Review/msi #5
Merged
Review/msi #5
Conversation
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Add MSI setup and teardown functions to pci_controller_ops.
Patch the callsites (arch_{setup,teardown}_msi_irqs) to prefer the
controller ops version if it's available.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Move the PowerNV/BML platform to use the pci_controller_ops structure rather than ppc_md for MSI related PCI controller operations. Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Move the Cell platform to use the pci_controller_ops structure rather than ppc_md for MSI related PCI controller operations. We can be confident that the functions will be added to the platform's ops struct before any PCI controller's ops struct is populated because: 1) These ops are added to the struct in a subsys initcall. We populate the ops in axon_msi_probe, which is the probe call for the axon-msi driver. However the driver is registered in axon_msi_init, which is a subsys initcall, so this will happen at the subsys level. 2) The controller recieves the struct later, in a device initcall. Cell populates the controller in cell_setup_phb, which is hooked up to ppc_md.pci_setup_phb. ppc_md.pci_setup_phb is only ever called in of_platform.c, as part of the OpenFirmware PCI driver's probe routine. That driver is registered in a device initcall, so it will occur *after* the struct is properly populated. Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
Buildbot: OK |
|
Kisskb: OK |
1 similar comment
|
Kisskb: OK |
|
Buildbot: OK |
|
Selftests: OK |
Move the pseries platform to use the pci_controller_ops structure rather than ppc_md for MSI related PCI controller operations Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Move the fsl_msi subsystem to use the pci_controller_ops structure rather than ppc_md for MSI related PCI controller operations. Previously, MSI ops were added to ppc_md at the subsys level. However, in fsl_pci.c, PCI controllers are created at the at arch level. So, unlike in e.g. PowerNV/pSeries/Cell, we can't simply populate a platform-level controller ops structure and have it copied into the controllers when they are created. Instead, walk every phb, and attempt to populate it with the MSI ops. Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Move the ppc4xx msi subsystem to use the pci_controller_ops structure rather than ppc_md for MSI related PCI controller operations. As with fsl_msi, operations are plugged in at the subsys level, after controller creation. Again, we iterate over all controllers and populate them with the MSI ops. Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Move the ppc4xx hsta msi subsystem to use the pci_controller_ops structure rather than ppc_md for MSI related PCI controller operations. As with fsl_msi, operations are plugged in at the subsys level, after controller creation. Again, we iterate over all controllers and populate them with the MSI ops. Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Move the PaSemi MPIC msi subsystem to use the pci_controller_ops structure rather than ppc_md for MSI related PCI controller operations. As with fsl_msi, operations are plugged in at the subsys level, after controller creation. Again, we iterate over all controllers and populate them with the MSI ops. Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Move the u3 MPIC msi subsystem to use the pci_controller_ops structure rather than ppc_md for MSI related PCI controller operations. As with fsl_msi, operations are plugged in at the subsys level, after controller creation. Again, we iterate over all controllers and populate them with the MSI ops. Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Remove unneeded ppc_md functions. Patch callsites to use pci_controller_ops functions exclusively. Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Remove powernv generic PCI controller operations. Replace it with controller ops for each of the two supported PHBs. As an added bonus, make the two new structs const, which will help guard against bugs such as the one introduced in 65ebf4b ("powerpc/powernv: Move controller ops from ppc_md to controller_ops") Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Some systems only need to deal with DMA masks for PCI devices. For these systems, we can avoid the need for a platform hook and instead use a pci controller based hook. Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Previously, dma_set_mask() on powernv was convoluted:
0) Call dma_set_mask() (a/p/kernel/dma.c)
1) In dma_set_mask(), ppc_md.dma_set_mask() exists, so call it.
2) On powernv, that function pointer is pnv_dma_set_mask().
In pnv_dma_set_mask(), the device is pci, so call pnv_pci_dma_set_mask().
3) In pnv_pci_dma_set_mask(), call pnv_phb->set_dma_mask() if it exists.
4) It only exists in the ioda case, where it points to
pnv_pci_ioda_dma_set_mask(), which is the final function.
So the call chain is:
dma_set_mask() ->
pnv_dma_set_mask() ->
pnv_pci_dma_set_mask() ->
pnv_pci_ioda_dma_set_mask()
Both ppc_md and pnv_phb function pointers are used.
Rip out the ppc_md call, pnv_dma_set_mask() and pnv_pci_dma_set_mask().
Instead:
0) Call dma_set_mask() (a/p/kernel/dma.c)
1) In dma_set_mask(), the device is pci, and pci_controller_ops.dma_set_mask()
exists, so call pci_controller_ops.dma_set_mask()
2) In the ioda case, that points to pnv_pci_ioda_dma_set_mask().
The new call chain is
dma_set_mask() ->
pnv_pci_ioda_dma_set_mask()
Now only the pci_controller_ops function pointer is used.
The fallback paths for p5ioc2 are the same.
Previously, pnv_pci_dma_set_mask() would find no pnv_phb->set_dma_mask()
function, to it would call __set_dma_mask().
Now, dma_set_mask() finds no ppc_md call or pci_controller_ops call,
so it calls __set_dma_mask().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 3, 2015
Nikolay has reported a hang when a memcg reclaim got stuck with the following backtrace: PID: 18308 TASK: ffff883d7c9b0a30 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "rsync" #0 __schedule at ffffffff815ab152 #1 schedule at ffffffff815ab76e #2 schedule_timeout at ffffffff815ae5e5 #3 io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff815aad6a #4 bit_wait_io at ffffffff815abfc6 #5 __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815abda5 #6 wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff8111fd4f #7 shrink_page_list at ffffffff81135445 #8 shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81135845 #9 shrink_lruvec at ffffffff81135ead #10 shrink_zone at ffffffff811360c3 torvalds#11 shrink_zones at ffffffff81136eff torvalds#12 do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8113712f torvalds#13 try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages at ffffffff811372be torvalds#14 try_charge at ffffffff81189423 torvalds#15 mem_cgroup_try_charge at ffffffff8118c6f5 torvalds#16 __add_to_page_cache_locked at ffffffff8112137d torvalds#17 add_to_page_cache_lru at ffffffff81121618 torvalds#18 pagecache_get_page at ffffffff8112170b torvalds#19 grow_dev_page at ffffffff811c8297 torvalds#20 __getblk_slow at ffffffff811c91d6 torvalds#21 __getblk_gfp at ffffffff811c92c1 torvalds#22 ext4_ext_grow_indepth at ffffffff8124565c torvalds#23 ext4_ext_create_new_leaf at ffffffff81246ca8 torvalds#24 ext4_ext_insert_extent at ffffffff81246f09 torvalds#25 ext4_ext_map_blocks at ffffffff8124a848 torvalds#26 ext4_map_blocks at ffffffff8121a5b7 torvalds#27 mpage_map_one_extent at ffffffff8121b1fa torvalds#28 mpage_map_and_submit_extent at ffffffff8121f07b torvalds#29 ext4_writepages at ffffffff8121f6d5 torvalds#30 do_writepages at ffffffff8112c490 torvalds#31 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffff81120199 torvalds#32 filemap_flush at ffffffff8112041c torvalds#33 ext4_alloc_da_blocks at ffffffff81219da1 torvalds#34 ext4_rename at ffffffff81229b91 torvalds#35 ext4_rename2 at ffffffff81229e32 torvalds#36 vfs_rename at ffffffff811a08a5 torvalds#37 SYSC_renameat2 at ffffffff811a3ffc torvalds#38 sys_renameat2 at ffffffff811a408e torvalds#39 sys_rename at ffffffff8119e51e torvalds#40 system_call_fastpath at ffffffff815afa89 Dave Chinner has properly pointed out that this is a deadlock in the reclaim code because ext4 doesn't submit pages which are marked by PG_writeback right away. The heuristic was introduced by commit e62e384 ("memcg: prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") and it was applied only when may_enter_fs was specified. The code has been changed by c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") which has removed the __GFP_FS restriction with a reasoning that we do not get into the fs code. But this is not sufficient apparently because the fs doesn't necessarily submit pages marked PG_writeback for IO right away. ext4_bio_write_page calls io_submit_add_bh but that doesn't necessarily submit the bio. Instead it tries to map more pages into the bio and mpage_map_one_extent might trigger memcg charge which might end up waiting on a page which is marked PG_writeback but hasn't been submitted yet so we would end up waiting for something that never finishes. Fix this issue by replacing __GFP_IO by may_enter_fs check (for case 2) before we go to wait on the writeback. The page fault path, which is the only path that triggers memcg oom killer since 3.12, shouldn't require GFP_NOFS and so we shouldn't reintroduce the premature OOM killer issue which was originally addressed by the heuristic. As per David Chinner the xfs is doing similar thing since 2.6.15 already so ext4 is not the only affected filesystem. Moreover he notes: : For example: IO completion might require unwritten extent conversion : which executes filesystem transactions and GFP_NOFS allocations. The : writeback flag on the pages can not be cleared until unwritten : extent conversion completes. Hence memory reclaim cannot wait on : page writeback to complete in GFP_NOFS context because it is not : safe to do so, memcg reclaim or otherwise. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9+ [tytso@mit.edu: corrected the control flow] Fixes: c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 3, 2015
It turns out that a PV domU also requires the "Xen PV" APIC driver. Otherwise, the flat driver is used and we get stuck in busy loops that never exit, such as in this stack trace: (gdb) target remote localhost:9999 Remote debugging using localhost:9999 __xapic_wait_icr_idle () at ./arch/x86/include/asm/ipi.h:56 56 while (native_apic_mem_read(APIC_ICR) & APIC_ICR_BUSY) (gdb) bt #0 __xapic_wait_icr_idle () at ./arch/x86/include/asm/ipi.h:56 #1 __default_send_IPI_shortcut (shortcut=<optimized out>, dest=<optimized out>, vector=<optimized out>) at ./arch/x86/include/asm/ipi.h:75 #2 apic_send_IPI_self (vector=246) at arch/x86/kernel/apic/probe_64.c:54 #3 0xffffffff81011336 in arch_irq_work_raise () at arch/x86/kernel/irq_work.c:47 #4 0xffffffff8114990c in irq_work_queue (work=0xffff88000fc0e400) at kernel/irq_work.c:100 #5 0xffffffff8110c29d in wake_up_klogd () at kernel/printk/printk.c:2633 #6 0xffffffff8110ca60 in vprintk_emit (facility=0, level=<optimized out>, dict=0x0 <irq_stack_union>, dictlen=<optimized out>, fmt=<optimized out>, args=<optimized out>) at kernel/printk/printk.c:1778 #7 0xffffffff816010c8 in printk (fmt=<optimized out>) at kernel/printk/printk.c:1868 #8 0xffffffffc00013ea in ?? () #9 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () Mailing-list-thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/8/4/755 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 3, 2015
A recent change to the cpu_cooling code introduced a AB-BA deadlock
scenario between the cpufreq_policy_notifier_list rwsem and the
cooling_cpufreq_lock. This is caused by cooling_cpufreq_lock being held
before the registration/removal of the notifier block (an operation
which takes the rwsem), and the notifier code itself which takes the
locks in the reverse order:
======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
3.18.0+ #1453 Not tainted
-------------------------------------------------------
rc.local/770 is trying to acquire lock:
(cooling_cpufreq_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<c04abfc4>] cpufreq_thermal_notifier+0x34/0xfc
but task is already holding lock:
((cpufreq_policy_notifier_list).rwsem){++++.+}, at: [<c0042f04>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x34/0x68
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 ((cpufreq_policy_notifier_list).rwsem){++++.+}:
[<c06bc3b0>] down_write+0x44/0x9c
[<c0043444>] blocking_notifier_chain_register+0x28/0xd8
[<c04ad610>] cpufreq_register_notifier+0x68/0x90
[<c04abe4c>] __cpufreq_cooling_register.part.1+0x120/0x180
[<c04abf44>] __cpufreq_cooling_register+0x98/0xa4
[<c04abf8c>] cpufreq_cooling_register+0x18/0x1c
[<bf0046f8>] imx_thermal_probe+0x1c0/0x470 [imx_thermal]
[<c037cef8>] platform_drv_probe+0x50/0xac
[<c037b710>] driver_probe_device+0x114/0x234
[<c037b8cc>] __driver_attach+0x9c/0xa0
[<c0379d68>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5c/0x90
[<c037b204>] driver_attach+0x24/0x28
[<c037ae7c>] bus_add_driver+0xe0/0x1d8
[<c037c0cc>] driver_register+0x80/0xfc
[<c037cd80>] __platform_driver_register+0x50/0x64
[<bf007018>] 0xbf007018
[<c0008a5c>] do_one_initcall+0x88/0x1d8
[<c0095da4>] load_module+0x1768/0x1ef8
[<c0096614>] SyS_init_module+0xe0/0xf4
[<c000ec00>] ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48
-> #0 (cooling_cpufreq_lock){+.+.+.}:
[<c00619f8>] lock_acquire+0xb0/0x124
[<c06ba3b4>] mutex_lock_nested+0x5c/0x3d8
[<c04abfc4>] cpufreq_thermal_notifier+0x34/0xfc
[<c0042bf4>] notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x8c
[<c0042f20>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x68
[<c0042f58>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x20/0x28
[<c04ae62c>] cpufreq_set_policy+0x7c/0x1d0
[<c04af3cc>] store_scaling_governor+0x74/0x9c
[<c04ad418>] store+0x90/0xc0
[<c0175384>] sysfs_kf_write+0x54/0x58
[<c01746b4>] kernfs_fop_write+0xdc/0x190
[<c010dcc0>] vfs_write+0xac/0x1b4
[<c010dfec>] SyS_write+0x44/0x90
[<c000ec00>] ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock((cpufreq_policy_notifier_list).rwsem);
lock(cooling_cpufreq_lock);
lock((cpufreq_policy_notifier_list).rwsem);
lock(cooling_cpufreq_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
7 locks held by rc.local/770:
#0: (sb_writers#6){.+.+.+}, at: [<c010dda0>] vfs_write+0x18c/0x1b4
#1: (&of->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0174678>] kernfs_fop_write+0xa0/0x190
#2: (s_active#52){.+.+.+}, at: [<c0174680>] kernfs_fop_write+0xa8/0x190
#3: (cpu_hotplug.lock){++++++}, at: [<c0026a60>] get_online_cpus+0x34/0x90
#4: (cpufreq_rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<c04ad3e0>] store+0x58/0xc0
#5: (&policy->rwsem){+.+.+.}, at: [<c04ad3f8>] store+0x70/0xc0
#6: ((cpufreq_policy_notifier_list).rwsem){++++.+}, at: [<c0042f04>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x34/0x68
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 770 Comm: rc.local Not tainted 3.18.0+ #1453
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
Backtrace:
[<c00121c8>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c0012360>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c)
r6:c0b85a80 r5:c0b75630 r4:00000000 r3:00000000
[<c0012348>] (show_stack) from [<c06b6c48>] (dump_stack+0x7c/0x98)
[<c06b6bcc>] (dump_stack) from [<c06b42a4>] (print_circular_bug+0x28c/0x2d8)
r4:c0b85a80 r3:d0071d40
[<c06b4018>] (print_circular_bug) from [<c00613b0>] (__lock_acquire+0x1acc/0x1bb0)
r10:c0b50660 r8:c09e6d80 r7:d0071d40 r6:c11d0f0c r5:00000007 r4:d0072240
[<c005f8e4>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c00619f8>] (lock_acquire+0xb0/0x124)
r10:00000000 r9:c04abfc4 r8:00000000 r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:c0a06f0c
r4:00000000
[<c0061948>] (lock_acquire) from [<c06ba3b4>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x5c/0x3d8)
r10:ec853800 r9:c0a06ed4 r8:d0071d40 r7:c0a06ed4 r6:c11d0f0c r5:00000000
r4:c04abfc4
[<c06ba358>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c04abfc4>] (cpufreq_thermal_notifier+0x34/0xfc)
r10:ec853800 r9:ec85380c r8:d00d7d3c r7:c0a06ed4 r6:d00d7d3c r5:00000000
r4:fffffffe
[<c04abf90>] (cpufreq_thermal_notifier) from [<c0042bf4>] (notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x8c)
r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:00000000 r4:fffffffe
[<c0042ba8>] (notifier_call_chain) from [<c0042f20>] (__blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x68)
r8:c0a072a4 r7:00000000 r6:d00d7d3c r5:ffffffff r4:c0a06fc8 r3:ffffffff
[<c0042ed0>] (__blocking_notifier_call_chain) from [<c0042f58>] (blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x20/0x28)
r7:ec98b540 r6:c13ebc80 r5:ed76e600 r4:d00d7d3c
[<c0042f38>] (blocking_notifier_call_chain) from [<c04ae62c>] (cpufreq_set_policy+0x7c/0x1d0)
[<c04ae5b0>] (cpufreq_set_policy) from [<c04af3cc>] (store_scaling_governor+0x74/0x9c)
r7:ec98b540 r6:0000000c r5:ec98b540 r4:ed76e600
[<c04af358>] (store_scaling_governor) from [<c04ad418>] (store+0x90/0xc0)
r6:0000000c r5:ed76e6d4 r4:ed76e600
[<c04ad388>] (store) from [<c0175384>] (sysfs_kf_write+0x54/0x58)
r8:0000000c r7:d00d7f78 r6:ec98b540 r5:0000000c r4:ec853800 r3:0000000c
[<c0175330>] (sysfs_kf_write) from [<c01746b4>] (kernfs_fop_write+0xdc/0x190)
r6:ec98b540 r5:00000000 r4:00000000 r3:c0175330
[<c01745d8>] (kernfs_fop_write) from [<c010dcc0>] (vfs_write+0xac/0x1b4)
r10:0162aa70 r9:d00d6000 r8:0000000c r7:d00d7f78 r6:0162aa70 r5:0000000c
r4:eccde500
[<c010dc14>] (vfs_write) from [<c010dfec>] (SyS_write+0x44/0x90)
r10:0162aa70 r8:0000000c r7:eccde500 r6:eccde500 r5:00000000 r4:00000000
[<c010dfa8>] (SyS_write) from [<c000ec00>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
r10:00000000 r8:c000edc4 r7:00000004 r6:000216cc r5:0000000c r4:0162aa70
Solve this by moving to finer grained locking - use one mutex to protect
the cpufreq_dev_list as a whole, and a separate lock to ensure correct
ordering of cpufreq notifier registration and removal.
cooling_list_lock is taken within cooling_cpufreq_lock on
(un)registration to preserve the behavior of the code, i.e. to
atomically add/remove to the list and (un)register the notifier.
Fixes: 2dcd851 ("thermal: cpu_cooling: Update always cpufreq policy with
Reviewed-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@gmail.com>
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 9, 2015
PID: 614 TASK: ffff882a739da580 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "ocfs2dc" #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5 #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8 #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0 #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5 #6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208] RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940 RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0 RFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 000000000000654b RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDX: 00000000000017d9 RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318 RBP: ffff882ecc375d20 R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60 R9: ffff88301f272200 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffffffffff R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2] #8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2] #9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2] #10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2] torvalds#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2] torvalds#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7 torvalds#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884 assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR. Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert. system_call_fastpath -> my_chmod -> sys_chmod -> sys_fchmodat -> notify_change -> ocfs2_setattr -> posix_acl_chmod -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl -> ocfs2_set_acl -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode Here is how. 1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 1120 { 1247 ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do. .. 1258 if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) { 1259 status = posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode); 519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode) 520 { .. 539 ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); 287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ... 288 { 289 return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL); 224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle, 225 struct inode *inode, ... 231 { .. 252 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh, 253 handle, mode); 168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ... 170 { 183 if (handle == NULL) { >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<< 184 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb), 185 OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS); ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247 we unlock and at torvalds#1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX mode (it should be). How this could have happended? We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in ocfs2_setattr.torvalds#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in ocfs2_acl_set_mode.torvalds#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc). Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL) for the request. ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does, takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two. Orabug: 20189959 Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Feb 7, 2019
Song Liu reported crash in 'perf record': > #0 0x0000000000500055 in ordered_events(float, long double,...)(...) () > #1 0x0000000000500196 in ordered_events.reinit () > #2 0x00000000004fe413 in perf_session.process_events () > #3 0x0000000000440431 in cmd_record () > #4 0x00000000004a439f in run_builtin () > #5 0x000000000042b3e5 in main ()" This can happen when we get out of buffers during event processing. The subsequent ordered_events__free() call assumes oe->buffer != NULL and crashes. Add a check to prevent that. Reported-by: Song Liu <liu.song.a23@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Song Liu <liu.song.a23@gmail.com> Tested-by: Song Liu <liu.song.a23@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190117113017.12977-1-jolsa@kernel.org Fixes: d5ceb62 ("perf ordered_events: Add 'struct ordered_events_buffer' layer") Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Feb 7, 2019
Ido Schimmel says: ==================== mlxsw: Various fixes This patchset contains small fixes in mlxsw and one fix in the bridge driver. Patches #1-#4 perform small adjustments in PCI and FID code following recent tests that were performed on the Spectrum-2 ASIC. Patch #5 fixes the bridge driver to mark FDB entries that were added by user as such. Otherwise, these entries will be ignored by underlying switch drivers. Patch #6 fixes a long standing issue in mlxsw where the driver incorrectly programmed static FDB entries as both static and sticky. Patches #7-#8 add test cases for above mentioned bugs. Please consider patches #1, #2 and #4 for stable. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Feb 7, 2019
When option CONFIG_KASAN is enabled toghether with ftrace, function ftrace_graph_caller() gets in to a recursion, via functions kasan_check_read() and kasan_check_write(). Breakpoint 2, ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:179 179 mcount_get_pc x0 // function's pc (gdb) bt #0 ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:179 #1 0xffffff90101406c8 in ftrace_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:151 #2 0xffffff90106fd084 in kasan_check_write (p=0xffffffc06c170878, size=4) at ../mm/kasan/common.c:105 #3 0xffffff90104a2464 in atomic_add_return (v=<optimized out>, i=<optimized out>) at ./include/generated/atomic-instrumented.h:71 #4 atomic_inc_return (v=<optimized out>) at ./include/generated/atomic-fallback.h:284 #5 trace_graph_entry (trace=0xffffffc03f5ff380) at ../kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c:441 #6 0xffffff9010481774 in trace_graph_entry_watchdog (trace=<optimized out>) at ../kernel/trace/trace_selftest.c:741 #7 0xffffff90104a185c in function_graph_enter (ret=<optimized out>, func=<optimized out>, frame_pointer=18446743799894897728, retp=<optimized out>) at ../kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c:196 #8 0xffffff9010140628 in prepare_ftrace_return (self_addr=18446743592948977792, parent=0xffffffc03f5ff418, frame_pointer=18446743799894897728) at ../arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c:231 #9 0xffffff90101406f4 in ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:182 Backtrace stopped: previous frame identical to this frame (corrupt stack?) (gdb) Rework so that the kasan implementation isn't traced. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181212183447.15890-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 15, 2019
In case a user process using xenbus has open transactions and is killed e.g. via ctrl-C the following cleanup of the allocated resources might result in a deadlock due to trying to end a transaction in the xenbus worker thread: [ 2551.474706] INFO: task xenbus:37 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 2551.492215] Tainted: P OE 5.0.0-29-generic #5 [ 2551.510263] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 2551.528585] xenbus D 0 37 2 0x80000080 [ 2551.528590] Call Trace: [ 2551.528603] __schedule+0x2c0/0x870 [ 2551.528606] ? _cond_resched+0x19/0x40 [ 2551.528632] schedule+0x2c/0x70 [ 2551.528637] xs_talkv+0x1ec/0x2b0 [ 2551.528642] ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80 [ 2551.528645] xs_single+0x53/0x80 [ 2551.528648] xenbus_transaction_end+0x3b/0x70 [ 2551.528651] xenbus_file_free+0x5a/0x160 [ 2551.528654] xenbus_dev_queue_reply+0xc4/0x220 [ 2551.528657] xenbus_thread+0x7de/0x880 [ 2551.528660] ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80 [ 2551.528665] kthread+0x121/0x140 [ 2551.528667] ? xb_read+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 2551.528670] ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 [ 2551.528673] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Fix this by doing the cleanup via a workqueue instead. Reported-by: James Dingwall <james@dingwall.me.uk> Fixes: fd8aa90 ("xen: optimize xenbus driver for multiple concurrent xenstore accesses") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.11 Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 4, 2020
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize could be accessed concurrently as noticed by KCSAN, BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ext4_write_end [ext4] / ext4_writepages [ext4] write to 0xffff91c6713b00f8 of 8 bytes by task 49268 on cpu 127: ext4_write_end+0x4e3/0x750 [ext4] ext4_update_i_disksize at fs/ext4/ext4.h:3032 (inlined by) ext4_update_inode_size at fs/ext4/ext4.h:3046 (inlined by) ext4_write_end at fs/ext4/inode.c:1287 generic_perform_write+0x208/0x2a0 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x11f/0x210 [ext4] ext4_file_write_iter+0xce/0x9e0 [ext4] new_sync_write+0x29c/0x3b0 __vfs_write+0x92/0xa0 vfs_write+0x103/0x260 ksys_write+0x9d/0x130 __x64_sys_write+0x4c/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe read to 0xffff91c6713b00f8 of 8 bytes by task 24872 on cpu 37: ext4_writepages+0x10ac/0x1d00 [ext4] mpage_map_and_submit_extent at fs/ext4/inode.c:2468 (inlined by) ext4_writepages at fs/ext4/inode.c:2772 do_writepages+0x5e/0x130 __writeback_single_inode+0xeb/0xb20 writeback_sb_inodes+0x429/0x900 __writeback_inodes_wb+0xc4/0x150 wb_writeback+0x4bd/0x870 wb_workfn+0x6b4/0x960 process_one_work+0x54c/0xbe0 worker_thread+0x80/0x650 kthread+0x1e0/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 37 PID: 24872 Comm: kworker/u261:2 Tainted: G W O L 5.5.0-next-20200204+ #5 Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 07/10/2019 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0) Since only the read is operating as lockless (outside of the "i_data_sem"), load tearing could introduce a logic bug. Fix it by adding READ_ONCE() for the read and WRITE_ONCE() for the write. Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1581085751-31793-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Feb 8, 2021
This effectively reverts commit d5c8238 ("btrfs: convert data_seqcount to seqcount_mutex_t"). While running fstests on 32 bits test box, many tests failed because of warnings in dmesg. One of those warnings (btrfs/003): [66.441317] WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 9251 at include/linux/seqlock.h:279 btrfs_remove_chunk+0x58b/0x7b0 [btrfs] [66.441446] CPU: 6 PID: 9251 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G O 5.11.0-rc4-custom+ #5 [66.441449] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ArchLinux 1.14.0-1 04/01/2014 [66.441451] EIP: btrfs_remove_chunk+0x58b/0x7b0 [btrfs] [66.441472] EAX: 00000000 EBX: 00000001 ECX: c576070c EDX: c6b15803 [66.441475] ESI: 10000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: c56fbcfc ESP: c56fbc70 [66.441477] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010246 [66.441481] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 05c8da20 CR3: 04b20000 CR4: 00350ed0 [66.441485] Call Trace: [66.441510] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0xb1/0x100 [btrfs] [66.441529] ? btrfs_lookup_block_group+0x17/0x20 [btrfs] [66.441562] btrfs_balance+0x8ed/0x13b0 [btrfs] [66.441586] ? btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x333/0x3c0 [btrfs] [66.441619] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0xf/0x11 [66.441643] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x333/0x3c0 [btrfs] [66.441664] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30 [btrfs] [66.441683] btrfs_ioctl+0x414/0x2ae0 [btrfs] [66.441700] ? __lock_acquire+0x35f/0x2650 [66.441717] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x87/0x120 [66.441720] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xd0/0x1e0 [66.441724] ? call_rcu+0x2d3/0x530 [66.441731] ? __might_fault+0x41/0x90 [66.441736] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x15/0x50 [66.441740] ? sched_clock+0x8/0x10 [66.441745] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x13/0x180 [66.441750] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30 [btrfs] [66.441750] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30 [btrfs] [66.441768] __ia32_sys_ioctl+0x165/0x8a0 [66.441773] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0xf/0x11 [66.441785] ? __might_fault+0x89/0x90 [66.441791] __do_fast_syscall_32+0x54/0x80 [66.441796] do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x70 [66.441801] do_SYSENTER_32+0x15/0x20 [66.441805] entry_SYSENTER_32+0x9f/0xf2 [66.441808] EIP: 0xab7b5549 [66.441814] EAX: ffffffda EBX: 00000003 ECX: c4009420 EDX: bfa91f5c [66.441816] ESI: 00000003 EDI: 00000001 EBP: 00000000 ESP: bfa91e98 [66.441818] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b EFLAGS: 00000292 [66.441833] irq event stamp: 42579 [66.441835] hardirqs last enabled at (42585): [<c60eb065>] console_unlock+0x495/0x590 [66.441838] hardirqs last disabled at (42590): [<c60eafd5>] console_unlock+0x405/0x590 [66.441840] softirqs last enabled at (41698): [<c601b76c>] call_on_stack+0x1c/0x60 [66.441843] softirqs last disabled at (41681): [<c601b76c>] call_on_stack+0x1c/0x60 ======================================================================== btrfs_remove_chunk+0x58b/0x7b0: __seqprop_mutex_assert at linux/./include/linux/seqlock.h:279 (inlined by) btrfs_device_set_bytes_used at linux/fs/btrfs/volumes.h:212 (inlined by) btrfs_remove_chunk at linux/fs/btrfs/volumes.c:2994 ======================================================================== The warning is produced by lockdep_assert_held() in __seqprop_mutex_assert() if CONFIG_LOCKDEP is enabled. And "olumes.c:2994 is btrfs_device_set_bytes_used() with mutex lock fs_info->chunk_mutex held already. After adding some debug prints, the cause was found that many __alloc_device() are called with NULL @fs_info (during scanning ioctl). Inside the function, btrfs_device_data_ordered_init() is expanded to seqcount_mutex_init(). In this scenario, its second parameter info->chunk_mutex is &NULL->chunk_mutex which equals to offsetof(struct btrfs_fs_info, chunk_mutex) unexpectedly. Thus, seqcount_mutex_init() is called in wrong way. And later btrfs_device_get/set helpers trigger lockdep warnings. The device and filesystem object lifetimes are different and we'd have to synchronize initialization of the btrfs_device::data_seqcount with the fs_info, possibly using some additional synchronization. It would still not prevent concurrent access to the seqcount lock when it's used for read and initialization. Commit d5c8238 ("btrfs: convert data_seqcount to seqcount_mutex_t") does not mention a particular problem being fixed so revert should not cause any harm and we'll get the lockdep warning fixed. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210139 Reported-by: Erhard F <erhard_f@mailbox.org> Fixes: d5c8238 ("btrfs: convert data_seqcount to seqcount_mutex_t") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10 CC: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Su Yue <l@damenly.su> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Feb 8, 2021
…ressing Fix an issue where dump stack is printed and Reset Adapter occurs when PSE0 GbE or/and PSE1 GbE is/are enabled. EHL PSE0 GbE and PSE1 GbE use 32 bits DMA addressing whereas EHL PCH GbE uses 64 bits DMA addressing. [ 25.535095] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 25.540276] NETDEV WATCHDOG: enp0s29f2 (intel-eth-pci): transmit queue 2 timed out [ 25.548749] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at net/sched/sch_generic.c:443 dev_watchdog+0x259/0x260 [ 25.558004] Modules linked in: 8021q bnep bluetooth ecryptfs snd_hda_codec_hdmi intel_gpy marvell intel_ishtp_loader intel_ishtp_hid iTCO_wdt mei_hdcp iTCO_vendor_support x86_pkg_temp_thermal kvm_intel dwmac_intel stmmac kvm igb pcs_xpcs irqbypass phylink snd_hda_intel intel_rapl_msr pcspkr dca snd_hda_codec i915 i2c_i801 i2c_smbus libphy intel_ish_ipc snd_hda_core mei_me intel_ishtp mei spi_dw_pci 8250_lpss spi_dw thermal dw_dmac_core parport_pc tpm_crb tpm_tis parport tpm_tis_core tpm intel_pmc_core sch_fq_codel uhid fuse configfs snd_sof_pci snd_sof_intel_byt snd_sof_intel_ipc snd_sof_intel_hda_common snd_sof_xtensa_dsp snd_sof snd_soc_acpi_intel_match snd_soc_acpi snd_intel_dspcfg ledtrig_audio snd_soc_core snd_compress ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore [ 25.633795] CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Tainted: G U 5.11.0-rc4-intel-lts-MISMAIL5+ #5 [ 25.644306] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Elkhart Lake Embedded Platform/ElkhartLake LPDDR4x T4 RVP1, BIOS EHLSFWI1.R00.2434.A00.2010231402 10/23/2020 [ 25.659674] RIP: 0010:dev_watchdog+0x259/0x260 [ 25.664650] Code: e8 3b 6b 60 ff eb 98 4c 89 ef c6 05 ec e7 bf 00 01 e8 fb e5 fa ff 89 d9 4c 89 ee 48 c7 c7 78 31 d2 9e 48 89 c2 e8 79 1b 18 00 <0f> 0b e9 77 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 48 c7 [ 25.685647] RSP: 0018:ffffb7ca80160eb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 25.691498] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000103 [ 25.699483] RDX: 0000000080000103 RSI: 00000000000000f6 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 25.707465] RBP: ffff985709ce0440 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffffefff [ 25.715455] R10: ffffb7ca80160cf0 R11: ffffb7ca80160ce8 R12: ffff985709ce039c [ 25.723438] R13: ffff985709ce0000 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: ffff9857068af940 [ 25.731425] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff985864300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 25.740481] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 25.746913] CR2: 00005567f8bb76b8 CR3: 00000001f8e0a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 25.754900] Call Trace: [ 25.757631] <IRQ> [ 25.759891] ? qdisc_put_unlocked+0x30/0x30 [ 25.764565] ? qdisc_put_unlocked+0x30/0x30 [ 25.769245] call_timer_fn+0x2e/0x140 [ 25.773346] run_timer_softirq+0x1f3/0x430 [ 25.777932] ? __hrtimer_run_queues+0x12c/0x2c0 [ 25.783005] ? ktime_get+0x3e/0xa0 [ 25.786812] __do_softirq+0xa6/0x2ef [ 25.790816] asm_call_irq_on_stack+0xf/0x20 [ 25.795501] </IRQ> [ 25.797852] do_softirq_own_stack+0x5d/0x80 [ 25.802538] irq_exit_rcu+0x94/0xb0 [ 25.806475] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x42/0xc0 [ 25.811836] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 [ 25.817586] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xd9/0x370 [ 25.823142] Code: 85 c0 0f 8f 0a 02 00 00 31 ff e8 22 d5 7e ff 45 84 ff 74 12 9c 58 f6 c4 02 0f 85 47 02 00 00 31 ff e8 7b a0 84 ff fb 45 85 f6 <0f> 88 ab 00 00 00 49 63 ce 48 2b 2c 24 48 89 c8 48 6b d1 68 48 c1 [ 25.844140] RSP: 0018:ffffb7ca800f7e80 EFLAGS: 00000206 [ 25.849996] RAX: ffff985864300000 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 000000000000001f [ 25.857975] RDX: 00000005f2028ea8 RSI: ffffffff9ec5907f RDI: ffffffff9ec62a5d [ 25.865961] RBP: 00000005f2028ea8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000029d00 [ 25.873947] R10: 000000137b0e0508 R11: ffff9858643294e4 R12: ffff9858643336d0 [ 25.881935] R13: ffffffff9ef74b00 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 25.889918] cpuidle_enter+0x29/0x40 [ 25.893922] do_idle+0x24a/0x290 [ 25.897536] cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20 [ 25.901930] start_secondary+0x128/0x160 [ 25.906326] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xb0/0xbb [ 25.911983] ---[ end trace b4c0c8195d0ba61f ]--- [ 25.917193] intel-eth-pci 0000:00:1d.2 enp0s29f2: Reset adapter. Fixes: 67c08ac ("net: stmmac: add EHL PSE0 & PSE1 1Gbps PCI info and PCI ID") Signed-off-by: Voon Weifeng <weifeng.voon@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Mohammad Athari Bin Ismail <mohammad.athari.ismail@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mohammad Athari Bin Ismail <mohammad.athari.ismail@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210126100844.30326-1-mohammad.athari.ismail@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 24, 2021
…xtent When cloning an inline extent there are a few cases, such as when we have an implicit hole at file offset 0, where we start a transaction while holding a read lock on a leaf. Starting the transaction results in a call to sb_start_intwrite(), which results in doing a read lock on a percpu semaphore. Lockdep doesn't like this and complains about it: [46.580704] ====================================================== [46.580752] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [46.580799] 5.13.0-rc1 torvalds#28 Not tainted [46.580832] ------------------------------------------------------ [46.580877] cloner/3835 is trying to acquire lock: [46.580918] c00000001301d638 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: clone_copy_inline_extent+0xe4/0x5a0 [46.581167] [46.581167] but task is already holding lock: [46.581217] c000000007fa2550 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x70/0x1d0 [46.581293] [46.581293] which lock already depends on the new lock. [46.581293] [46.581351] [46.581351] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [46.581410] [46.581410] -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}: [46.581464] down_read_nested+0x68/0x200 [46.581536] __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x70/0x1d0 [46.581577] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x88/0x200 [46.581623] btrfs_search_slot+0x298/0xb70 [46.581665] btrfs_set_inode_index+0xfc/0x260 [46.581708] btrfs_new_inode+0x26c/0x950 [46.581749] btrfs_create+0xf4/0x2b0 [46.581782] lookup_open.isra.57+0x55c/0x6a0 [46.581855] path_openat+0x418/0xd20 [46.581888] do_filp_open+0x9c/0x130 [46.581920] do_sys_openat2+0x2ec/0x430 [46.581961] do_sys_open+0x90/0xc0 [46.581993] system_call_exception+0x3d4/0x410 [46.582037] system_call_common+0xec/0x278 [46.582078] [46.582078] -> #0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}: [46.582135] __lock_acquire+0x1e90/0x2c50 [46.582176] lock_acquire+0x2b4/0x5b0 [46.582263] start_transaction+0x3cc/0x950 [46.582308] clone_copy_inline_extent+0xe4/0x5a0 [46.582353] btrfs_clone+0x5fc/0x880 [46.582388] btrfs_clone_files+0xd8/0x1c0 [46.582434] btrfs_remap_file_range+0x3d8/0x590 [46.582481] do_clone_file_range+0x10c/0x270 [46.582558] vfs_clone_file_range+0x1b0/0x310 [46.582605] ioctl_file_clone+0x90/0x130 [46.582651] do_vfs_ioctl+0x874/0x1ac0 [46.582697] sys_ioctl+0x6c/0x120 [46.582733] system_call_exception+0x3d4/0x410 [46.582777] system_call_common+0xec/0x278 [46.582822] [46.582822] other info that might help us debug this: [46.582822] [46.582888] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [46.582888] [46.582942] CPU0 CPU1 [46.582984] ---- ---- [46.583028] lock(btrfs-tree-00); [46.583062] lock(sb_internal#2); [46.583119] lock(btrfs-tree-00); [46.583174] lock(sb_internal#2); [46.583212] [46.583212] *** DEADLOCK *** [46.583212] [46.583266] 6 locks held by cloner/3835: [46.583299] #0: c00000001301d448 (sb_writers#12){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ioctl_file_clone+0x90/0x130 [46.583382] #1: c00000000f6d3768 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#15){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_two_nondirectories+0x58/0xc0 [46.583477] #2: c00000000f6d72a8 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#15/4){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_two_nondirectories+0x9c/0xc0 [46.583574] #3: c00000000f6d7138 (&ei->i_mmap_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_remap_file_range+0xd0/0x590 [46.583657] #4: c00000000f6d35f8 (&ei->i_mmap_lock/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_remap_file_range+0xe0/0x590 [46.583743] #5: c000000007fa2550 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x70/0x1d0 [46.583828] [46.583828] stack backtrace: [46.583872] CPU: 1 PID: 3835 Comm: cloner Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1 torvalds#28 [46.583931] Call Trace: [46.583955] [c0000000167c7200] [c000000000c1ee78] dump_stack+0xec/0x144 (unreliable) [46.584052] [c0000000167c7240] [c000000000274058] print_circular_bug.isra.32+0x3a8/0x400 [46.584123] [c0000000167c72e0] [c0000000002741f4] check_noncircular+0x144/0x190 [46.584191] [c0000000167c73b0] [c000000000278fc0] __lock_acquire+0x1e90/0x2c50 [46.584259] [c0000000167c74f0] [c00000000027aa94] lock_acquire+0x2b4/0x5b0 [46.584317] [c0000000167c75e0] [c000000000a0d6cc] start_transaction+0x3cc/0x950 [46.584388] [c0000000167c7690] [c000000000af47a4] clone_copy_inline_extent+0xe4/0x5a0 [46.584457] [c0000000167c77c0] [c000000000af525c] btrfs_clone+0x5fc/0x880 [46.584514] [c0000000167c7990] [c000000000af5698] btrfs_clone_files+0xd8/0x1c0 [46.584583] [c0000000167c7a00] [c000000000af5b58] btrfs_remap_file_range+0x3d8/0x590 [46.584652] [c0000000167c7ae0] [c0000000005d81dc] do_clone_file_range+0x10c/0x270 [46.584722] [c0000000167c7b40] [c0000000005d84f0] vfs_clone_file_range+0x1b0/0x310 [46.584793] [c0000000167c7bb0] [c00000000058bf80] ioctl_file_clone+0x90/0x130 [46.584861] [c0000000167c7c10] [c00000000058c894] do_vfs_ioctl+0x874/0x1ac0 [46.584922] [c0000000167c7d10] [c00000000058db4c] sys_ioctl+0x6c/0x120 [46.584978] [c0000000167c7d60] [c0000000000364a4] system_call_exception+0x3d4/0x410 [46.585046] [c0000000167c7e10] [c00000000000d45c] system_call_common+0xec/0x278 [46.585114] --- interrupt: c00 at 0x7ffff7e22990 [46.585160] NIP: 00007ffff7e22990 LR: 00000001000010ec CTR: 0000000000000000 [46.585224] REGS: c0000000167c7e80 TRAP: 0c00 Not tainted (5.13.0-rc1) [46.585280] MSR: 800000000280f033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28000244 XER: 00000000 [46.585374] IRQMASK: 0 [46.585374] GPR00: 0000000000000036 00007fffffffdec0 00007ffff7f17100 0000000000000004 [46.585374] GPR04: 000000008020940d 00007fffffffdf40 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [46.585374] GPR08: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [46.585374] GPR12: 0000000000000000 00007ffff7ffa940 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [46.585374] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [46.585374] GPR20: 0000000000000000 000000009123683e 00007fffffffdf40 0000000000000000 [46.585374] GPR24: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000004 [46.585374] GPR28: 0000000100030260 0000000100030280 0000000000000003 000000000000005f [46.585919] NIP [00007ffff7e22990] 0x7ffff7e22990 [46.585964] LR [00000001000010ec] 0x1000010ec [46.586010] --- interrupt: c00 This should be a false positive, as both locks are acquired in read mode. Nevertheless, we don't need to hold a leaf locked when we start the transaction, so just release the leaf (path) before starting it. Reported-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20210513214404.xks77p566fglzgum@riteshh-domain/ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 21, 2021
Fix crash with illegal operation exception in dasd_device_tasklet. Commit b729493 ("s390/dasd: Prepare for additional path event handling") renamed the verify_path function for ECKD but not for FBA and DIAG. This leads to a panic when the path verification function is called for a FBA or DIAG device. Fix by defining a wrapper function for dasd_generic_verify_path(). Fixes: b729493 ("s390/dasd: Prepare for additional path event handling") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #5.11 Reviewed-by: Jan Hoeppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210525125006.157531-2-sth@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 21, 2021
ASan reported a memory leak caused by info_linear not being deallocated.
The info_linear was allocated during in perf_event__synthesize_one_bpf_prog().
This patch adds the corresponding free() when bpf_prog_info_node
is freed in perf_env__purge_bpf().
$ sudo ./perf record -- sleep 5
[ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
[ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.025 MB perf.data (8 samples) ]
=================================================================
==297735==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 7688 byte(s) in 19 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x4f420f in malloc (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x4f420f)
#1 0xc06a74 in bpf_program__get_prog_info_linear /home/user/linux/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c:11113:16
#2 0xb426fe in perf_event__synthesize_one_bpf_prog /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c:191:16
#3 0xb42008 in perf_event__synthesize_bpf_events /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c:410:9
#4 0x594596 in record__synthesize /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1490:8
#5 0x58c9ac in __cmd_record /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:1798:8
#6 0x58990b in cmd_record /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-record.c:2901:8
#7 0x7b2a20 in run_builtin /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
#8 0x7b12ff in handle_internal_command /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
#9 0x7b2583 in run_argv /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
#10 0x7b0d79 in main /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539:3
torvalds#11 0x7fa357ef6b74 in __libc_start_main /usr/src/debug/glibc-2.33-8.fc34.x86_64/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:332:16
Signed-off-by: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210602224024.300485-1-rickyman7@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 21, 2021
Function mlx5e_rep_neigh_update() wasn't updated to accommodate rtnl lock removal from TC filter update path and properly handle concurrent encap entry insertion/deletion which can lead to following use-after-free: [23827.464923] ================================================================== [23827.469446] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.470971] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881d132228c by task kworker/u20:6/21635 [23827.472251] [23827.472615] CPU: 9 PID: 21635 Comm: kworker/u20:6 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3+ #5 [23827.473788] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [23827.475639] Workqueue: mlx5e mlx5e_rep_neigh_update [mlx5_core] [23827.476731] Call Trace: [23827.477260] dump_stack+0xbb/0x107 [23827.477906] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x140 [23827.478896] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.479879] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.480905] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 [23827.481701] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.482744] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0 [23827.493112] mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.494054] ? mlx5e_tc_tun_encap_info_equal_generic+0x140/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.495296] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update+0x41e/0x5e0 [mlx5_core] [23827.496338] ? mlx5e_rep_neigh_entry_release+0xb80/0xb80 [mlx5_core] [23827.497486] ? read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20 [23827.498250] ? strscpy+0xa0/0x2a0 [23827.498889] process_one_work+0x8ac/0x14e0 [23827.499638] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 [23827.500537] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x2c0/0x2c0 [23827.501359] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 [23827.502116] worker_thread+0x53b/0x1220 [23827.502831] ? process_one_work+0x14e0/0x14e0 [23827.503627] kthread+0x328/0x3f0 [23827.504254] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40 [23827.505065] ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x90/0x90 [23827.505912] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [23827.506621] [23827.506987] Allocated by task 28248: [23827.507694] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [23827.508476] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90 [23827.509197] mlx5e_attach_encap+0xde1/0x1d40 [mlx5_core] [23827.510194] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow+0x397/0xc40 [mlx5_core] [23827.511218] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x519/0xb30 [mlx5_core] [23827.512234] mlx5e_configure_flower+0x191c/0x4870 [mlx5_core] [23827.513298] tc_setup_cb_add+0x1d5/0x420 [23827.514023] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x382/0x6a0 [cls_flower] [23827.514975] fl_change+0x2ceb/0x4a51 [cls_flower] [23827.515821] tc_new_tfilter+0x89a/0x2070 [23827.516548] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x644/0x8c0 [23827.517300] netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x340 [23827.518021] netlink_unicast+0x42b/0x700 [23827.518742] netlink_sendmsg+0x743/0xc20 [23827.519467] sock_sendmsg+0xb2/0xe0 [23827.520131] ____sys_sendmsg+0x590/0x770 [23827.520851] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x160 [23827.521552] __sys_sendmsg+0xb7/0x140 [23827.522238] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x70 [23827.522907] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [23827.523797] [23827.524163] Freed by task 25948: [23827.524780] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [23827.525488] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 [23827.526187] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 [23827.526968] __kasan_slab_free+0xed/0x130 [23827.527709] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xcf/0x1d0 [23827.528528] kmem_cache_free_bulk+0x33a/0x6e0 [23827.529317] kfree_rcu_work+0x55f/0xb70 [23827.530024] process_one_work+0x8ac/0x14e0 [23827.530770] worker_thread+0x53b/0x1220 [23827.531480] kthread+0x328/0x3f0 [23827.532114] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [23827.532785] [23827.533147] Last potentially related work creation: [23827.534007] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [23827.534710] kasan_record_aux_stack+0xab/0xc0 [23827.535492] kvfree_call_rcu+0x31/0x7b0 [23827.536206] mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0x577/0xef0 [mlx5_core] [23827.537305] mlx5e_flow_put+0x49/0x80 [mlx5_core] [23827.538290] mlx5e_delete_flower+0x6d1/0xe60 [mlx5_core] [23827.539300] tc_setup_cb_destroy+0x18e/0x2f0 [23827.540144] fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x1d2/0x310 [cls_flower] [23827.541148] __fl_delete+0x4dc/0x660 [cls_flower] [23827.541985] fl_delete+0x97/0x160 [cls_flower] [23827.542782] tc_del_tfilter+0x7ab/0x13d0 [23827.543503] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x644/0x8c0 [23827.544257] netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x340 [23827.544981] netlink_unicast+0x42b/0x700 [23827.545700] netlink_sendmsg+0x743/0xc20 [23827.546424] sock_sendmsg+0xb2/0xe0 [23827.547084] ____sys_sendmsg+0x590/0x770 [23827.547850] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x160 [23827.548606] __sys_sendmsg+0xb7/0x140 [23827.549303] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x70 [23827.549969] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [23827.550853] [23827.551217] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881d1322200 [23827.551217] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 [23827.553341] The buggy address is located 140 bytes inside of [23827.553341] 256-byte region [ffff8881d1322200, ffff8881d1322300) [23827.555747] The buggy address belongs to the page: [23827.556847] page:00000000898762aa refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1d1320 [23827.558651] head:00000000898762aa order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [23827.559961] flags: 0x2ffff800010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) [23827.561243] raw: 002ffff800010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888100042b40 [23827.562653] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [23827.564112] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [23827.565439] [23827.565932] Memory state around the buggy address: [23827.566917] ffff8881d1322180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [23827.568485] ffff8881d1322200: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [23827.569818] >ffff8881d1322280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [23827.571143] ^ [23827.571879] ffff8881d1322300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [23827.573283] ffff8881d1322380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [23827.574654] ================================================================== Most of the necessary logic is already correctly implemented by mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap() helper that is used in neigh stats update handler. Make the handler generic by renaming it to mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap() and use callback to test whether flow is matching instead of hardcoded check for 'valid' flag value. Implement mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap() by calling mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap() with callback that tests encap MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID flag. Implement new mlx5e_get_next_init_encap() helper by calling mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap() with callback that tests encap completion result to be non-error and use it in mlx5e_rep_neigh_update() to safely iterate over nhe->encap_list. Remove encap completion logic from mlx5e_rep_update_flows() since the encap entries passed to this function are already guaranteed to be properly initialized by similar code in mlx5e_get_next_init_encap(). Fixes: 2a1f176 ("net/mlx5e: Refactor neigh update for concurrent execution") Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
mpe
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 20, 2024
Disable strict aliasing, as has been done in the kernel proper for decades
(literally since before git history) to fix issues where gcc will optimize
away loads in code that looks 100% correct, but is _technically_ undefined
behavior, and thus can be thrown away by the compiler.
E.g. arm64's vPMU counter access test casts a uint64_t (unsigned long)
pointer to a u64 (unsigned long long) pointer when setting PMCR.N via
u64p_replace_bits(), which gcc-13 detects and optimizes away, i.e. ignores
the result and uses the original PMCR.
The issue is most easily observed by making set_pmcr_n() noinline and
wrapping the call with printf(), e.g. sans comments, for this code:
printf("orig = %lx, next = %lx, want = %lu\n", pmcr_orig, pmcr, pmcr_n);
set_pmcr_n(&pmcr, pmcr_n);
printf("orig = %lx, next = %lx, want = %lu\n", pmcr_orig, pmcr, pmcr_n);
gcc-13 generates:
0000000000401c90 <set_pmcr_n>:
401c90: f9400002 ldr x2, [x0]
401c94: b3751022 bfi x2, x1, torvalds#11, #5
401c98: f9000002 str x2, [x0]
401c9c: d65f03c0 ret
0000000000402660 <test_create_vpmu_vm_with_pmcr_n>:
402724: aa1403e3 mov x3, x20
402728: aa1503e2 mov x2, x21
40272c: aa1603e0 mov x0, x22
402730: aa1503e1 mov x1, x21
402734: 940060ff bl 41ab30 <_IO_printf>
402738: aa1403e1 mov x1, x20
40273c: 910183e0 add x0, sp, #0x60
402740: 97fffd54 bl 401c90 <set_pmcr_n>
402744: aa1403e3 mov x3, x20
402748: aa1503e2 mov x2, x21
40274c: aa1503e1 mov x1, x21
402750: aa1603e0 mov x0, x22
402754: 940060f bl 41ab30 <_IO_printf>
with the value stored in [sp + 0x60] ignored by both printf() above and
in the test proper, resulting in a false failure due to vcpu_set_reg()
simply storing the original value, not the intended value.
$ ./vpmu_counter_access
Random seed: 0x6b8b4567
orig = 3040, next = 3040, want = 0
orig = 3040, next = 3040, want = 0
==== Test Assertion Failure ====
aarch64/vpmu_counter_access.c:505: pmcr_n == get_pmcr_n(pmcr)
pid=71578 tid=71578 errno=9 - Bad file descriptor
1 0x400673: run_access_test at vpmu_counter_access.c:522
2 (inlined by) main at vpmu_counter_access.c:643
3 0x4132d7: __libc_start_call_main at libc-start.o:0
4 0x413653: __libc_start_main at ??:0
5 0x40106f: _start at ??:0
Failed to update PMCR.N to 0 (received: 6)
Somewhat bizarrely, gcc-11 also exhibits the same behavior, but only if
set_pmcr_n() is marked noinline, whereas gcc-13 fails even if set_pmcr_n()
is inlined in its sole caller.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=116912
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
No description provided.