAGS: 0001024  6
  [   16.452526] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000030  0
  [   16.452994] RDX: 0000000000000280 RSI: 00003513840053f0 RDI: 000000000000000  0
  [   16.453492] RBP: ffffa097808e3800 R08: ffffa09782dba1e0 R09: 000000000000000  5
  [   16.453987] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0978274640  0
  [   16.454497] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa09782d4092  0
  [   16.454996] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa097bbc00000(0000) knlGS:000000000000000  0
  [   16.455557] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003  3
  [   16.455961] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000102788004 CR4: 0000000000770ef  0
  [   16.456459] PKRU: 5555555  4
  [   16.456654] Call Trace  :
  [   16.456832]  <TASK  >
  [   16.456989]  ? __die+0x23/0x7  0
  [   16.457215]  ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c  0
  [   16.457508]  ? __lock_acquire+0x3e6/0x249  0
  [   16.457801]  ? exc_page_fault+0x68/0x20  0
  [   16.458080]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x3  0
  [   16.458389]  ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159  0
  [   16.458689]  ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159  0
  [   16.458987]  ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x10  0
  [   16.459284]  process_one_work+0x1ea/0x6d  0
  [   16.459570]  worker_thread+0x1c3/0x38  0
  [   16.459839]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x1  0
  [   16.460144]  kthread+0xe0/0x11  0
  [   16.460372]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1  0
  [   16.460640]  ret_from_fork+0x31/0x5  0
  [   16.460896]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1  0
  [   16.461166]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x3  0
  [   16.461453]  </TASK  >
  [   16.461616] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE)  ]
  [   16.462134] CR2: 000000000000003  0
  [   16.462380] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  [   16.462710] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x1590

The direct cause of this issue is that after smc_listen_out_connected(),
newclcsock->sk may be NULL since it will releases the smcsk. Therefore,
if the application closes the socket immediately after accept,
newclcsock->sk can be NULL. A possible execution order could be as
follows:

smc_listen_work                                 | userspace
-----------------------------------------------------------------
lock_sock(sk)                                   |
smc_listen_out_connected()                      |
| \- smc_listen_out                             |
|    | \- release_sock                          |
     | |- sk->sk_data_ready()                   |
                                                | fd = accept();
                                                | close(fd);
                                                |  \- socket->sk = NULL;
/* newclcsock->sk is NULL now */
SMC_STAT_SERV_SUCC_INC(sock_net(newclcsock->sk))

Since smc_listen_out_connected() will not fail, simply swapping the order
of the code can easily fix this issue.

Fixes: 3b2dec2 ("net/smc: restructure client and server code in af_smc")
Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Guangguan Wang <guangguan.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250818054618.41615-1-alibuda@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

These iterations require the read lock, otherwise RCU
lockdep will splat:

=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.17.0-rc3-00014-g31419c045d64 #6 Tainted: G           O
-----------------------------
drivers/base/power/main.c:1333 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
5 locks held by rtcwake/547:
 #0: 00000000643ab418 (sb_writers#6){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: file_start_write+0x2b/0x3a
 #1: 0000000067a0ca88 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x181/0x24b
 #2: 00000000631eac40 (kn->active#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x191/0x24b
 #3: 00000000609a1308 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: pm_suspend+0xaf/0x30b
 #4: 0000000060c0fdb0 (device_links_srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: device_links_read_lock+0x75/0x98

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 547 Comm: rtcwake Tainted: G           O        6.17.0-rc3-00014-g31419c045d64 #6 VOLUNTARY
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
Stack:
 223721b3a80 6089eac6 00000001 00000001
 ffffff00 6089eac6 00000535 6086e528
 721b3ac0 6003c294 00000000 60031fc0
Call Trace:
 [<600407ed>] show_stack+0x10e/0x127
 [<6003c294>] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xc6
 [<6003c2fd>] dump_stack+0x1a/0x20
 [<600bc2f8>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x116/0x13e
 [<603d8ea1>] dpm_async_suspend_superior+0x117/0x17e
 [<603d980f>] device_suspend+0x528/0x541
 [<603da24b>] dpm_suspend+0x1a2/0x267
 [<603da837>] dpm_suspend_start+0x5d/0x72
 [<600ca0c9>] suspend_devices_and_enter+0xab/0x736
 [...]

Add the fourth argument to the iteration to annotate
this and avoid the splat.

Fixes: 0679963 ("PM: sleep: Make async suspend handle suppliers like parents")
Fixes: ed18738 ("PM: sleep: Make async resume handle consumers like children")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250826134348.aba79f6e6299.I9ecf55da46ccf33778f2c018a82e1819d815b348@changeid
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

syzbot reported the splat below. [0]

When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect()
or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel
special message.

The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length.
Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc.

The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a
space for an in-kernel pointer.

  struct atmtcp_control {
  	struct atmtcp_hdr hdr;	/* must be first */
  ...
  	atm_kptr_t vcc;		/* both directions */
  ...
  } __ATM_API_ALIGN;

  typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t;

The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called
from atmtcp_c_send().

atmtcp_c_send() is vcc->dev->ops->send() and called from 2 paths:

  1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc->send() == atm_send_aal0())
  2. vcc_sendmsg()

The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and
userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr
by atmtcp_control.

Let's add a new ->pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg().

[0]:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gbab3ce404553 #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025
RIP: 0010:atmtcp_recv_control drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:93 [inline]
RIP: 0010:atmtcp_c_send+0x1da/0x950 drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:297
Code: 4d 8d 75 1a 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 15 06 00 00 41 0f b7 1e 4d 8d b7 60 05 00 00 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 13 06 00 00 66 41 89 1e 4d 8d 75 1c 4c
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003f5f810 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: 00000000200000ab RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88802a510000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff888030a6068c
RBP: ffff88802699fb40 R08: ffff888030a606eb R09: 1ffff1100614c0dd
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8718fc40 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffff888030a60680 R14: 000000010000055f R15: 00000000ffffffff
FS:  00007f8d7e9236c0(0000) GS:ffff888125c1c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000045ad50 CR3: 0000000075bde000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 vcc_sendmsg+0xa10/0xc60 net/atm/common.c:645
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x505/0x830 net/socket.c:2614
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2668
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2700 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2705 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2703 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x19b/0x260 net/socket.c:2703
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f8d7e96a4a9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f8d7e923198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f8d7e9f4308 RCX: 00007f8d7e96a4a9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000200000000240 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007f8d7e9f4300 R08: 65732f636f72702f R09: 65732f636f72702f
R10: 65732f636f72702f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8d7e9c10ac
R13: 00007f8d7e9231a0 R14: 0000200000000200 R15: 0000200000000250
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+1741b56d54536f4ec349@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/68a6767c.050a0220.3d78fd.0011.GAE@google.com/
Tested-by: syzbot+1741b56d54536f4ec349@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250821021901.2814721-1-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

If preparing a write bio fails then blk_zone_wplug_bio_work() calls
bio_endio() with zwplug->lock held. If a device mapper driver is stacked
on top of the zoned block device then this results in nested locking of
zwplug->lock. The resulting lockdep complaint is a false positive
because this is nested locking and not recursive locking. Suppress this
false positive by calling blk_zone_wplug_bio_io_error() without holding
zwplug->lock. This is safe because no code in
blk_zone_wplug_bio_io_error() depends on zwplug->lock being held. This
patch suppresses the following lockdep complaint:

WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
--------------------------------------------
kworker/3:0H/46 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffff882968b830 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_write_plug_bio_endio+0x64/0x1f0

but task is already holding lock:
ffffff88315bc230 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x8c/0x48c

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&zwplug->lock);
  lock(&zwplug->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by kworker/3:0H/46:
 #0: ffffff8809486758 ((wq_completion)sdd_zwplugs){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1bc/0x65c
 #1: ffffffc085de3d70 ((work_completion)(&zwplug->bio_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1e4/0x65c
 #2: ffffff88315bc230 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x8c/0x48c

stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 46 Comm: kworker/3:0H Tainted: G        W  OE      6.12.38-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 8b362b6f76e3645a58cd27d86982bce10d150025
Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Spacecraft board based on MALIBU (DT)
Workqueue: sdd_zwplugs blk_zone_wplug_bio_work
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c
 show_stack+0x18/0x28
 dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0
 dump_stack+0x18/0x24
 print_deadlock_bug+0x38c/0x398
 __lock_acquire+0x13e8/0x2e1c
 lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
 blk_zone_write_plug_bio_endio+0x64/0x1f0
 bio_endio+0x9c/0x240
 __dm_io_complete+0x214/0x260
 clone_endio+0xe8/0x214
 bio_endio+0x218/0x240
 blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x204/0x48c
 process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
 worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
 kthread+0x110/0x134
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Fixes: dd291d7 ("block: Introduce zone write plugging")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250825182720.1697203-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

 into HEAD

KVM/riscv fixes for 6.17, take #1

- Fix pte settings within kvm_riscv_gstage_ioremap()
- Fix comments in kvm_riscv_check_vcpu_requests()
- Fix stack overrun when setting vlenb via ONE_REG

commit c652887 ("KVM: arm64: vgic-v3: Allow userspace to write
GICD_TYPER2.nASSGIcap") makes the allocation of vPEs depend on nASSGIcap
for GICv4.1 hosts. While the vGIC v4 initialization and teardown is
handled correctly, it erroneously attempts to establish a vLPI mapping
to a VM that has no vPEs allocated:

  Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a8
   Mem abort info:
     ESR = 0x0000000096000044
     EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
     SET = 0, FnV = 0
     EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
     FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
   Data abort info:
     ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000044, ISS2 = 0x00000000
     CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
     GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
   user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000073a453b000
   [00000000000000a8] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
   Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000044 [#1] SMP
   pstate: 23400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
   pc : its_irq_set_vcpu_affinity+0x58c/0x95c
   lr : its_irq_set_vcpu_affinity+0x1e0/0x95c
   sp : ffff8001029bb9e0
   pmr_save: 00000060
   x29: ffff8001029bba20 x28: ffff0001ca5e28c0 x27: 0000000000000000
   x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff00019eee9f80 x24: ffff0001992b3f00
   x23: ffff8001029bbab8 x22: ffff00001159fb80 x21: 00000000000024a7
   x20: 00000000000024a7 x19: ffff00019eee9fb4 x18: 0000000000000494
   x17: 000000000000000e x16: 0000000000000494 x15: 0000000000000002
   x14: ffff0001a7f34600 x13: ffffccaad1203000 x12: 0000000000000018
   x11: ffff000011991000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 00000000000000a2
   x8 : 00000000000020a8 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
   x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000004
   x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff8001029bbab8 x0 : 00000000000000a8
   Call trace:
    its_irq_set_vcpu_affinity+0x58c/0x95c
    irq_set_vcpu_affinity+0x74/0xc8
    its_map_vlpi+0x4c/0x94
    kvm_vgic_v4_set_forwarding+0x134/0x298
    kvm_arch_irq_bypass_add_producer+0x28/0x34
    irq_bypass_register_producer+0xf8/0x1d8
    vfio_msi_set_vector_signal+0x2c8/0x308
    vfio_pci_set_msi_trigger+0x198/0x2d4
    vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl+0xf0/0x104
    vfio_pci_core_ioctl+0x6ac/0xc5c
    vfio_device_fops_unl_ioctl+0x128/0x370
    __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x98/0xd0
    el0_svc_common+0xd8/0x1d8
    do_el0_svc+0x28/0x34
    el0_svc+0x40/0xb8
    el0t_64_sync_handler+0x70/0xbc
    el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1ac
   Code: 321f0129 f940094a 8b08014 d1400900 (39000009)
   ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fix it by moving the GICv4.1 special-casing to
vgic_supports_direct_msis(), returning false if the user explicitly
disabled nASSGIcap for the VM.

Fixes: c652887 ("KVM: arm64: vgic-v3: Allow userspace to write GICD_TYPER2.nASSGIcap")
Suggested-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Raghavendra Rao Ananta <rananta@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250729210644.830364-1-rananta@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>

In gicv5_irs_of_init_affinity() a WARN_ON() is triggered if:

 1) a phandle in the "cpus" property does not correspond to a valid OF
    node
 2  a CPU logical id does not exist for a given OF cpu_node

#1 is a firmware bug and should be reported as such but does not warrant a
   WARN_ON() backtrace.

#2 is not necessarily an error condition (eg a kernel can be booted with
   nr_cpus=X limiting the number of cores artificially) and therefore there
   is no reason to clutter the kernel log with WARN_ON() output when the
   condition is hit.

Rework the IRS affinity parsing code to remove undue WARN_ON()s thus
making it less noisy.

Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lpieralisi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250814094138.1611017-1-lpieralisi@kernel.org