Fixed overflow bug in binary search. #14

mutexlox · 2011-09-30T03:06:52Z

(left + right)/2 can overflow in cases where left + (right-left)/2 wouldn't.
See, for example left=2 and right=2^32-1.

mutexlox · 2011-09-30T03:13:32Z

Just saw the Documentation/SubmittingPatches file; will resubmit properly.

Overly indented code should be refactored. Suggest refactoring excessive indentation of of if/else/for/do/while/switch statements. For example: $ cat t.c #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { if (1) if (2) if (3) if (4) if (5) if (6) if (7) if (8) ; return 0; } $ ./scripts/checkpatch.pl -f t.c WARNING: Too many leading tabs - consider code refactoring #12: FILE: t.c:12: + if (6) WARNING: Too many leading tabs - consider code refactoring #13: FILE: t.c:13: + if (7) WARNING: Too many leading tabs - consider code refactoring #14: FILE: t.c:14: + if (8) total: 0 errors, 3 warnings, 17 lines checked t.c has style problems, please review. If any of these errors are false positives, please report them to the maintainer, see CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS. Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

If the netdev is already in NETREG_UNREGISTERING/_UNREGISTERED state, do not update the real num tx queues. netdev_queue_update_kobjects() is already called via remove_queue_kobjects() at NETREG_UNREGISTERING time. So, when upper layer driver, e.g., FCoE protocol stack is monitoring the netdev event of NETDEV_UNREGISTER and calls back to LLD ndo_fcoe_disable() to remove extra queues allocated for FCoE, the associated txq sysfs kobjects are already removed, and trying to update the real num queues would cause something like below: ... PID: 25138 TASK: ffff88021e64c440 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "kworker/3:3" #0 [ffff88021f007760] machine_kexec at ffffffff810226d9 #1 [ffff88021f0077d0] crash_kexec at ffffffff81089d2d #2 [ffff88021f0078a0] oops_end at ffffffff813bca78 #3 [ffff88021f0078d0] no_context at ffffffff81029e72 #4 [ffff88021f007920] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8102a155 #5 [ffff88021f0079f0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8102a23e torvalds#6 [ffff88021f007a00] do_page_fault at ffffffff813bf32e torvalds#7 [ffff88021f007b10] page_fault at ffffffff813bc045 [exception RIP: sysfs_find_dirent+17] RIP: ffffffff81178611 RSP: ffff88021f007bc0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff88021e64c440 RBX: ffffffff8156cc63 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: ffffffff8156cc63 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88021f007be0 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 0000000000000008 R10: ffffffff816fed00 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffffff8156cc63 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8802222a0000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 torvalds#8 [ffff88021f007be8] sysfs_get_dirent at ffffffff81178c07 torvalds#9 [ffff88021f007c18] sysfs_remove_group at ffffffff8117ac27 torvalds#10 [ffff88021f007c48] netdev_queue_update_kobjects at ffffffff813178f9 torvalds#11 [ffff88021f007c88] netif_set_real_num_tx_queues at ffffffff81303e38 torvalds#12 [ffff88021f007cc8] ixgbe_set_num_queues at ffffffffa0249763 [ixgbe] torvalds#13 [ffff88021f007cf8] ixgbe_init_interrupt_scheme at ffffffffa024ea89 [ixgbe] torvalds#14 [ffff88021f007d48] ixgbe_fcoe_disable at ffffffffa0267113 [ixgbe] torvalds#15 [ffff88021f007d68] vlan_dev_fcoe_disable at ffffffffa014fef5 [8021q] torvalds#16 [ffff88021f007d78] fcoe_interface_cleanup at ffffffffa02b7dfd [fcoe] torvalds#17 [ffff88021f007df8] fcoe_destroy_work at ffffffffa02b7f08 [fcoe] torvalds#18 [ffff88021f007e18] process_one_work at ffffffff8105d7ca torvalds#19 [ffff88021f007e68] worker_thread at ffffffff81060513 torvalds#20 [ffff88021f007ee8] kthread at ffffffff810648b6 torvalds#21 [ffff88021f007f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff813c40f4 Signed-off-by: Yi Zou <yi.zou@intel.com> Tested-by: Ross Brattain <ross.b.brattain@intel.com> Tested-by: Stephen Ko <stephen.s.ko@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>

…S block during isolation for migration commit 0bf380b upstream. When isolating for migration, migration starts at the start of a zone which is not necessarily pageblock aligned. Further, it stops isolating when COMPACT_CLUSTER_MAX pages are isolated so migrate_pfn is generally not aligned. This allows isolate_migratepages() to call pfn_to_page() on an invalid PFN which can result in a crash. This was originally reported against a 3.0-based kernel with the following trace in a crash dump. PID: 9902 TASK: d47aecd0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "memcg_process_s" #0 [d72d3ad0] crash_kexec at c028cfdb #1 [d72d3b24] oops_end at c05c5322 #2 [d72d3b38] __bad_area_nosemaphore at c0227e60 #3 [d72d3bec] bad_area at c0227fb6 #4 [d72d3c00] do_page_fault at c05c72e #5 [d72d3c80] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: 00000000 EBX: 000c0000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000807 EBP: 000c0000 DS: 007b ESI: 00000001 ES: 007b EDI: f3000a80 GS: 6f50 CS: 0060 EIP: c030b15a ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010002 torvalds#6 [d72d3cb4] isolate_migratepages at c030b15a torvalds#7 [d72d3d14] zone_watermark_ok at c02d26cb torvalds#8 [d72d3d2c] compact_zone at c030b8d torvalds#9 [d72d3d68] compact_zone_order at c030bba1 torvalds#10 [d72d3db4] try_to_compact_pages at c030bc84 torvalds#11 [d72d3ddc] __alloc_pages_direct_compact at c02d61e7 torvalds#12 [d72d3e08] __alloc_pages_slowpath at c02d66c7 torvalds#13 [d72d3e78] __alloc_pages_nodemask at c02d6a97 torvalds#14 [d72d3eb8] alloc_pages_vma at c030a845 torvalds#15 [d72d3ed4] do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page at c03178eb torvalds#16 [d72d3f00] handle_mm_fault at c02f36c6 torvalds#17 [d72d3f30] do_page_fault at c05c70ed torvalds#18 [d72d3fb] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: b71ff000 EBX: 00000001 ECX: 00001600 EDX: 00000431 DS: 007b ESI: 08048950 ES: 007b EDI: bfaa3788 SS: 007b ESP: bfaa36e0 EBP: bfaa3828 GS: 6f50 CS: 0073 EIP: 080487c8 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010202 It was also reported by Herbert van den Bergh against 3.1-based kernel with the following snippet from the console log. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 01c00008 IP: [<c0522399>] isolate_migratepages+0x119/0x390 *pdpt = 000000002f7ce001 *pde = 0000000000000000 It is expected that it also affects 3.2.x and current mainline. The problem is that pfn_valid is only called on the first PFN being checked and that PFN is not necessarily aligned. Lets say we have a case like this H = MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES boundary | = pageblock boundary m = cc->migrate_pfn f = cc->free_pfn o = memory hole H------|------H------|----m-Hoooooo|ooooooH-f----|------H The migrate_pfn is just below a memory hole and the free scanner is beyond the hole. When isolate_migratepages started, it scans from migrate_pfn to migrate_pfn+pageblock_nr_pages which is now in a memory hole. It checks pfn_valid() on the first PFN but then scans into the hole where there are not necessarily valid struct pages. This patch ensures that isolate_migratepages calls pfn_valid when necessary. Reported-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com> Tested-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…S block during isolation for migration commit 0bf380b upstream. When isolating for migration, migration starts at the start of a zone which is not necessarily pageblock aligned. Further, it stops isolating when COMPACT_CLUSTER_MAX pages are isolated so migrate_pfn is generally not aligned. This allows isolate_migratepages() to call pfn_to_page() on an invalid PFN which can result in a crash. This was originally reported against a 3.0-based kernel with the following trace in a crash dump. PID: 9902 TASK: d47aecd0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "memcg_process_s" #0 [d72d3ad0] crash_kexec at c028cfdb #1 [d72d3b24] oops_end at c05c5322 #2 [d72d3b38] __bad_area_nosemaphore at c0227e60 #3 [d72d3bec] bad_area at c0227fb6 #4 [d72d3c00] do_page_fault at c05c72e #5 [d72d3c80] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: 00000000 EBX: 000c0000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000807 EBP: 000c0000 DS: 007b ESI: 00000001 ES: 007b EDI: f3000a80 GS: 6f50 CS: 0060 EIP: c030b15a ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010002 #6 [d72d3cb4] isolate_migratepages at c030b15a #7 [d72d3d14] zone_watermark_ok at c02d26cb #8 [d72d3d2c] compact_zone at c030b8d #9 [d72d3d68] compact_zone_order at c030bba1 torvalds#10 [d72d3db4] try_to_compact_pages at c030bc84 torvalds#11 [d72d3ddc] __alloc_pages_direct_compact at c02d61e7 torvalds#12 [d72d3e08] __alloc_pages_slowpath at c02d66c7 torvalds#13 [d72d3e78] __alloc_pages_nodemask at c02d6a97 torvalds#14 [d72d3eb8] alloc_pages_vma at c030a845 torvalds#15 [d72d3ed4] do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page at c03178eb torvalds#16 [d72d3f00] handle_mm_fault at c02f36c6 torvalds#17 [d72d3f30] do_page_fault at c05c70ed torvalds#18 [d72d3fb] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: b71ff000 EBX: 00000001 ECX: 00001600 EDX: 00000431 DS: 007b ESI: 08048950 ES: 007b EDI: bfaa3788 SS: 007b ESP: bfaa36e0 EBP: bfaa3828 GS: 6f50 CS: 0073 EIP: 080487c8 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010202 It was also reported by Herbert van den Bergh against 3.1-based kernel with the following snippet from the console log. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 01c00008 IP: [<c0522399>] isolate_migratepages+0x119/0x390 *pdpt = 000000002f7ce001 *pde = 0000000000000000 It is expected that it also affects 3.2.x and current mainline. The problem is that pfn_valid is only called on the first PFN being checked and that PFN is not necessarily aligned. Lets say we have a case like this H = MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES boundary | = pageblock boundary m = cc->migrate_pfn f = cc->free_pfn o = memory hole H------|------H------|----m-Hoooooo|ooooooH-f----|------H The migrate_pfn is just below a memory hole and the free scanner is beyond the hole. When isolate_migratepages started, it scans from migrate_pfn to migrate_pfn+pageblock_nr_pages which is now in a memory hole. It checks pfn_valid() on the first PFN but then scans into the hole where there are not necessarily valid struct pages. This patch ensures that isolate_migratepages calls pfn_valid when necessary. Reported-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com> Tested-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…S block during isolation for migration BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/931719 commit 0bf380b upstream. When isolating for migration, migration starts at the start of a zone which is not necessarily pageblock aligned. Further, it stops isolating when COMPACT_CLUSTER_MAX pages are isolated so migrate_pfn is generally not aligned. This allows isolate_migratepages() to call pfn_to_page() on an invalid PFN which can result in a crash. This was originally reported against a 3.0-based kernel with the following trace in a crash dump. PID: 9902 TASK: d47aecd0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "memcg_process_s" #0 [d72d3ad0] crash_kexec at c028cfdb #1 [d72d3b24] oops_end at c05c5322 #2 [d72d3b38] __bad_area_nosemaphore at c0227e60 #3 [d72d3bec] bad_area at c0227fb6 #4 [d72d3c00] do_page_fault at c05c72e #5 [d72d3c80] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: 00000000 EBX: 000c0000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000807 EBP: 000c0000 DS: 007b ESI: 00000001 ES: 007b EDI: f3000a80 GS: 6f50 CS: 0060 EIP: c030b15a ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010002 torvalds#6 [d72d3cb4] isolate_migratepages at c030b15a torvalds#7 [d72d3d14] zone_watermark_ok at c02d26cb torvalds#8 [d72d3d2c] compact_zone at c030b8d torvalds#9 [d72d3d68] compact_zone_order at c030bba1 torvalds#10 [d72d3db4] try_to_compact_pages at c030bc84 torvalds#11 [d72d3ddc] __alloc_pages_direct_compact at c02d61e7 torvalds#12 [d72d3e08] __alloc_pages_slowpath at c02d66c7 torvalds#13 [d72d3e78] __alloc_pages_nodemask at c02d6a97 torvalds#14 [d72d3eb8] alloc_pages_vma at c030a845 torvalds#15 [d72d3ed4] do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page at c03178eb torvalds#16 [d72d3f00] handle_mm_fault at c02f36c6 torvalds#17 [d72d3f30] do_page_fault at c05c70ed torvalds#18 [d72d3fb] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: b71ff000 EBX: 00000001 ECX: 00001600 EDX: 00000431 DS: 007b ESI: 08048950 ES: 007b EDI: bfaa3788 SS: 007b ESP: bfaa36e0 EBP: bfaa3828 GS: 6f50 CS: 0073 EIP: 080487c8 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010202 It was also reported by Herbert van den Bergh against 3.1-based kernel with the following snippet from the console log. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 01c00008 IP: [<c0522399>] isolate_migratepages+0x119/0x390 *pdpt = 000000002f7ce001 *pde = 0000000000000000 It is expected that it also affects 3.2.x and current mainline. The problem is that pfn_valid is only called on the first PFN being checked and that PFN is not necessarily aligned. Lets say we have a case like this H = MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES boundary | = pageblock boundary m = cc->migrate_pfn f = cc->free_pfn o = memory hole H------|------H------|----m-Hoooooo|ooooooH-f----|------H The migrate_pfn is just below a memory hole and the free scanner is beyond the hole. When isolate_migratepages started, it scans from migrate_pfn to migrate_pfn+pageblock_nr_pages which is now in a memory hole. It checks pfn_valid() on the first PFN but then scans into the hole where there are not necessarily valid struct pages. This patch ensures that isolate_migratepages calls pfn_valid when necessary. Reported-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com> Tested-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>

…S block during isolation for migration commit 0bf380b upstream. When isolating for migration, migration starts at the start of a zone which is not necessarily pageblock aligned. Further, it stops isolating when COMPACT_CLUSTER_MAX pages are isolated so migrate_pfn is generally not aligned. This allows isolate_migratepages() to call pfn_to_page() on an invalid PFN which can result in a crash. This was originally reported against a 3.0-based kernel with the following trace in a crash dump. PID: 9902 TASK: d47aecd0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "memcg_process_s" #0 [d72d3ad0] crash_kexec at c028cfdb #1 [d72d3b24] oops_end at c05c5322 #2 [d72d3b38] __bad_area_nosemaphore at c0227e60 #3 [d72d3bec] bad_area at c0227fb6 #4 [d72d3c00] do_page_fault at c05c72e #5 [d72d3c80] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: 00000000 EBX: 000c0000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000807 EBP: 000c0000 DS: 007b ESI: 00000001 ES: 007b EDI: f3000a80 GS: 6f50 CS: 0060 EIP: c030b15a ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010002 #6 [d72d3cb4] isolate_migratepages at c030b15a #7 [d72d3d14] zone_watermark_ok at c02d26cb #8 [d72d3d2c] compact_zone at c030b8d #9 [d72d3d68] compact_zone_order at c030bba1 torvalds#10 [d72d3db4] try_to_compact_pages at c030bc84 torvalds#11 [d72d3ddc] __alloc_pages_direct_compact at c02d61e7 torvalds#12 [d72d3e08] __alloc_pages_slowpath at c02d66c7 torvalds#13 [d72d3e78] __alloc_pages_nodemask at c02d6a97 torvalds#14 [d72d3eb8] alloc_pages_vma at c030a845 torvalds#15 [d72d3ed4] do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page at c03178eb torvalds#16 [d72d3f00] handle_mm_fault at c02f36c6 torvalds#17 [d72d3f30] do_page_fault at c05c70ed torvalds#18 [d72d3fb] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: b71ff000 EBX: 00000001 ECX: 00001600 EDX: 00000431 DS: 007b ESI: 08048950 ES: 007b EDI: bfaa3788 SS: 007b ESP: bfaa36e0 EBP: bfaa3828 GS: 6f50 CS: 0073 EIP: 080487c8 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010202 It was also reported by Herbert van den Bergh against 3.1-based kernel with the following snippet from the console log. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 01c00008 IP: [<c0522399>] isolate_migratepages+0x119/0x390 *pdpt = 000000002f7ce001 *pde = 0000000000000000 It is expected that it also affects 3.2.x and current mainline. The problem is that pfn_valid is only called on the first PFN being checked and that PFN is not necessarily aligned. Lets say we have a case like this H = MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES boundary | = pageblock boundary m = cc->migrate_pfn f = cc->free_pfn o = memory hole H------|------H------|----m-Hoooooo|ooooooH-f----|------H The migrate_pfn is just below a memory hole and the free scanner is beyond the hole. When isolate_migratepages started, it scans from migrate_pfn to migrate_pfn+pageblock_nr_pages which is now in a memory hole. It checks pfn_valid() on the first PFN but then scans into the hole where there are not necessarily valid struct pages. This patch ensures that isolate_migratepages calls pfn_valid when necessary. Reported-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com> Tested-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 3d2606f upstream. IBS initialization is a mix of per-core register access and per-node pci device setup. Register access should be pinned to the cpu, but pci setup must run with preemption enabled. This patch better separates the code into non-/preemptible sections and fixes sleeping with preemption disabled. See bug message below. Fixes also freeing the eilvt entry by introducing put_eilvt(). BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:824 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 32357, name: modprobe INFO: lockdep is turned off. Pid: 32357, comm: modprobe Not tainted 2.6.39-rc7+ torvalds#14 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8104bdc8>] __might_sleep+0x112/0x117 [<ffffffff81129693>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x4b/0xe7 [<ffffffff81278f14>] kzalloc.constprop.0+0x29/0x2b [<ffffffff81278f4c>] pci_get_subsys+0x36/0x78 [<ffffffff81022689>] ? setup_APIC_eilvt+0xfb/0x139 [<ffffffff81278fa4>] pci_get_device+0x16/0x18 [<ffffffffa06c8b5d>] op_amd_init+0xd3/0x211 [oprofile] [<ffffffffa064d000>] ? 0xffffffffa064cfff [<ffffffffa064d298>] op_nmi_init+0x21e/0x26a [oprofile] [<ffffffffa064d062>] oprofile_arch_init+0xe/0x26 [oprofile] [<ffffffffa064d010>] oprofile_init+0x10/0x42 [oprofile] [<ffffffff81002099>] do_one_initcall+0x7f/0x13a [<ffffffff81096524>] sys_init_module+0x132/0x281 [<ffffffff814cc682>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

…S block during isolation for migration commit 0bf380b upstream. When isolating for migration, migration starts at the start of a zone which is not necessarily pageblock aligned. Further, it stops isolating when COMPACT_CLUSTER_MAX pages are isolated so migrate_pfn is generally not aligned. This allows isolate_migratepages() to call pfn_to_page() on an invalid PFN which can result in a crash. This was originally reported against a 3.0-based kernel with the following trace in a crash dump. PID: 9902 TASK: d47aecd0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "memcg_process_s" #0 [d72d3ad0] crash_kexec at c028cfdb #1 [d72d3b24] oops_end at c05c5322 #2 [d72d3b38] __bad_area_nosemaphore at c0227e60 #3 [d72d3bec] bad_area at c0227fb6 #4 [d72d3c00] do_page_fault at c05c72e #5 [d72d3c80] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: 00000000 EBX: 000c0000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000807 EBP: 000c0000 DS: 007b ESI: 00000001 ES: 007b EDI: f3000a80 GS: 6f50 CS: 0060 EIP: c030b15a ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010002 #6 [d72d3cb4] isolate_migratepages at c030b15a #7 [d72d3d14] zone_watermark_ok at c02d26cb #8 [d72d3d2c] compact_zone at c030b8d #9 [d72d3d68] compact_zone_order at c030bba1 torvalds#10 [d72d3db4] try_to_compact_pages at c030bc84 torvalds#11 [d72d3ddc] __alloc_pages_direct_compact at c02d61e7 torvalds#12 [d72d3e08] __alloc_pages_slowpath at c02d66c7 torvalds#13 [d72d3e78] __alloc_pages_nodemask at c02d6a97 torvalds#14 [d72d3eb8] alloc_pages_vma at c030a845 torvalds#15 [d72d3ed4] do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page at c03178eb torvalds#16 [d72d3f00] handle_mm_fault at c02f36c6 torvalds#17 [d72d3f30] do_page_fault at c05c70ed torvalds#18 [d72d3fb] error_code (via page_fault) at c05c47a4 EAX: b71ff000 EBX: 00000001 ECX: 00001600 EDX: 00000431 DS: 007b ESI: 08048950 ES: 007b EDI: bfaa3788 SS: 007b ESP: bfaa36e0 EBP: bfaa3828 GS: 6f50 CS: 0073 EIP: 080487c8 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010202 It was also reported by Herbert van den Bergh against 3.1-based kernel with the following snippet from the console log. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 01c00008 IP: [<c0522399>] isolate_migratepages+0x119/0x390 *pdpt = 000000002f7ce001 *pde = 0000000000000000 It is expected that it also affects 3.2.x and current mainline. The problem is that pfn_valid is only called on the first PFN being checked and that PFN is not necessarily aligned. Lets say we have a case like this H = MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES boundary | = pageblock boundary m = cc->migrate_pfn f = cc->free_pfn o = memory hole H------|------H------|----m-Hoooooo|ooooooH-f----|------H The migrate_pfn is just below a memory hole and the free scanner is beyond the hole. When isolate_migratepages started, it scans from migrate_pfn to migrate_pfn+pageblock_nr_pages which is now in a memory hole. It checks pfn_valid() on the first PFN but then scans into the hole where there are not necessarily valid struct pages. This patch ensures that isolate_migratepages calls pfn_valid when necessary. Reported-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com> Tested-by: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Symbolize stack traces by creating a live machine. Add this functionality to dump_stack and switch dump_stack users to use it. Switch TUI to use it. Add stack traces to the child test function which can be useful to diagnose blocked code. Example output: ``` $ perf test -vv PERF_RECORD_ ... 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields: 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Running (1 active) ^C Signal (2) while running tests. Terminating tests with the same signal Internal test harness failure. Completing any started tests: : 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields: ---- unexpected signal (2) ---- #0 0x55788c6210a3 in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:0 #1 0x7fc12fe49df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0 #2 0x7fc12fe99687 in __internal_syscall_cancel cancellation.c:64 #3 0x7fc12fee5f7a in clock_nanosleep@GLIBC_2.2.5 clock_nanosleep.c:72 #4 0x7fc12fef1393 in __nanosleep nanosleep.c:26 #5 0x7fc12ff02d68 in __sleep sleep.c:55 torvalds#6 0x55788c63196b in test__PERF_RECORD perf-record.c:0 torvalds#7 0x55788c620fb0 in run_test_child builtin-test.c:0 torvalds#8 0x55788c5bd18d in start_command run-command.c:127 torvalds#9 0x55788c621ef3 in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:0 torvalds#10 0x55788c6225bf in cmd_test ??:0 torvalds#11 0x55788c5afbd0 in run_builtin perf.c:0 torvalds#12 0x55788c5afeeb in handle_internal_command perf.c:0 torvalds#13 0x55788c52b383 in main ??:0 torvalds#14 0x7fc12fe33ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74 torvalds#15 0x7fc12fe33d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128 torvalds#16 0x55788c52b9d1 in _start ??:0 ---- unexpected signal (2) ---- #0 0x55788c6210a3 in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:0 #1 0x7fc12fe49df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0 #2 0x7fc12fea3a14 in pthread_sigmask@GLIBC_2.2.5 pthread_sigmask.c:45 #3 0x7fc12fe49fd9 in __GI___sigprocmask sigprocmask.c:26 #4 0x7fc12ff2601b in __longjmp_chk longjmp.c:36 #5 0x55788c6210c0 in print_test_result.isra.0 builtin-test.c:0 torvalds#6 0x7fc12fe49df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0 torvalds#7 0x7fc12fe99687 in __internal_syscall_cancel cancellation.c:64 torvalds#8 0x7fc12fee5f7a in clock_nanosleep@GLIBC_2.2.5 clock_nanosleep.c:72 torvalds#9 0x7fc12fef1393 in __nanosleep nanosleep.c:26 torvalds#10 0x7fc12ff02d68 in __sleep sleep.c:55 torvalds#11 0x55788c63196b in test__PERF_RECORD perf-record.c:0 torvalds#12 0x55788c620fb0 in run_test_child builtin-test.c:0 torvalds#13 0x55788c5bd18d in start_command run-command.c:127 torvalds#14 0x55788c621ef3 in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:0 torvalds#15 0x55788c6225bf in cmd_test ??:0 torvalds#16 0x55788c5afbd0 in run_builtin perf.c:0 torvalds#17 0x55788c5afeeb in handle_internal_command perf.c:0 torvalds#18 0x55788c52b383 in main ??:0 torvalds#19 0x7fc12fe33ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74 torvalds#20 0x7fc12fe33d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128 torvalds#21 0x55788c52b9d1 in _start ??:0 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Skip (permissions) ``` Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250624210500.2121303-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit eedf3e3 ] ACPICA commit 1c28da2242783579d59767617121035dafba18c3 This was originally done in NetBSD: NetBSD/src@b69d1ac and is the correct alternative to the smattering of `memcpy`s I previously contributed to this repository. This also sidesteps the newly strict checks added in UBSAN: llvm/llvm-project@7926744 Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #1.2 0x000021982bc4af3c in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1.1 0x000021982bc4af3c in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1 0x000021982bc4af3c in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:395 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #2 0x000021982bc4bb6f in handletype_mismatch_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:137 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42b6f #3 0x000021982bc4b723 in __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1 compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:142 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42723 #4 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #5 0x000021afcfdf2089 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*, struct acpi_rsconvert_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsmisc.c:355 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b2089 #6 0x000021afcfded169 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resources(u8*, u32, u32, u8, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rslist.c:137 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ad169 #7 0x000021afcfe2d24a in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources(struct acpi_walk_state*, u8*, acpi_size, acpi_walk_aml_callback, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utresrc.c:237 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ed24a #8 0x000021afcfde66b7 in acpi_rs_create_resource_list(union acpi_operand_object*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rscreate.c:199 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6a66b7 #9 0x000021afcfdf6979 in acpi_rs_get_method_data(acpi_handle, const char*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsutils.c:770 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b6979 torvalds#10 0x000021afcfdf708f in acpi_walk_resources(acpi_handle, char*, acpi_walk_resource_callback, void*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsxface.c:731 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b708f torvalds#11 0x000021afcfa95dcf in acpi::acpi_impl::walk_resources(acpi::acpi_impl*, acpi_handle, const char*, acpi::Acpi::resources_callable) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:41 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x355dcf torvalds#12 0x000021afcfaa8278 in acpi::device_builder::gather_resources(acpi::device_builder*, acpi::Acpi*, fidl::any_arena&, acpi::Manager*, acpi::device_builder::gather_resources_callback) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/device-builder.cc:84 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x368278 torvalds#13 0x000021afcfbddb87 in acpi::Manager::configure_discovered_devices(acpi::Manager*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/manager.cc:75 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x49db87 torvalds#14 0x000021afcf99091d in publish_acpi_devices(acpi::Manager*, zx_device_t*, zx_device_t*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/acpi-nswalk.cc:95 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x25091d torvalds#15 0x000021afcf9c1d4e in x86::X86::do_init(x86::X86*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:60 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x281d4e torvalds#16 0x000021afcf9e33ad in λ(x86::X86::ddk_init::(anon class)*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:77 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a33ad torvalds#17 0x000021afcf9e313e in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:76:19), false, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void>::invoke(void*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:183 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a313e torvalds#18 0x000021afcfbab4c7 in fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b4c7 torvalds#19 0x000021afcfbab342 in fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b342 torvalds#20 0x000021afcfcd98c3 in async::internal::retained_task::Handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_task_t*, zx_status_t) ../../sdk/lib/async/task.cc:24 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x5998c3 torvalds#21 0x00002290f9924616 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::post_task::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:789 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a616 torvalds#22 0x00002290f9924323 in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:788:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a323 torvalds#23 0x00002290f9904b76 in fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xeab76 torvalds#24 0x00002290f9904831 in fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:471 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xea831 torvalds#25 0x00002290f98d5adc in driver_runtime::callback_request::Call(driver_runtime::callback_request*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/callback_request.h:74 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xbbadc torvalds#26 0x00002290f98e1e58 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1248 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xc7e58 torvalds#27 0x00002290f98e4159 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callbacks(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1308 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xca159 torvalds#28 0x00002290f9918414 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::create_with_adder::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:353 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe414 torvalds#29 0x00002290f991812d in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:351:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe12d torvalds#30 0x00002290f9906fc7 in fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecfc7 torvalds#31 0x00002290f9906c66 in fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecc66 torvalds#32 0x00002290f98e73d9 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::invoke_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.h:543 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd3d9 torvalds#33 0x00002290f98e700d in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::handle_event(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1442 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd00d torvalds#34 0x00002290f9918983 in async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event(async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>*, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/async_loop_owned_event_handler.h:59 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe983 torvalds#35 0x00002290f9918b9e in async::wait_method<async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>, &async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event>::call_handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async/include/lib/async/cpp/wait.h:201 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfeb9e torvalds#36 0x00002290f99bf509 in async_loop_dispatch_wait(async_loop_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:394 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a5509 torvalds#37 0x00002290f99b9958 in async_loop_run_once(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:343 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f958 torvalds#38 0x00002290f99b9247 in async_loop_run(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t, _Bool) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:301 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f247 torvalds#39 0x00002290f99ba962 in async_loop_run_thread(void*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:860 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a0962 torvalds#40 0x000041afd176ef30 in start_c11(void*) ../../zircon/third_party/ulib/musl/pthread/pthread_create.c:63 <libc.so>+0x84f30 torvalds#41 0x000041afd18a448d in thread_trampoline(uintptr_t, uintptr_t) ../../zircon/system/ulib/runtime/thread.cc:100 <libc.so>+0x1ba48d Link: acpica/acpica@1c28da22 Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4664267.LvFx2qVVIh@rjwysocki.net Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird@gmail.com> [ rjw: Pick up the tag from Tamir ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Calling perf top with branch filters enabled on Intel CPU's with branch counters logging (A.K.A LBR event logging [1]) support results in a segfault. $ perf top -e '{cpu_core/cpu-cycles/,cpu_core/event=0xc6,umask=0x3,frontend=0x11,name=frontend_retired_dsb_miss/}' -j any,counter ... Thread 27 "perf" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [Switching to Thread 0x7fffafff76c0 (LWP 949003)] perf_env__find_br_cntr_info (env=0xf66dc0 <perf_env>, nr=0x0, width=0x7fffafff62c0) at util/env.c:653 653 *width = env->cpu_pmu_caps ? env->br_cntr_width : (gdb) bt #0 perf_env__find_br_cntr_info (env=0xf66dc0 <perf_env>, nr=0x0, width=0x7fffafff62c0) at util/env.c:653 #1 0x00000000005b1599 in symbol__account_br_cntr (branch=0x7fffcc3db580, evsel=0xfea2d0, offset=12, br_cntr=8) at util/annotate.c:345 #2 0x00000000005b17fb in symbol__account_cycles (addr=5658172, start=5658160, sym=0x7fffcc0ee420, cycles=539, evsel=0xfea2d0, br_cntr=8) at util/annotate.c:389 #3 0x00000000005b1976 in addr_map_symbol__account_cycles (ams=0x7fffcd7b01d0, start=0x7fffcd7b02b0, cycles=539, evsel=0xfea2d0, br_cntr=8) at util/annotate.c:422 #4 0x000000000068d57f in hist__account_cycles (bs=0x110d288, al=0x7fffafff6540, sample=0x7fffafff6760, nonany_branch_mode=false, total_cycles=0x0, evsel=0xfea2d0) at util/hist.c:2850 #5 0x0000000000446216 in hist_iter__top_callback (iter=0x7fffafff6590, al=0x7fffafff6540, single=true, arg=0x7fffffff9e00) at builtin-top.c:737 torvalds#6 0x0000000000689787 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffafff6590, al=0x7fffafff6540, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffff9e00) at util/hist.c:1359 torvalds#7 0x0000000000446710 in perf_event__process_sample (tool=0x7fffffff9e00, event=0x110d250, evsel=0xfea2d0, sample=0x7fffafff6760, machine=0x108c968) at builtin-top.c:845 torvalds#8 0x0000000000447735 in deliver_event (qe=0x7fffffffa120, qevent=0x10fc200) at builtin-top.c:1211 torvalds#9 0x000000000064ccae in do_flush (oe=0x7fffffffa120, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245 torvalds#10 0x000000000064d005 in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x7fffffffa120, how=OE_FLUSH__TOP, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324 torvalds#11 0x000000000064d0ef in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x7fffffffa120, how=OE_FLUSH__TOP) at util/ordered-events.c:342 torvalds#12 0x00000000004472a9 in process_thread (arg=0x7fffffff9e00) at builtin-top.c:1120 torvalds#13 0x00007ffff6e7dba8 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:448 torvalds#14 0x00007ffff6f01b8c in __GI___clone3 () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:78 The cause is that perf_env__find_br_cntr_info tries to access a null pointer pmu_caps in the perf_env struct. A similar issue exists for homogeneous core systems which use the cpu_pmu_caps structure. Fix this by populating cpu_pmu_caps and pmu_caps structures with values from sysfs when calling perf top with branch stack sampling enabled. [1], LBR event logging introduced here: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231025201626.3000228-5-kan.liang@linux.intel.com/ Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Falcon <thomas.falcon@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250612163659.1357950-2-thomas.falcon@intel.com Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit eedf3e3 ] ACPICA commit 1c28da2242783579d59767617121035dafba18c3 This was originally done in NetBSD: NetBSD/src@b69d1ac and is the correct alternative to the smattering of `memcpy`s I previously contributed to this repository. This also sidesteps the newly strict checks added in UBSAN: llvm/llvm-project@7926744 Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #1.2 0x000021982bc4af3c in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1.1 0x000021982bc4af3c in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1 0x000021982bc4af3c in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:395 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #2 0x000021982bc4bb6f in handletype_mismatch_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:137 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42b6f #3 0x000021982bc4b723 in __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1 compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:142 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42723 #4 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #5 0x000021afcfdf2089 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*, struct acpi_rsconvert_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsmisc.c:355 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b2089 torvalds#6 0x000021afcfded169 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resources(u8*, u32, u32, u8, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rslist.c:137 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ad169 torvalds#7 0x000021afcfe2d24a in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources(struct acpi_walk_state*, u8*, acpi_size, acpi_walk_aml_callback, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utresrc.c:237 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ed24a torvalds#8 0x000021afcfde66b7 in acpi_rs_create_resource_list(union acpi_operand_object*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rscreate.c:199 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6a66b7 torvalds#9 0x000021afcfdf6979 in acpi_rs_get_method_data(acpi_handle, const char*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsutils.c:770 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b6979 torvalds#10 0x000021afcfdf708f in acpi_walk_resources(acpi_handle, char*, acpi_walk_resource_callback, void*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsxface.c:731 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b708f torvalds#11 0x000021afcfa95dcf in acpi::acpi_impl::walk_resources(acpi::acpi_impl*, acpi_handle, const char*, acpi::Acpi::resources_callable) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:41 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x355dcf torvalds#12 0x000021afcfaa8278 in acpi::device_builder::gather_resources(acpi::device_builder*, acpi::Acpi*, fidl::any_arena&, acpi::Manager*, acpi::device_builder::gather_resources_callback) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/device-builder.cc:84 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x368278 torvalds#13 0x000021afcfbddb87 in acpi::Manager::configure_discovered_devices(acpi::Manager*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/manager.cc:75 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x49db87 torvalds#14 0x000021afcf99091d in publish_acpi_devices(acpi::Manager*, zx_device_t*, zx_device_t*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/acpi-nswalk.cc:95 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x25091d torvalds#15 0x000021afcf9c1d4e in x86::X86::do_init(x86::X86*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:60 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x281d4e torvalds#16 0x000021afcf9e33ad in λ(x86::X86::ddk_init::(anon class)*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:77 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a33ad torvalds#17 0x000021afcf9e313e in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:76:19), false, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void>::invoke(void*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:183 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a313e torvalds#18 0x000021afcfbab4c7 in fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b4c7 torvalds#19 0x000021afcfbab342 in fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b342 torvalds#20 0x000021afcfcd98c3 in async::internal::retained_task::Handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_task_t*, zx_status_t) ../../sdk/lib/async/task.cc:24 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x5998c3 torvalds#21 0x00002290f9924616 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::post_task::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:789 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a616 torvalds#22 0x00002290f9924323 in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:788:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a323 torvalds#23 0x00002290f9904b76 in fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xeab76 torvalds#24 0x00002290f9904831 in fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:471 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xea831 torvalds#25 0x00002290f98d5adc in driver_runtime::callback_request::Call(driver_runtime::callback_request*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/callback_request.h:74 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xbbadc torvalds#26 0x00002290f98e1e58 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1248 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xc7e58 torvalds#27 0x00002290f98e4159 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callbacks(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1308 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xca159 torvalds#28 0x00002290f9918414 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::create_with_adder::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:353 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe414 torvalds#29 0x00002290f991812d in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:351:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe12d torvalds#30 0x00002290f9906fc7 in fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecfc7 torvalds#31 0x00002290f9906c66 in fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecc66 torvalds#32 0x00002290f98e73d9 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::invoke_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.h:543 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd3d9 torvalds#33 0x00002290f98e700d in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::handle_event(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1442 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd00d torvalds#34 0x00002290f9918983 in async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event(async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>*, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/async_loop_owned_event_handler.h:59 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe983 torvalds#35 0x00002290f9918b9e in async::wait_method<async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>, &async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event>::call_handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async/include/lib/async/cpp/wait.h:201 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfeb9e torvalds#36 0x00002290f99bf509 in async_loop_dispatch_wait(async_loop_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:394 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a5509 torvalds#37 0x00002290f99b9958 in async_loop_run_once(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:343 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f958 torvalds#38 0x00002290f99b9247 in async_loop_run(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t, _Bool) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:301 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f247 torvalds#39 0x00002290f99ba962 in async_loop_run_thread(void*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:860 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a0962 torvalds#40 0x000041afd176ef30 in start_c11(void*) ../../zircon/third_party/ulib/musl/pthread/pthread_create.c:63 <libc.so>+0x84f30 torvalds#41 0x000041afd18a448d in thread_trampoline(uintptr_t, uintptr_t) ../../zircon/system/ulib/runtime/thread.cc:100 <libc.so>+0x1ba48d Link: acpica/acpica@1c28da22 Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4664267.LvFx2qVVIh@rjwysocki.net Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird@gmail.com> [ rjw: Pick up the tag from Tamir ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

A syzbot-generated disk image triggered a BUG_ON in ext4_update_inline_data() when an inode had the EXT4_INLINE_DATA_FL flag set but lacked the required system.data extended attribute. ext4_prepare_inline_data() now checks for the presence of this xattr and returns -EFSCORRUPTED if it is missing. This prevents corrupted inodes from reaching the update path and causing a crash. [1] Syzbot crash log: EXT4-fs (loop0): mounted filesystem 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 r/w without journal. Quota mode: writeback. fscrypt: AES-256-XTS using implementation "xts-aes-aesni-avx" loop0: detected capacity change from 512 to 64 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inline.c:357! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5499 Comm: syz.0.16 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4-syzkaller-00348-g772b78c2abd8 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:ext4_update_inline_data+0x4e8/0x4f0 fs/ext4/inline.c:357 Code: ... Call Trace: <TASK> ext4_prepare_inline_data+0x141/0x1d0 fs/ext4/inline.c:415 ext4_generic_write_inline_data+0x207/0xc90 fs/ext4/inline.c:692 ext4_try_to_write_inline_data+0x80/0xa0 fs/ext4/inline.c:763 ext4_write_begin+0x2d8/0x1680 fs/ext4/inode.c:1281 generic_perform_write+0x2c7/0x910 mm/filemap.c:4112 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0xce/0x3a0 fs/ext4/file.c:299 ext4_file_write_iter+0x298/0x1bc0 fs/ext4/file.c:-1 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0x548/0xa90 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: ... </TASK> [2] Reproducer image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/f97118969515/mount_0.gz [3] e2fsck output on the provided image: $ e2fsck -fn mount_0 e2fsck 1.47.0 (5-Feb-2023) One or more block group descriptor checksums are invalid. Fix? no Group descriptor 0 checksum is 0x8245, should be 0x353a. IGNORED. Pass 1: Checking inodes, blocks, and sizes Inode 12 has INLINE_DATA_FL flag but extended attribute not found. Truncate? no Inode 16, i_blocks is 3298534883346, should be 18. Fix? no Inode 17, i_blocks is 17592186044416, should be 0. Fix? no Pass 2: Checking directory structure Symlink /file0/file1 (inode torvalds#14) is invalid. Clear? no Entry 'file1' in /file0 (12) has an incorrect filetype (was 7, should be 0). Fix? no Directory inode 11, block #5, offset 0: directory corrupted Salvage? no e2fsck: aborted syzkaller: ********** WARNING: Filesystem still has errors ********** Reported-by: syzbot+544248a761451c0df72f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=544248a761451c0df72f Fixes: 67cf5b0 ("ext4: add the basic function for inline data support") Tested-by: syzbot+544248a761451c0df72f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Moon Hee Lee <moonhee.lee.ca@gmail.com>

commit fa787ac upstream. In KVM guests with Hyper-V hypercalls enabled, the hypercalls HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST and HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX allow a guest to request invalidation of portions of a virtual TLB. For this, the hypercall parameter includes a list of GVAs that are supposed to be invalidated. However, when non-canonical GVAs are passed, there is currently no filtering in place and they are eventually passed to checked invocations of INVVPID on Intel / INVLPGA on AMD. While AMD's INVLPGA silently ignores non-canonical addresses (effectively a no-op), Intel's INVVPID explicitly signals VM-Fail and ultimately triggers the WARN_ONCE in invvpid_error(): invvpid failed: ext=0x0 vpid=1 gva=0xaaaaaaaaaaaaa000 WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 326 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:482 invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel] Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm 9pnet_virtio irqbypass fuse CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 326 Comm: kvm-vm Not tainted 6.15.0 torvalds#14 PREEMPT(voluntary) RIP: 0010:invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel] Call Trace: vmx_flush_tlb_gva+0x320/0x490 [kvm_intel] kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb+0x24f/0x4f0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3013/0x5810 [kvm] Hyper-V documents that invalid GVAs (those that are beyond a partition's GVA space) are to be ignored. While not completely clear whether this ruling also applies to non-canonical GVAs, it is likely fine to make that assumption, and manual testing on Azure confirms "real" Hyper-V interprets the specification in the same way. Skip non-canonical GVAs when processing the list of address to avoid tripping the INVVPID failure. Alternatively, KVM could filter out "bad" GVAs before inserting into the FIFO, but practically speaking the only downside of pushing validation to the final processing is that doing so is suboptimal for the guest, and no well-behaved guest will request TLB flushes for non-canonical addresses. Fixes: 2609708 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: Handle HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST{,EX} calls gently") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Manuel Andreas <manuel.andreas@tum.de> Suggested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c090efb3-ef82-499f-a5e0-360fc8420fb7@tum.de Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…void Priority Inversion in SRIOV commit dc0297f upstream. RLCG Register Access is a way for virtual functions to safely access GPU registers in a virtualized environment., including TLB flushes and register reads. When multiple threads or VFs try to access the same registers simultaneously, it can lead to race conditions. By using the RLCG interface, the driver can serialize access to the registers. This means that only one thread can access the registers at a time, preventing conflicts and ensuring that operations are performed correctly. Additionally, when a low-priority task holds a mutex that a high-priority task needs, ie., If a thread holding a spinlock tries to acquire a mutex, it can lead to priority inversion. register access in amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw especially in a fast code path is critical. The call stack shows that the function amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw is being called, which attempts to acquire the mutex. This function is invoked from amdgpu_sriov_wreg, which in turn is called from gmc_v11_0_flush_gpu_tlb. The [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] indicates that a thread is trying to acquire a mutex while it is in a context that does not allow it to sleep (like holding a spinlock). Fixes the below: [ 253.013423] ============================= [ 253.013434] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 253.013446] 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 torvalds#14 Tainted: G U OE [ 253.013464] ----------------------------- [ 253.013475] kworker/0:1/10 is trying to lock: [ 253.013487] ffff9f30542e3cf8 (&adev->virt.rlcg_reg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu] [ 253.013815] other info that might help us debug this: [ 253.013827] context-{4:4} [ 253.013835] 3 locks held by kworker/0:1/10: [ 253.013847] #0: ffff9f3040050f58 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680 [ 253.013877] #1: ffffb789c008be40 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680 [ 253.013905] #2: ffff9f3054281838 (&adev->gmc.invalidate_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: gmc_v11_0_flush_gpu_tlb+0x198/0x4f0 [amdgpu] [ 253.014154] stack backtrace: [ 253.014164] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 10 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G U OE 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 torvalds#14 [ 253.014189] Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 253.014203] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 11/18/2024 [ 253.014224] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn [ 253.014241] Call Trace: [ 253.014250] <TASK> [ 253.014260] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0 [ 253.014275] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 253.014287] __lock_acquire+0xa47/0x2810 [ 253.014303] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 253.014321] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 253.014333] ? amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu] [ 253.014562] ? __lock_acquire+0xa6b/0x2810 [ 253.014578] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 253.014591] ? amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu] [ 253.014782] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10 [ 253.014795] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 253.014808] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0 [ 253.014822] ? amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu] [ 253.015012] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 253.015029] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 253.015044] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 253.015057] amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu] [ 253.015249] amdgpu_sriov_wreg+0xc5/0xd0 [amdgpu] [ 253.015435] gmc_v11_0_flush_gpu_tlb+0x44b/0x4f0 [amdgpu] [ 253.015667] gfx_v11_0_hw_init+0x499/0x29c0 [amdgpu] [ 253.015901] ? __pfx_smu_v13_0_update_pcie_parameters+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu] [ 253.016159] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 253.016173] ? smu_hw_init+0x18d/0x300 [amdgpu] [ 253.016403] amdgpu_device_init+0x29ad/0x36a0 [amdgpu] [ 253.016614] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x1a/0xc0 [amdgpu] [ 253.017057] amdgpu_pci_probe+0x1c2/0x660 [amdgpu] [ 253.017493] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0xb0 [ 253.017746] work_for_cpu_fn+0x1a/0x30 [ 253.017995] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 253.018248] worker_thread+0x190/0x330 [ 253.018500] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 253.018746] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 253.018988] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 253.019231] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 253.019468] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 253.019701] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 253.019939] </TASK> v2: s/spin_trylock/spin_lock_irqsave to be safe (Christian). Fixes: e864180 ("drm/amdgpu: Add lock around VF RLCG interface") Cc: lin cao <lin.cao@amd.com> Cc: Jingwen Chen <Jingwen.Chen2@amd.com> Cc: Victor Skvortsov <victor.skvortsov@amd.com> Cc: Zhigang Luo <zhigang.luo@amd.com> Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam@amd.com> Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> [ Minor context change fixed. ] Signed-off-by: Wenshan Lan <jetlan9@163.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit fa787ac ] In KVM guests with Hyper-V hypercalls enabled, the hypercalls HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST and HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX allow a guest to request invalidation of portions of a virtual TLB. For this, the hypercall parameter includes a list of GVAs that are supposed to be invalidated. However, when non-canonical GVAs are passed, there is currently no filtering in place and they are eventually passed to checked invocations of INVVPID on Intel / INVLPGA on AMD. While AMD's INVLPGA silently ignores non-canonical addresses (effectively a no-op), Intel's INVVPID explicitly signals VM-Fail and ultimately triggers the WARN_ONCE in invvpid_error(): invvpid failed: ext=0x0 vpid=1 gva=0xaaaaaaaaaaaaa000 WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 326 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:482 invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel] Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm 9pnet_virtio irqbypass fuse CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 326 Comm: kvm-vm Not tainted 6.15.0 torvalds#14 PREEMPT(voluntary) RIP: 0010:invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel] Call Trace: vmx_flush_tlb_gva+0x320/0x490 [kvm_intel] kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb+0x24f/0x4f0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3013/0x5810 [kvm] Hyper-V documents that invalid GVAs (those that are beyond a partition's GVA space) are to be ignored. While not completely clear whether this ruling also applies to non-canonical GVAs, it is likely fine to make that assumption, and manual testing on Azure confirms "real" Hyper-V interprets the specification in the same way. Skip non-canonical GVAs when processing the list of address to avoid tripping the INVVPID failure. Alternatively, KVM could filter out "bad" GVAs before inserting into the FIFO, but practically speaking the only downside of pushing validation to the final processing is that doing so is suboptimal for the guest, and no well-behaved guest will request TLB flushes for non-canonical addresses. Fixes: 2609708 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: Handle HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST{,EX} calls gently") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Manuel Andreas <manuel.andreas@tum.de> Suggested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c090efb3-ef82-499f-a5e0-360fc8420fb7@tum.de Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit fa787ac ] In KVM guests with Hyper-V hypercalls enabled, the hypercalls HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST and HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX allow a guest to request invalidation of portions of a virtual TLB. For this, the hypercall parameter includes a list of GVAs that are supposed to be invalidated. However, when non-canonical GVAs are passed, there is currently no filtering in place and they are eventually passed to checked invocations of INVVPID on Intel / INVLPGA on AMD. While AMD's INVLPGA silently ignores non-canonical addresses (effectively a no-op), Intel's INVVPID explicitly signals VM-Fail and ultimately triggers the WARN_ONCE in invvpid_error(): invvpid failed: ext=0x0 vpid=1 gva=0xaaaaaaaaaaaaa000 WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 326 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:482 invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel] Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm 9pnet_virtio irqbypass fuse CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 326 Comm: kvm-vm Not tainted 6.15.0 torvalds#14 PREEMPT(voluntary) RIP: 0010:invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel] Call Trace: vmx_flush_tlb_gva+0x320/0x490 [kvm_intel] kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb+0x24f/0x4f0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3013/0x5810 [kvm] Hyper-V documents that invalid GVAs (those that are beyond a partition's GVA space) are to be ignored. While not completely clear whether this ruling also applies to non-canonical GVAs, it is likely fine to make that assumption, and manual testing on Azure confirms "real" Hyper-V interprets the specification in the same way. Skip non-canonical GVAs when processing the list of address to avoid tripping the INVVPID failure. Alternatively, KVM could filter out "bad" GVAs before inserting into the FIFO, but practically speaking the only downside of pushing validation to the final processing is that doing so is suboptimal for the guest, and no well-behaved guest will request TLB flushes for non-canonical addresses. Fixes: 2609708 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: Handle HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST{,EX} calls gently") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Manuel Andreas <manuel.andreas@tum.de> Suggested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c090efb3-ef82-499f-a5e0-360fc8420fb7@tum.de Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> [sean: use plain is_noncanonical_address()] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

[ Upstream commit fa787ac ] In KVM guests with Hyper-V hypercalls enabled, the hypercalls HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST and HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX allow a guest to request invalidation of portions of a virtual TLB. For this, the hypercall parameter includes a list of GVAs that are supposed to be invalidated. However, when non-canonical GVAs are passed, there is currently no filtering in place and they are eventually passed to checked invocations of INVVPID on Intel / INVLPGA on AMD. While AMD's INVLPGA silently ignores non-canonical addresses (effectively a no-op), Intel's INVVPID explicitly signals VM-Fail and ultimately triggers the WARN_ONCE in invvpid_error(): invvpid failed: ext=0x0 vpid=1 gva=0xaaaaaaaaaaaaa000 WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 326 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:482 invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel] Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm 9pnet_virtio irqbypass fuse CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 326 Comm: kvm-vm Not tainted 6.15.0 torvalds#14 PREEMPT(voluntary) RIP: 0010:invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel] Call Trace: vmx_flush_tlb_gva+0x320/0x490 [kvm_intel] kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb+0x24f/0x4f0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3013/0x5810 [kvm] Hyper-V documents that invalid GVAs (those that are beyond a partition's GVA space) are to be ignored. While not completely clear whether this ruling also applies to non-canonical GVAs, it is likely fine to make that assumption, and manual testing on Azure confirms "real" Hyper-V interprets the specification in the same way. Skip non-canonical GVAs when processing the list of address to avoid tripping the INVVPID failure. Alternatively, KVM could filter out "bad" GVAs before inserting into the FIFO, but practically speaking the only downside of pushing validation to the final processing is that doing so is suboptimal for the guest, and no well-behaved guest will request TLB flushes for non-canonical addresses. Fixes: 2609708 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: Handle HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST{,EX} calls gently") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Manuel Andreas <manuel.andreas@tum.de> Suggested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c090efb3-ef82-499f-a5e0-360fc8420fb7@tum.de Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> [sean: use plain is_noncanonical_address()] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

hfsplus_bmap_alloc can trigger a crash if a record offset or length is larger than node_size [ 15.264282] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfsplus_bmap_alloc+0x887/0x8b0 [ 15.265192] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881085ca188 by task test/183 [ 15.265949] [ 15.266163] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 183 Comm: test Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-gc17b750b3ad9 torvalds#14 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 15.266165] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 15.266167] Call Trace: [ 15.266168] <TASK> [ 15.266169] dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 [ 15.266173] print_report+0xd0/0x660 [ 15.266181] kasan_report+0xce/0x100 [ 15.266185] hfsplus_bmap_alloc+0x887/0x8b0 [ 15.266208] hfs_btree_inc_height.isra.0+0xd5/0x7c0 [ 15.266217] hfsplus_brec_insert+0x870/0xb00 [ 15.266222] __hfsplus_ext_write_extent+0x428/0x570 [ 15.266225] __hfsplus_ext_cache_extent+0x5e/0x910 [ 15.266227] hfsplus_ext_read_extent+0x1b2/0x200 [ 15.266233] hfsplus_file_extend+0x5a7/0x1000 [ 15.266237] hfsplus_get_block+0x12b/0x8c0 [ 15.266238] __block_write_begin_int+0x36b/0x12c0 [ 15.266251] block_write_begin+0x77/0x110 [ 15.266252] cont_write_begin+0x428/0x720 [ 15.266259] hfsplus_write_begin+0x51/0x100 [ 15.266262] cont_write_begin+0x272/0x720 [ 15.266270] hfsplus_write_begin+0x51/0x100 [ 15.266274] generic_perform_write+0x321/0x750 [ 15.266285] generic_file_write_iter+0xc3/0x310 [ 15.266289] __kernel_write_iter+0x2fd/0x800 [ 15.266296] dump_user_range+0x2ea/0x910 [ 15.266301] elf_core_dump+0x2a94/0x2ed0 [ 15.266320] vfs_coredump+0x1d85/0x45e0 [ 15.266349] get_signal+0x12e3/0x1990 [ 15.266357] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x89/0x580 [ 15.266362] irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xab/0x110 [ 15.266364] asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 [ 15.266366] RIP: 0033:0x41bd35 [ 15.266367] Code: bc d1 f3 0f 7f 27 f3 0f 7f 6f 10 f3 0f 7f 77 20 f3 0f 7f 7f 30 49 83 c0 0f 49 29 d0 48 8d 7c 17 31 e9 9f 0b 00 00 66 0f ef c0 <f3> 0f 6f 0e f3 0f 6f 56 10 66 0f 74 c1 66 0f d7 d0 49 83 f8f [ 15.266369] RSP: 002b:00007ffc9e62d078 EFLAGS: 00010283 [ 15.266371] RAX: 00007ffc9e62d100 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 15.266372] RDX: 00000000000000e0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007ffc9e62d100 [ 15.266373] RBP: 0000400000000040 R08: 00000000000000e0 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 15.266374] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 15.266375] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000400000000000 [ 15.266376] </TASK> When calling hfsplus_bmap_alloc to allocate a free node, this function first retrieves the bitmap from header node and map node using node->page together with the offset and length from hfs_brec_lenoff ``` len = hfs_brec_lenoff(node, 2, &off16); off = off16; off += node->page_offset; pagep = node->page + (off >> PAGE_SHIFT); data = kmap_local_page(*pagep); ``` However, if the retrieved offset or length is invalid(i.e. exceeds node_size), the code may end up accessing pages outside the allocated range for this node. This patch adds proper validation of both offset and length before use, preventing out-of-bounds page access. Move is_bnode_offset_valid and check_and_correct_requested_length to hfsplus_fs.h, as they may be required by other functions. Reported-by: syzbot+356aed408415a56543cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/67bcb4a6.050a0220.bbfd1.008f.GAE@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Yang Chenzhi <yang.chenzhi@vivo.com>

[ Upstream commit fa787ac ] In KVM guests with Hyper-V hypercalls enabled, the hypercalls HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST and HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX allow a guest to request invalidation of portions of a virtual TLB. For this, the hypercall parameter includes a list of GVAs that are supposed to be invalidated. However, when non-canonical GVAs are passed, there is currently no filtering in place and they are eventually passed to checked invocations of INVVPID on Intel / INVLPGA on AMD. While AMD's INVLPGA silently ignores non-canonical addresses (effectively a no-op), Intel's INVVPID explicitly signals VM-Fail and ultimately triggers the WARN_ONCE in invvpid_error(): invvpid failed: ext=0x0 vpid=1 gva=0xaaaaaaaaaaaaa000 WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 326 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:482 invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel] Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm 9pnet_virtio irqbypass fuse CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 326 Comm: kvm-vm Not tainted 6.15.0 torvalds#14 PREEMPT(voluntary) RIP: 0010:invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel] Call Trace: vmx_flush_tlb_gva+0x320/0x490 [kvm_intel] kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb+0x24f/0x4f0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3013/0x5810 [kvm] Hyper-V documents that invalid GVAs (those that are beyond a partition's GVA space) are to be ignored. While not completely clear whether this ruling also applies to non-canonical GVAs, it is likely fine to make that assumption, and manual testing on Azure confirms "real" Hyper-V interprets the specification in the same way. Skip non-canonical GVAs when processing the list of address to avoid tripping the INVVPID failure. Alternatively, KVM could filter out "bad" GVAs before inserting into the FIFO, but practically speaking the only downside of pushing validation to the final processing is that doing so is suboptimal for the guest, and no well-behaved guest will request TLB flushes for non-canonical addresses. Fixes: 2609708 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: Handle HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST{,EX} calls gently") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Manuel Andreas <manuel.andreas@tum.de> Suggested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c090efb3-ef82-499f-a5e0-360fc8420fb7@tum.de Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> [sean: use plain is_noncanonical_address()] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…faces BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2115616 commit 2240fed upstream. Robert Morris created a test program which can cause usb_hub_to_struct_hub() to dereference a NULL or inappropriate pointer: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xcccccccccccccccc: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 117 Comm: kworker/7:1 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-00017-gf44d154d6e3d torvalds#14 Hardware name: FreeBSD BHYVE/BHYVE, BIOS 14.0 10/17/2021 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event RIP: 0010:usb_hub_adjust_deviceremovable+0x78/0x110 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x31/0x80 ? exc_general_protection+0x1b4/0x3c0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? usb_hub_adjust_deviceremovable+0x78/0x110 hub_probe+0x7c7/0xab0 usb_probe_interface+0x14b/0x350 really_probe+0xd0/0x2d0 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 __driver_probe_device+0x6e/0x110 driver_probe_device+0x1a/0x90 __device_attach_driver+0x7e/0xc0 bus_for_each_drv+0x7f/0xd0 __device_attach+0xaa/0x1a0 bus_probe_device+0x8b/0xa0 device_add+0x62e/0x810 usb_set_configuration+0x65d/0x990 usb_generic_driver_probe+0x4b/0x70 usb_probe_device+0x36/0xd0 The cause of this error is that the device has two interfaces, and the hub driver binds to interface 1 instead of interface 0, which is where usb_hub_to_struct_hub() looks. We can prevent the problem from occurring by refusing to accept hub devices that violate the USB spec by having more than one configuration or interface. Reported-and-tested-by: Robert Morris <rtm@csail.mit.edu> Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/95564.1737394039@localhost/ Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c27f3bf4-63d8-4fb5-ac82-09e3cd19f61c@rowland.harvard.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <noah.wager@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit fa787ac ] In KVM guests with Hyper-V hypercalls enabled, the hypercalls HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST and HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX allow a guest to request invalidation of portions of a virtual TLB. For this, the hypercall parameter includes a list of GVAs that are supposed to be invalidated. However, when non-canonical GVAs are passed, there is currently no filtering in place and they are eventually passed to checked invocations of INVVPID on Intel / INVLPGA on AMD. While AMD's INVLPGA silently ignores non-canonical addresses (effectively a no-op), Intel's INVVPID explicitly signals VM-Fail and ultimately triggers the WARN_ONCE in invvpid_error(): invvpid failed: ext=0x0 vpid=1 gva=0xaaaaaaaaaaaaa000 WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 326 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:482 invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel] Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm 9pnet_virtio irqbypass fuse CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 326 Comm: kvm-vm Not tainted 6.15.0 torvalds#14 PREEMPT(voluntary) RIP: 0010:invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel] Call Trace: vmx_flush_tlb_gva+0x320/0x490 [kvm_intel] kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb+0x24f/0x4f0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3013/0x5810 [kvm] Hyper-V documents that invalid GVAs (those that are beyond a partition's GVA space) are to be ignored. While not completely clear whether this ruling also applies to non-canonical GVAs, it is likely fine to make that assumption, and manual testing on Azure confirms "real" Hyper-V interprets the specification in the same way. Skip non-canonical GVAs when processing the list of address to avoid tripping the INVVPID failure. Alternatively, KVM could filter out "bad" GVAs before inserting into the FIFO, but practically speaking the only downside of pushing validation to the final processing is that doing so is suboptimal for the guest, and no well-behaved guest will request TLB flushes for non-canonical addresses. Fixes: 2609708 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: Handle HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST{,EX} calls gently") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Manuel Andreas <manuel.andreas@tum.de> Suggested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c090efb3-ef82-499f-a5e0-360fc8420fb7@tum.de Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> [sean: use plain is_noncanonical_address()] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

fix GHCB_MSR_VMPL_REQ_LEVEL

[ Upstream commit fa787ac ] In KVM guests with Hyper-V hypercalls enabled, the hypercalls HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST and HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX allow a guest to request invalidation of portions of a virtual TLB. For this, the hypercall parameter includes a list of GVAs that are supposed to be invalidated. However, when non-canonical GVAs are passed, there is currently no filtering in place and they are eventually passed to checked invocations of INVVPID on Intel / INVLPGA on AMD. While AMD's INVLPGA silently ignores non-canonical addresses (effectively a no-op), Intel's INVVPID explicitly signals VM-Fail and ultimately triggers the WARN_ONCE in invvpid_error(): invvpid failed: ext=0x0 vpid=1 gva=0xaaaaaaaaaaaaa000 WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 326 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:482 invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel] Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm 9pnet_virtio irqbypass fuse CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 326 Comm: kvm-vm Not tainted 6.15.0 torvalds#14 PREEMPT(voluntary) RIP: 0010:invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel] Call Trace: vmx_flush_tlb_gva+0x320/0x490 [kvm_intel] kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb+0x24f/0x4f0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3013/0x5810 [kvm] Hyper-V documents that invalid GVAs (those that are beyond a partition's GVA space) are to be ignored. While not completely clear whether this ruling also applies to non-canonical GVAs, it is likely fine to make that assumption, and manual testing on Azure confirms "real" Hyper-V interprets the specification in the same way. Skip non-canonical GVAs when processing the list of address to avoid tripping the INVVPID failure. Alternatively, KVM could filter out "bad" GVAs before inserting into the FIFO, but practically speaking the only downside of pushing validation to the final processing is that doing so is suboptimal for the guest, and no well-behaved guest will request TLB flushes for non-canonical addresses. Fixes: 2609708 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: Handle HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST{,EX} calls gently") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Manuel Andreas <manuel.andreas@tum.de> Suggested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c090efb3-ef82-499f-a5e0-360fc8420fb7@tum.de Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> [sean: use plain is_noncanonical_address()] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Patch series "mm: remove nth_page()", v2. As discussed recently with Linus, nth_page() is just nasty and we would like to remove it. To recap, the reason we currently need nth_page() within a folio is because on some kernel configs (SPARSEMEM without SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP), the memmap is allocated per memory section. While buddy allocations cannot cross memory section boundaries, hugetlb and dax folios can. So crossing a memory section means that "page++" could do the wrong thing. Instead, nth_page() on these problematic configs always goes from page->pfn, to the go from (++pfn)->page, which is rather nasty. Likely, many people have no idea when nth_page() is required and when it might be dropped. We refer to such problematic PFN ranges and "non-contiguous pages". If we only deal with "contiguous pages", there is not need for nth_page(). Besides that "obvious" folio case, we might end up using nth_page() within CMA allocations (again, could span memory sections), and in one corner case (kfence) when processing memblock allocations (again, could span memory sections). So let's handle all that, add sanity checks, and remove nth_page(). Patch #1 -> #5 : stop making SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP user-selectable + cleanups Patch torvalds#6 -> torvalds#13 : disallow folios to have non-contiguous pages Patch torvalds#14 -> torvalds#20 : remove nth_page() usage within folios Patch torvalds#22 : disallow CMA allocations of non-contiguous pages Patch torvalds#23 -> torvalds#33 : sanity+check + remove nth_page() usage within SG entry Patch torvalds#34 : sanity-check + remove nth_page() usage in unpin_user_page_range_dirty_lock() Patch torvalds#35 : remove nth_page() in kfence Patch torvalds#36 : adjust stale comment regarding nth_page Patch torvalds#37 : mm: remove nth_page() A lot of this is inspired from the discussion at [1] between Linus, Jason and me, so cudos to them. This patch (of 37): In an ideal world, we wouldn't have to deal with SPARSEMEM without SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, but in particular for 32bit SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP is considered too costly and consequently not supported. However, if an architecture does support SPARSEMEM with SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, let's forbid the user to disable VMEMMAP: just like we already do for arm64, s390 and x86. So if SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP is supported, don't allow to use SPARSEMEM without SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP. This implies that the option to not use SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP will now be gone for loongarch, powerpc, riscv and sparc. All architectures only enable SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP with 64bit support, so there should not really be a big downside to using the VMEMMAP (quite the contrary). This is a preparation for not supporting (1) folio sizes that exceed a single memory section (2) CMA allocations of non-contiguous page ranges in SPARSEMEM without SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP configs, whereby we want to limit possible impact as much as possible (e.g., gigantic hugetlb page allocations suddenly fails). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250901150359.867252-1-david@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250901150359.867252-2-david@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wiCYfNp4AJLBORU-c7ZyRBUp66W2-Et6cdQ4REx-GyQ_A@mail.gmail.com/T/#u [1] Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org> Acked-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name> Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Andreas Larsson <andreas@gaisler.com> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com> Cc: Alex Dubov <oakad@yahoo.com> Cc: Alex Willamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Cc: Bart van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Cc: Brett Creeley <brett.creeley@amd.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter (Ampere) <cl@gentwo.org> Cc: Damien Le Maol <dlemoal@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@gmail.com> Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Inki Dae <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: James Bottomley <james.bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Jonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com> Cc: Lars Persson <lars.persson@axis.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Cc: Maxim Levitky <maximlevitsky@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev> Cc: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Robin Murohy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Shameerali Kolothum Thodi <shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tursulin@ursulin.net> Cc: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

In November last year, I sent an RFC to introduce CAN XL [1]. That RFC, despite positive feedback, was put on hold due to some unanswered question concerning the PWM encoding [2]. While stuck, some small preparation work was done in parallel in [3] by refactoring the struct can_priv and doing some trivial clean-up and renaming. [3] received zero feedback but was eventually merged after splitting it in smaller parts and resending it. Finally, in July this year, we clarified the remaining mysteries about PWM calculation, thus unlocking the series. Summer being a bit busy because of some personal matters brings us to now. After doing all the refactoring and adding all the CAN XL features, the final result is roughly 30 patches, probably too much for a single series. So I am splitting it in two: - preparation (this series) - CAN XL And so, this series continues and finishes the preparation work done in [3]. It contains all the refactoring needed to smoothly introduce CAN XL. The goal is to: - split the function in smaller pieces: CAN XL will introduce a fair amount of code. And some functions which are already fairly long (86 lines for can_validate(), 216 lines for can_changelink()) would grow to disproportionate sizes if the CAN XL logic were to be inlined in those functions. - repurpose the existing code to handle both CAN FD and CAN XL: a huge part of CAN XL simply reuses the CAN FD logic. All the existing CAN FD logic is made more generic to handle both CAN FD and XL. In more details: - Patch #1 moves struct data_bittiming_params from dev.h to bittiming.h and patch #2 makes can_get_relative_tdco() FD agnostic before also moving it to bittiming.h. - Patch #3 adds some comments to netlink.h tagging which IFLA symbols are FD specific. - Patch #4 to torvalds#7 are refactoring can_validate() and can_validate_bittiming(). - Patch torvalds#8 to torvalds#12 are refactoring can_changelink() and can_tdc_changelink(). - Patch torvalds#13 and torvalds#14 are refactoring can_get_size() and can_tdc_get_size(). - Patch torvalds#15 to torvalds#18 are refactoring can_fill_info() and can_tdc_fill_info(). - Patch torvalds#19 makes can_calc_tdco() FD agnostic. - Patch torvalds#20 adds can_get_ctrlmode_str() which converts control mode flags into strings. This is done in preparation of patch torvalds#20. - Patch torvalds#21 is the final patch and improves the user experience by providing detailed error messages whenever invalid parameters are provided. All those error messages came into handy when debugging the upcoming CAN XL patches. Aside from the last patch, the other changes do not impact any of the existing functionalities. The follow up series which introduces CAN XL is nearly completed but will be sent only once this one is approved: one thing at a time, I do not want to overwhelm people (including myself). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20241110155902.72807-16-mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/c4771c16-c578-4a6d-baee-918fe276dbe9@wanadoo.fr/ [3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20241110155902.72807-16-mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr/ To: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> To: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Cc: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Cc: Stéphane Grosjean <stephane.grosjean@hms-networks.com> Cc: Robert Nawrath <mbro1689@gmail.com> Cc: Minh Le <minh.le.aj@renesas.com> Cc: Duy Nguyen <duy.nguyen.rh@renesas.com> Cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - EDITME: describe what is new in this series revision. - EDITME: use bulletpoints and terse descriptions. - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250903-canxl-netlink-prep-v1-0-904bd6037cd9@kernel.org --- b4-submit-tracking --- # This section is used internally by b4 prep for tracking purposes. { "series": { "revision": 2, "change-id": "20250831-canxl-netlink-prep-9dbf8498fd9d", "prefixes": [], "prerequisites": [ "base-commit: net-next/main" ], "history": { "v1": [ "20250903-canxl-netlink-prep-v1-0-904bd6037cd9@kernel.org" ] } } }

Patch series "mm: remove nth_page()", v2. As discussed recently with Linus, nth_page() is just nasty and we would like to remove it. To recap, the reason we currently need nth_page() within a folio is because on some kernel configs (SPARSEMEM without SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP), the memmap is allocated per memory section. While buddy allocations cannot cross memory section boundaries, hugetlb and dax folios can. So crossing a memory section means that "page++" could do the wrong thing. Instead, nth_page() on these problematic configs always goes from page->pfn, to the go from (++pfn)->page, which is rather nasty. Likely, many people have no idea when nth_page() is required and when it might be dropped. We refer to such problematic PFN ranges and "non-contiguous pages". If we only deal with "contiguous pages", there is not need for nth_page(). Besides that "obvious" folio case, we might end up using nth_page() within CMA allocations (again, could span memory sections), and in one corner case (kfence) when processing memblock allocations (again, could span memory sections). So let's handle all that, add sanity checks, and remove nth_page(). Patch #1 -> #5 : stop making SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP user-selectable + cleanups Patch torvalds#6 -> torvalds#13 : disallow folios to have non-contiguous pages Patch torvalds#14 -> torvalds#20 : remove nth_page() usage within folios Patch torvalds#22 : disallow CMA allocations of non-contiguous pages Patch torvalds#23 -> torvalds#33 : sanity+check + remove nth_page() usage within SG entry Patch torvalds#34 : sanity-check + remove nth_page() usage in unpin_user_page_range_dirty_lock() Patch torvalds#35 : remove nth_page() in kfence Patch torvalds#36 : adjust stale comment regarding nth_page Patch torvalds#37 : mm: remove nth_page() A lot of this is inspired from the discussion at [1] between Linus, Jason and me, so cudos to them. This patch (of 37): In an ideal world, we wouldn't have to deal with SPARSEMEM without SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, but in particular for 32bit SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP is considered too costly and consequently not supported. However, if an architecture does support SPARSEMEM with SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, let's forbid the user to disable VMEMMAP: just like we already do for arm64, s390 and x86. So if SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP is supported, don't allow to use SPARSEMEM without SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP. This implies that the option to not use SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP will now be gone for loongarch, powerpc, riscv and sparc. All architectures only enable SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP with 64bit support, so there should not really be a big downside to using the VMEMMAP (quite the contrary). This is a preparation for not supporting (1) folio sizes that exceed a single memory section (2) CMA allocations of non-contiguous page ranges in SPARSEMEM without SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP configs, whereby we want to limit possible impact as much as possible (e.g., gigantic hugetlb page allocations suddenly fails). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250901150359.867252-1-david@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250901150359.867252-2-david@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wiCYfNp4AJLBORU-c7ZyRBUp66W2-Et6cdQ4REx-GyQ_A@mail.gmail.com/T/#u [1] Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org> Acked-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name> Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Andreas Larsson <andreas@gaisler.com> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com> Cc: Alex Dubov <oakad@yahoo.com> Cc: Alex Willamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Cc: Bart van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Cc: Brett Creeley <brett.creeley@amd.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter (Ampere) <cl@gentwo.org> Cc: Damien Le Maol <dlemoal@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@gmail.com> Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Inki Dae <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: James Bottomley <james.bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Jonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com> Cc: Lars Persson <lars.persson@axis.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Cc: Maxim Levitky <maximlevitsky@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev> Cc: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Robin Murohy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Shameerali Kolothum Thodi <shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tursulin@ursulin.net> Cc: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Fixed overflow bug in binary search.

8fdfc03

mutexlox closed this Sep 30, 2011

ruzickajakub pushed a commit to ruzickajakub/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 28, 2025

Merge pull request torvalds#14 from 123abcpp/svsm

ab43d2f

fix GHCB_MSR_VMPL_REQ_LEVEL

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Fixed overflow bug in binary search. #14

Fixed overflow bug in binary search. #14

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mutexlox commented Sep 30, 2011

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mutexlox commented Sep 30, 2011

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Fixed overflow bug in binary search. #14

Fixed overflow bug in binary search. #14

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mutexlox commented Sep 30, 2011

Uh oh!

mutexlox commented Sep 30, 2011

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