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rfc, p2p: Restart-based eclipse attack mitigation #17326

@hebasto

Description

@hebasto

Refs:

A victim node restart is still the most likely way of an eclipse attack occurring (#17326 (comment)).

Suppose that a node periodically dumps the current outbound connection list to the disk (a very small file) and retrieve it after shutdown/crash and restart, and tries to re-connect to the listed peers. It could mitigate eclipse attack.

UPDATE 2019-11-07 13:30 UTC
There is an eclipse attack scenario when an attacker exploits a victim node restart to force it to connect to new, probably adversarial, peers.

Trying to re-connect to the before-restart dedicated block-relay-only (#15759) outbound peers mitigates such type of attack.

This proposition does not:

  • prevent all types of eclipse attack
  • completely eliminate the type of eclipse attack described above, as re-connection could fail
  • make block-relay-only connections persistent as any of them could be dropped by a peer

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